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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis was to examine the possibility that sub-mechanisms of Short-
Term or Working Memory (WM) can be selectively affected by task variables such as 
processing requirements, or situational variables such as positive or negative mood. 
The model ofWM, developed by Baddeley and colleagues (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974; 
Baddeley, 2000) was taken as the basis for conceptualising the componential 
architecture of WM. It is proposed that individual WM components, i.e. the executive 
attention component, the verbal and the spatial storage components, could be 
systematically modulated by emotions. 
The fIrst 2 studies investigate the differential involvement of the Central Executive 
component in tasks that have been reported to be differentially affected by mood. It 
has been argued that analytical tasks make greater demands on the Central Executive 
(CE) and therefore alternative demands on the CE will disrupt such tasks. The 
detrimental effect of positive mood on analytical tasks is due to the disruptive effect of 
this type of mood on CE function. Using a dual-task paradigm, it was demonstrated 
that an analytical reasoning task was more disrupted by a concurrent WM task than 
was a creative task, i.e. a demonstration that the CE is more involved in analytical 
tasks. Measures of brain electrical potentials demonstrated a parallel effect at the 
cortical level. 
The following studies examined other WM components, the verbal and spatial "slave" 
mechanisms and the possibility that they may be differentially modulated by emotion. 
Recent behavioural, psychophysiological and neuroimaging evidence suggests that 
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spatia~ but not verbal, WM system is largely reliant on visual attention. It has also 
been shown that certain emotions, i.e. anxiety or fear, may be intrinsically associated 
with visual attention. On the basis of this overlap, it was predicted that induced 
anxiety/ fear would selectively modulate spatial WM, with little effect on verbal WM 
performance. An n-back task allowing of fine-grained dissociation of verbal and 
spatial WM was developed and three studies examined the effects of threat of shock 
on verbal and spatial n-back WM performance. The studies confirmed the prediction, 
showing that spatial WM performance was impaired in conditions of threat, while 
verbal WM performance remained unchanged. A number of analyses emphasised the 
relationship between anxiety and the decrement in spatial n-back performance. The 
presence of anxiety was objectively validated via physiological recordings. 
The literature contains suggestions that, in contrast to the selective disruption of spatial 
WM in threat-anxiety observed in our studies, trait and test anxiety tend to affect 
verbal WM more than spatial WM. Therefore, in a subsequent study verbal and spatial 
n-back WM performance was contrasted in high vs. low trait anxiety individuals. It 
was found that verbal and spatial WM were not differentially disrupted in individuals 
high with trait anxiety. 
The final study aimed to determine whether interhemispheric asymmetry models in 
emotion and WM could serve as a neuroanatomical explanation of the selective effect 
of anxiety on spatial WM. The study employed neuroimaging technology to compare 
the activation of regions of the frontal cortex in the two hemispheres in the verbal and 
spatial n-back tasks employed earlier. The anatomical regions of interest were chosen 
on the basis ofneuroanatomical models ofbrain laterality in emotion. The results do 
XIII 
not contain reliable patterns of frontallateralization. Hence, they provide little support 
to laterality-based accounts of the interaction between spatial WM and anxiety. 
These fmdings support the hypothesis that WM components can be selectively 
modulated by factors such as affective state. They also suggest that attentional-
executive mechanisms may not be fully distinct from the storage systems, as claimed 
in the original characterisation ofWM. 
XIV 
Outline of the organisation of the thesis 
The present thesis attempts to examine specific influences of emotional states on 
affectively-neutral Working Memory (WM) processing. A reliable association is 
sought between the cognitive sub-mechanisms of particular emotional states on the 
one hand, and components ofWM, i.e. Central Executive, verbal WM and spatial WM 
processes (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974) on the other hand. 
The thesis comprises four parts, each of which contains several chapters which, in 
their turn, are divided into sections. 
Part 1: Introduction provides a background on the main trends in the research on 
effects of emotion on cognitive processing (Chapter 1). In Chapter 2 there is a 
discussion of the choice ofthe cognitive process investigated here (WM) and 
information-processing and neurobiological models ofWM are introduced. Finally, 
there is a critical examination of the extant literature on the effects of emotional states 
or traits on individual WM components. 
Part 2: Effects of positive emotion on analytical and creative tasks: a Central 
Executive account focuses on one of the relatively few reports of differential effects 
of emotion on cognitive tasks. Positive mood seems to facilitate creative problem-
solving, but disrupt analytical performance (Chapter 3). It has been proposed 
(Oaksford et aI., 1996) that this difference is due to differential involvement of a WM 
component- the Central Executive (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974) in the two types of 
tasks. This perspective is consistent with biologically-founded models of the influence 
xv 
of positive mood upon cognition (Ashby et aI., 1999) and biologically plausible 
computational models ofWM (O'Reilly et at, 2000) (Chapter 4). Although the studies 
reported in Part 2 (Chapters 6 and 7) did not manipUlate emotion, they directly tested 
one of the core assumptions of the Central Executive/WM account of differential 
effects of positive mood on creative vs. analytical tasks, namely that the two kinds of 
tasks make different demands on the Central Executive. Our studies investigated this 
assumption at both the behavioural and electrophysiologicallevels. Finally, the 
limitations related to the use of complex cognitive tasks are also discussed. 
Part 3: Effects of anxiety on verbal and spatial WM examines the ways in which 
other WM components, i.e. the "slave-systems" (verbal WM and spatial WM) can be 
differentially influenced by certain emotions. In particular, on the basis of several 
corpora of studies, it is hypothesised that intense anxiety (fear) can have a selective 
impact on spatial WM (Chapter 8). It is aimed to probe this hypothesis by using verbal 
and spatial WM tasks, which are more transparent than complex cognitive tasks (e.g. 
insight and reasoning tasks) in terms of the recruited cognitive mechanisms (Chapter 
9). The employed verbal and spatial (n-back) WM tasks are rigorously piloted 
(Chapter 10). Finally, the hypothesis of selective effects of acute anxiety on spatial 
WM is experimentally tested (Chapters 11 and 12) in paradigms that involve anxiety 
elicitation by means of threat-of-shock and physiological recordings as objective 
methods for establishing the presence of anxiety (Chapter 9). 
Part 4: Threat and spatial WM: the generality of the effect and its neuroanatomical 
correlates is devoted to further explorations of the association between anxiety and 
spatial WM, revealed in the studies reported in Part 3. Two investigations are 
XVI 
presented. One aims to establish whether less acute forms of anxiety (e.g. test-anxiety) 
parallel threat-evoked anxiety (fear) in its differential effects on verbal and spatial WM 
(Chapter 13). The second investigation aims to establish whether selective impact of 
anxiety on spatial WM can be explained at the neuroanatomicallevel by models of 
asymmetric pre-frontal activation in emotion and WM (Chapter 14). 
The thesis does not have a separate, general section on methodology, due to the 
multitude of utilised experimental methods and techniques. Instead individual 
methods/ techniques/ technologies are introduced before reporting the studies in which 
they were employed, often as separate chapters. Accordingly, in Part 2 the use of 
concurrent tasks is discussed and Event-Related Potentials (ERPs) are introduced 
(Chapter 5). A detailed discussion of mood-induction techniques is contained in Part 3 
(Chapter 9). Chapter 9 also introduces the physiological recordings (Electro-
Myography and heart-rate) employed in Part 3 as tools for objective assessment of the 
emotional state. In Part 4 the utilised neuroimaging technology (functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging, fMRI) is introduced and relevant aspects of experimental designs 
used in fMRI are discussed (Chapter 14). 
Similarly, the three types of tasks employed in the present studies are introduced in the 
corresponding chapters, rather than all in one general section. Insight and reasoning 
tasks, whose modulation by positive mood and WM correlates are compared in Part 2, 
are introduced in Chapter 6 (Part 2). N-back WM tasks, are introduced in Chapter 9 
(Part 3), prior to reporting the studies that employed them. 
XVII 
The thesis ends with a General Discussion, which summarises the fmdings and 
conclusions of individual studies and, in addition, provides general conclusions that 
emerged from the synthesis of results from individual investigations. 
XVIII 
Part I. Emotion and cognitive processing. Background 
PART I. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1. Emotion and cognitive processing. Background 
1.1. Research on mood biases 
The influence of emotion on cognitive processes has always been a topic of 
considerable interest and there is an ample literature dedicated to this domain. In 
addition to the vast applicability of such knowledge in the clinical domain, it has 
important implications in the context of cognitive psychology. Emotions are important 
factors in human cognition. In particular, a perspective that will be investigated in 
depth in this thesis is that emotions can be powerful modulators of information 
processing mechanisms and that such modulatory influences can be very specific (i.e. 
specific to certain emotions and certain cognitive systems). 
In what follows, I present some of the well-explored theoretical perspectives on the 
effects of emotion on cognitive processes. This discussion also contains some points 
regarding the limitations of these perspectives in relation to the aim of the current 
investigation, namely selective modulation of affectively-neutral cognitive 
mechanisms by particular emotions. Research of the affect-cognition interaction that 
attempts to circumvent these limitations is presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 8-12. 
Part I. Emotion and cognitive processing. Background 
Mood biases and memory 
One of the largest corpora of studies in this field has examined biases in cognitive 
processing due to the affective valence of the processed material, referred to as mood 
biases (Alexander & Guenther, 1986; Beck & McBee, 1995; Bower et aI., 1978; Isen 
et aI., 1978). This work can be further subdivided. A substantial number of 
investigations looked at mood biases in memory processing. One type of mood-biasing 
effects revealed in memory investigations is mood congruency, which refers to the 
bias to memorise/recall information whose affective valence is consistent with one's 
affective state (Fiedler & Stroehm, 1986; Isen et aI., 1978). It is intuitively appealing 
that somebody in a happy state would tend to remember happy events and, conversely, 
that depression would prompt sad memories. Indeed, the results from a number of 
studies (Alexander & Guenther, 1986; Isen et aI., 1978), with few exceptions (Bower 
& Mayer, 1985), have confirmed this intuition: depressed mood leads to a greater 
number of negative events recalled and to a smaller number of positive memories. 
This was found with autobiographic episodes (Alexander & Guenther, 1986), as well 
as with laboratory stimuli, whose recall followed relatively shortly after the 
presentation (Fiedler & Stroehm, 1986). Furthermore, the effect was documented with 
various stimuli (e.g. words, photographs). An interesting finding was that mood 
congruency is observed for isolated stimuli, but not for categorical material (Fiedler & 
Stroehm, 1986). 
There have been investigations that gained insights into neurobiological mechanisms 
of mood congruency. Some psychopharmacological studies examined the effect of 
interventions at the level of neurotransmitter systems on the valence of the material 
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retrieved from memory. For example, haloperidol, a drug known for its suppressing 
effects on dopamine transmission, as well as for its property of either flattening affect 
or inducing depressed mood, was shown to cause negative mood congruency effects, 
which emphasises the role of dopamine in retaining the affective valence of stimuli 
(Kumari et aI., 1998). 
In addition to mood congruency, another phenomenon documented in the literature on 
mood biases in memory processing is mood dependent memory, which refers to 
facilitation of memory when the mood states at encoding and recall are the same (Eich 
& Metcalfe, 1989). Although the evidence of mood dependent memory has been less 
consistent than that of mood congruency (Bower and Mayer, 1989), recent studies, 
employing a more rigorous methodology, have confirmed the effect (Beck & McBee, 
1995). The most influential model of mood biases in memory, based on spreading 
activation associative models of memory (Anderson, 1976), is the semantic network 
model (Bower, 1981). It proposes that networks containing semantic information about 
stimuli, also include nodes encoding affective information and that activation of the 
latter facilitates retrieval of particular semantic information. Recent studies of mood 
biases in memory (Varner and Ellis, 1998) provided support for the model. 
lv/ood biases and attention 
Mood biases have been investigated not only in relation to memory processes. A large 
corpus of studies have examined attentional biases in emotional states and disorders. 
In particular, attentional biases in highly anxious individuals have been systematically 
investigated for some time (MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992; Mathews & MacLeod, 
3 
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1994; Mogg et aI., 1994). Mathews and colleagues (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; 
Mathews et aI., 1997; Williams et aI., 1988) made one of the earliest attempts to 
condense the results of numerous studies in a theoretical framework. Trait anxiety has 
been conceptualised as one of the basic dimensions of personality (Gray, 1982), 
reflecting the proneness of the individual to experiencing anxiety states. The model by 
Mathews and co-workers postulated that highly anxious individuals (Le. individuals 
with high trait anxiety) show a facilitatory attentional bias in processing material with 
(even mild) negative affective content, referred to as attention to threat (Mathews et 
aI., 1997). In contrast, individuals with low trait-anxiety show the opposite bias for 
mildly negative stimuli- an avoidance bias; only for stimuli perceived as highly 
threatening do individuals with low anxiety also show a facilitation bias. The model 
explains the difference between high- and low-trait anxiety groups in terms of the 
reactivity of the mechanism that allocates resources to the processing of threat. 
Considerable evidence was amassed in support of the theory from designs utilising 
various stimuli (words, pictures, etc., see Mathews et aI., 1997). 
A similar model of attention to threat was proposed by Mogg, Bradley and colleagues 
(Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Mogg et aI., 1994). Both models distinguish between a 
component that evaluates how threatening various stimuli are and another component 
that allocates cognitive and physiological resources (e.g. attention) to threat 
processing. The only significant difference was that one model explained the 
difference between high- and low- anxiety groups in terms of the evaluation 
mechanism (Mogg & Bradley, 1998), whereas the other model explained that in terms 
of resources allocated to threat processing (Mathews et aI., 1997). 
4 
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Studies of mood biases in memory and attention provided significant insights into the 
role of emotion in prioritising information. Theoretical accounts formulated in the 
domain (e.g. the semantic network model or attention to threat theories) developed 
useful conceptualisations of the interaction between semantic information and affect. 
Moreover, psychopharmacological studies have begun to unravel the neurobiological 
correlates on mood-induced selectivity in memory (Kumari et aI., 1998). However, the 
current thesis is concerned with the effects of emotion on affectively-neutral cognitive 
processes. The literature on mood biases is less conclusive with regard to material that 
does not have affective valence. 
1.2. Emotional disorders and cognitive processing 
A number of studies have examined performance on a variety of affectively neutral 
cognitive tasks in individuals with affective disorders, especially depression (Brown et 
aI., 1994; Henriques & Davidson, 1992; Watkins et aI., 1996). This approach had 
several motivations. Firstly, it was expected to reveal the cognitive profiles of 
emotional traits and disorders. Secondly, additional insight could be gained from the 
consideration of the neurobiological and neuroanatomical substrates of emotional 
disorders and how these could be related to information-processing deficits in affective 
disorders. Such a perspective has been strengthened significantly by the utilisation of 
modern neuroimaging technologies (Bench et aI., 1992; Drevets & Raichle, 1995; 
Drevets et aI., 1992). Finally, cognitive profiles of emotional disorders have been used 
as models of the effects of emotional states on cognition in a more general context. 
This can be exemplified by the well-documented relationship between the 
hyperthymic (manic) episodes in bipolar depression on the one hand, and creativity on 
5 
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the other hand. Several influential studies have reported strong associations between 
manic affective states/episodes and creativity (Andreasen, 1987; Andreasen & Canter, 
1974), though see Shapiro & Weisberg (1999) for a more moderate interpretation of 
these and similar results in terms of increased productivity, rather than creativity. 
Although investigations of cognitive profiles of affective disorders have proven 
informative, significant difficulties in this field have been related to generalisation to 
normal emotion. It may be tempting to regard disordered and normal affect as 
quantitatively different, but it is increasingly clear that there are qualitative differences 
between the two (Drevets & Raichle, 1995). Furthermore, affective changes in 
emotional disorders are largely explicable in terms of major neurochemical changes in 
the brain. However, among these neurochemical changes some would have little 
influence on affect per se, but may have a considerable impact on cognitive 
functioning. 
1.3. Investigations of the overlap between the anatomical substrates of emotion and 
cognition 
A complementary perspective, embraced by many researchers, was to consider 
biochemical and neuroanatomical models of normal emotion in relation to the 
functional anatomy of certain cognitive processes (Bartolic et aI., 1999; Gray, 2001; 
Tucker, 1999). Consequently, predictions could be formulated on the basis of the 
overlap between the biochemical or neuroanatomical substrates of certain emotions 
and of certain cognitive processes. For example, models of interhemispheric 
asymmetry in emotion have been particularly prolific in generating such predictions. 
6 
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These models exploited the left vs. right coordinates of the brain anatomy, ascribing 
differential involvement to left vs. right (Davidson, 1992, 1995, 1998; Tucker, 1981; 
Tucker & Williamson, 1984) cortical regions in dichotomously defined basic emotions 
(e.g. approach vs. withdrawal, Davidson, 1992). Numerous studies have been 
conducted in order to test such hypotheses. They have utilised behavioural (Tucker, 
1981; Liotti & Tucker, 1992), neuropsychological (Bruder, 1989; Morris et aI., 1996), 
psychophysiological (Davidson et aI., 1990; Gotlib et aI., 1998; Sobotka et aI., 1992), 
and, more recently, neuroimaging (Sutton et aI., 1997), techniques and gathered 
substantial amounts of empirical evidence. 
The interest in the functional-anatomical overlap between emotion and cognitive 
function has not diminished over the recent years (see Gray, 2001). More importantly, 
some of the recent behavioural studies were in remarkable consensus with regard to 
their findings of differential effects of emotion on certain cognitive processes, 
predicted on the basis of models of interhemispheric asymmetry in emotion and 
cognition (Bartolic et aI., 1999; Gray, 2001, see Chapter 14 for a more detailed 
discussion). However, a significant drawback of this approach is that neuroimaging 
studies have so far provided only limited support (Lawrence & Murphy, 2001; see also 
Chua et aI., 1999 and Rauch et aI., 1998 for divergent results) for one of the most 
widely held models of functional anatomy of emotion, namely the prefrontal cortex 
asymmetry model (Davidson, 1992, 1995, 1998). A more fundamental limitation of 
this perspective is its relative muteness with regard to the information-processing 
mechanisms underlying the effects of emotion on cognitive processing and, hence, on 
the evolutionary role of these effects. The overlap between cortical regions that 
represent a certain type of affect and a particular cognitive function can predict 
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interactions between particular types of affect and cognition. However, some 
fundamental questions, e.g. "why is there overlap in cortical representation of 
emotions and cognitive functions?", would still remain unanswered. For example, an 
influential psychophysiological study (Henriques & Davidson, 1997) proposed to 
investigate the role of interhemispheric asymmetries in the interaction between 
depressed mood and verbal vs. spatial cognitive performance. The study employed 
verbal and spatial cognitive tasks, which were well matched for difficulty. However, 
although the tasks appeared to involve several cognitive functions (perception, long-
term memory, Working Memory, etc.), the authors made no attempts to explore the 
cognitive aspects of the utilised tasks. The investigators only indicated that previous 
studies found differential involvement of brain hemispheres in the employed verbal 
and spatial tasks. This was regarded as sufficient for the purpose of testing 
interhemispheric models of emotion and its effect on cognition. A similar approach 
was taken in a recent behavioural study (Bartolic et aI., 1999). The authors examined 
how frontal lobe interhemispheric asymmetries in emotion would account for the 
effects of induced positive and negative mood on tasks claimed to predominantly 
involve left (verbal fluency) and right (spatial fluency) frontal regions. Although 
careful consideration was given in this study to the neuroanatomy of verbal and spatial 
fluency in relation to the neuroanatomy of emotion, the cognitive processes contained 
in the two kinds of tasks and their functional role in the interaction with emotion were 
not examined. 
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1.4. The Resource Allocation framework 
There are studies which attempted to address some of these issues, in particular the 
information-processing mechanisms underlying the influence of affect on cognitive 
processes. A number of investigations amassed support for the rather influential 
resource allocation theory (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1987). The theory explained the 
detrimental effects of depressed mood and the associated affective states (e.g. sadness) 
and disorders (e.g. clinical depression) on cognitive tasks in terms of cognitive 
resources being preferentially allocated to processing mood-related, but task irrelevant, 
cognitive material. Studies employing different mood induction procedures for 
eliciting depressed (sad) mood in healthy participants supported the resource 
allocation model in its application to memory encoding (Ellis et aI., 1984) and 
memory retrieval (Ellis et aI., 1985). It has also been shown that the more mood-
related thoughts participants had, the more impaired was their memory performance 
(Seibert & Ellis, 1991). Similar effects of induced mood were observed on text 
comprehension (Ellis et aI., 1997). Interestingly, although it had been previously found 
that the association of a piece of information with a negative affective state increases 
the likelihood of its retrieval in a similar affective state (mood dependent memory, 
Beck and McBee, 1995; Eich & Metcalfe, 1989), the overall memory efficiency in 
conditions of depressed mood is decreased for both encoding and retrieval (Ellis & 
Ashbrook, 1987; Ellis et aI., 1985). 
In its original formulation, the model was only intended to account for the effects of 
depressed mood on memory processing. One of the model's limitations is that it made 
little use of the knowledge of neurochemical and anatomical correlates of both 
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depressed mood and memory. Consequently, the concept of resource allocation is 
sometimes difficult to apply in relation to functional-anatomical data. For example, 
one influential neuroimaging study examined the effects of induced depressed mood 
on verbal fluency (Baker et aI., 1997). In the most commonly used versions of the 
verbal fluency task (e.g. Controlled Oral Word Association Test, Benton & Hamster, 
1983) participants are given a letter of the alphabet and asked to generate during a 
certain time interval as many distinct words as they can that start with that letter. In the 
above-mentioned neuroimaging study, prior to performing the verbal fluency task, 
participants were asked to read aloud verbal statements with elated, sad or neutral 
content (first used by Velten, 1967, hence referred to as Velten statements), e.g. 
"People annoy me, I wish I could be by myself'. A control group did the task with no 
exposure to Velten statements. The results showed decreased activity after depressed 
mood induction in the left prefrontal region- the most active cortical area during verbal 
fluency in the absence of mood induction. This finding raises questions with regard to 
the resource allocation account. If depressed mood were to re-allocate resources within 
certain cortical regions from verbal fluency to sad thoughts, the activation in these 
areas should not have decreased. A possible reconciliation of these results with the 
resource allocation framework is that, as a consequence of mood change, resources are 
re-distributed from one brain area to other brain areas. Indeed, there were brain regions 
outside the territories activated by verbal fluency that showed more activity in the 
depressed compared to the neutral conditions (Baker et aI., 1997). The important point 
here is that neuroanatomical and neurochemical data can and should be used to 
constrain the information-processing models and to define their key concepts more 
precisely (e.g. the notion "cognitive resources" could be re-defined in terms of 
activation of brain areas). This was done in biologically plausible cognitive models of 
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the effects of emotion on cognitive processing (e.g. "dopamine theory", Ashby et aI., 
1999, see Chapter 3). The definition of notions used in such models in neurobiological 
terms increases their expliecative value. 
Despite limitations, the resource allocation theory can serve as an elegant conceptual 
framework, which was subsequently used for accounting for the effects of other types 
of emotion on several cognitive processes/ tasks (e.g. reasoning and Central Executive 
tasks, Oaksford et aI., 1996). 
1.5. Tlte Processing Efficiency tlteory 
A theory that makes similar assumptions as the resource allocation framework is the 
model of the effects of trait anxiety on Working Memory (WM; Part II of the thesis is 
dedicated to the description of the most influential cognitive and neurobiological 
models of WM.), the processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck, 
1997). A number of studies have concurred in finding WM deficits in individuals with 
trait-anxiety (Calvo & Alamo, 1987; Darke, 1988; Eysenck, 1989; Markham & Darke, 
1991). Importantly, these individuals seem to be more impaired on WM tasks than on 
other tasks. A recent study by Tohill & Holyoak (2000) found that state and trait 
anxiety depleted the capacity to perform complex analogies. Since the authors linked 
the complexity of analogies with the WM capacity, they interpreted the impact of state 
and trait anxiety on analogy in terms of the disruptive effects of anxiety on WM. The 
model by Eysenck and colleagues explains WM deficits in high trait anxiety 
individuals in terms of WM capacity being saturated by task irrelevant anxiety-related 
thoughts, e.g. worries (ruminations, Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). Although the theoretical 
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approach of Eysenck and co-workers is conceptually related to the resource allocation 
framework, it is qualitatively different in at least three respects. 
Firstly, it is more specific than the original resource allocation model with regard to 
the cognitive processes modulated by emotion. For example, in addition to predicting 
what cognitive tasks would be influenced by trait anxiety (the ones involving WM), it 
also predicts weaker effects on tasks that do not make substantial WM demands 
(Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). Secondly, rather than simply assume that anxiety reduces 
the amount of WM resources available to the task, the processing efficiency model 
proposes that this reduction in resources is largely compensated through additional 
effort. The latter means that the absolute amount of cognitive resources available to 
the task does not change in conditions of anxiety. Rather, the proportion of resources 
allocated to the task out of the global pool of cognitive resources decreases because of 
irrelevant anxiety-related processing, hence the term processing efficiency. 
Accordingly, the processing efficiency model predicts that only tasks that make large 
demands on WM resources would be visibly impaired by trait! test anxiety. Thirdly 
(and this is closely related to the previous point), the processing efficiency theory 
predicts that the Central Executive component of WM is the mechanism that manages 
the compensatory resources and, consequently, it is more affected than WM slave-
systems, though some disruption of the phonological loop is also thought to occur. 
Therefore, in contrast to the resource allocation model, concerned with the depletion 
of memory resources, processing efficiency proposes that anxiety affects primarily 
attentionall executive resources. In Chapter 13 the processing efficiency theory is 
discussed in more detail, and some of its predictions tested. 
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As it will be shown below (Chapter 2), the neurobiological substrate of the cognitive 
process examined in the processing efficiency theory (WM) is well investigated. 
Unfortunately, this advantage has not been capitalised upon by the theory or the 
studies that tested it. Moreover, the majority of the studies upon which the theory is 
based employed verbal WM tasks. The influence of anxiety on spatial WM is less 
documented. This is important in the context of the present investigations whose focus 
is the selective interaction between emotion and sub-mechanisms of WM (e.g. verbal 
vs. spatial WM components). 
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Chapter 2. The choice of the cognitive process: Working Memory 
2.1. Information-processing models of WM 
The present thesis examines the modulation of affectively-neutral cognition by 
affective states and the cognitive function under scrutiny is Working Memory. Several 
reasons determined the choice of Working Memory as the object of investigations. As 
was argued above, some of the most prominent research perspectives on effects of 
mood on cognitive processing, such as interhemispheric asymmetry models or the 
resource allocation theory, did not provide detailed accounts of the cognitive 
processes whose modulation by affect was investigated. Therefore, one important 
motivation for choosing here to investigate Working Memory is the following: 
Working Memory is well characterised in terms of its cognitive architecture. 
WM as a multi-component system 
Working Memory (WM) was first conceptualised by Baddeley and colleagues 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974, Baddeley, 1986, 2000) as a system for temporary 
maintenance and manipUlation of information. Although WM acts as a memory 
mechanism, its functional significance for on-line, goal oriented processing makes it 
more than merely a memory system. It has been proposed that WM integrates 
motivational and instrumental aspects of behaviour. In other words, at any point in 
time WM represents the information about goals as well as about potential ways they 
can be accomplished. The prioritisation of goals and response alternatives is 
performed by the Central Executive component of WM, or, as conceptualised by other 
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authors, the Supervisory Attentional System (Norman & Shallice, 1986). The Central 
Executive operates independently of the type of information, or the modality through 
which information is acquired, and is therefore said to be modality-independent. In 
addition, given its role of ultimate decision-making instance, the Central Executive is 
at the top of the hierarchy of WM components. Two other components that are part of 
WM, unlike the Central Executive, are defined by the types of information they 
process. The Verbal component of WM, also referred to as the phonological loop 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), stores verbal material, putatively in the form of articulatory 
or phonological codes. The Spatial component of WM, also referred to as the visuo-
spatial sketchpad (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), is assumed to hold visuo-spatial 
information that reaches WM. 
The model by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) represents a development of earlier models 
of short-term memory (Broadbent, 1958, Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). Nevertheless it 
is qualitatively different from the latter in at least two ways. Firstly, the early models 
of short-term memory viewed memory as a unitary store, whereas Baddeley and Hitch 
proposed a non-homogeneous, mUlti-component model. Secondly, the Baddeley and 
Hitch model of WM is more than a memory store, as suggested by the role of its 
Central Executive component. The Central Executive is involved in prioritisation of 
any non-routine (Le. deliberate) behaviour. The non-storage character of the Central 
Executive is further evidenced by the lack of maintenance capacity, postulated in the 
early version of the model (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) and reiterated subsequently 
(Baddeley, 1986, 2000). Hence, the Central Executive has to use external storage 
capacity, represented in Baddeley and colleagues model by two "slave-systems": the 
phonological loop and the visuo-spatial sketchpad. 
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In addition to the integration of processing and storage dimensions, a factor that also 
contributed to the model's recognition is that considerable evidence from various areas 
of cognitive science and neuroscience supported the multi-component character of the 
model. There is substantial behavioural evidence supporting the distinctiveness of the 
verbal and spatial sub-components of WM (Baddeley, 2000). Although somewhat less 
consistently, neuroimaging data also suggests relatively distinct substrates of verbal 
and spatial WM in the brain (Smith & Jonides, 1999). As it will be discussed later, 
recently an additional storage system, the episodic buffer, was added to the original 
WM model (Baddeley, 2000). 
By far the most investigated component of WM has been the phonological loop, 
proposed to maintain verbal and acoustic information. In the original version of the 
WM model, the phonological loop was further sub-divided into the phonological store 
and the articulatory rehearsal mechanism. The function of the rehearsal mechanism 
was to enhance the on-line maintenance capacity for verbal information. Evidence for 
the phonological loop as a distinct component of WM comes from different domains. 
Memory experiments with phonological material showed that it is easier to remember 
a sequence of letters or words when these are phonologically dissimilar and, 
conversely, memory performance for sequences decreases with increasing 
phonological similarity between items (Conrad & HulI, 1964, Baddeley, 1966). For 
example, the sequence g, c, b, t, v, p is harder to remember than the sequence f, w, k, s, 
y, k (Baddeley, 2000). In contrast, semantic or visual similarity has little effect 
(Conrad & Hull, 1964, Baddeley, 1966). This suggests that even when these items are 
presented visually, they are remembered as acoustic or phonological codes. 
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Furthermore, participants find it easier to recall sequences of short words (wit, sum, 
harm compared to university, auditorium, constitution). This phenomenon, referred to 
as the word-length effect, has been interpreted in terms of polysyllabic words taking 
longer to rehearse, which allows the memory trace to deteriorate (Baddeley, 2000). 
Articulatory suppression is a particularly interesting phenomenon in the context of the 
phonological component of WM. When people are prevented from rehearsing the 
items that have to be remembered (e.g. by being asked to repeat continuously an 
irrelevant word with little semantic content, such as the) performance is impaired 
significantly. Moreover, articulatory suppression eliminates the word-length effect, so 
that it does not make much difference how long the words in a sequence are. Indeed, if 
the words are not verbally rehearsed, it does not matter how long it takes to articulate 
them. Interestingly, articulatory suppression can also substantially reduce the effect of 
phonological similarity. For instance, in conditions of concurrent articulatory activity 
it does not seem to matter how phonologically similar the items are. However, this 
only holds for the visual presentation of items; articulatory suppression does not 
eliminate the disadvantage for phonologically similar items in auditory presentations. 
The explanation for this is straightforward if it is assumed that articulatory suppression 
disrupts the transfer of information from visual to phonological codes (Murray, 1968). 
Such transfer is likely to be ubiquitous because the phonological loop is efficient and 
people choose to subvocally rehearse visually presented items (Baddeley, 2000). 
There is persuasive neuropsychological evidence for the distinctiveness ofthe 
phonological loop within WM. Among patients with speech impairments, some do and 
some do not have rehearsal deficits. Importantly, patients who have intact rehearsal are 
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the ones whose speech impairments are known to be of peripheral nature (Baddeley & 
Wilson, 1985), supporting a more "central" character of the rehearsal code (Baddeley, 
2000). Further evidence concerning the phonological loop comes from well-
documented cases of individuals who have relatively spared memory for visuo-spatial 
information, but impaired phonological WM (Vallar & Shallice, 1990). 
The second slave-system, postulated in the Baddeley and Hitch (1974) model of WM, 
the vi suo-spatial sketchpad, is less investigated and understood. As with the 
phonological loop, it is believed to be further fractionated into a visual, a spatial and, 
possibly, a kinaesthetic component (Baddeley, 2000). Despite the scarcity of 
behavioural data on the visuo-spatial store, what is available seems to support its 
specialised character. For instance, in the same manner the phonological loop was 
tested with articulatory suppression, interference paradigms were employed to probe 
the existence of visuo-spatial WM, and with similar results. Simple tasks believed to 
load the processing resources of the visuo-spatial sketchpad (e.g. tapping the corners 
of a square with one's fingers) were found to disrupt the WM for spatial information, 
but not the WM for verbal or acoustic information (Baddeley, 2000). Although more 
rare, selective neuropsychological impairments of visuo-spatial WM have also been 
documented (Hanley et aI., 1991). 
Limitations of the Baddeley and Hitch (1974) original WM model 
Despite the impressive record of the Baddeley and Hitch (1974) WM model in 
accounting for various data, it soon became apparent even to its proponents that some 
significant phenomena were beyond its scope. For instance, it was evident from the 
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outset that the phonological loop could not be the only system responsible for WM for 
verbal material (Baddeley, 2000). Indeed, if it would be the only mechanism for short-
term retention of verbal information, then articulatory suppression should have 
catastrophic effects on verbal WM. While the effects of articulatory suppression are 
significant, people still preserve a substantial proportion of verbal WM capacity. 
Moreover, patients with deep impairments of short-term phonological memory, who 
have a digit span of one for verbal material in auditory presentations, have a digit span 
of four in visual presentations. One could resort to the possibility that verbal material 
could also be visually coded in the visuo-spatial sketchpad. This would predict that 
there would be significant visual similarity effects for verbal material (similar to the 
above-mentioned phonological similarity effects). Such effects were indeed found 
(Logie et aI., 2000), but they are too small to account for the capacity to retain verbal 
material when the phonological loop is disrupted (via suppression or neurological 
damage). 
Further questions were raised by studies of sentence and text comprehension, which 
showed that the phonological loop does not provide an adequate account of WM for 
verbal material in text comprehension (Gathercole & Hitch, 1993). This is well 
illustrated by memory for prose. It has been known for a long time that when verbal 
material can be organised into "chunks", then chunks, rather than individual words, are 
digits in the digit span (Miller, 1956). Chunks can be easily shown to exceed the 
capacity of the phonological rehearsal mechanism. Moreover, the assumption that WM 
for chunks is phonological in nature imminently leads to a contradiction of the above-
discussed word-length effect (long words are harder to remember}. It seems obvious 
that the chunking effect is due at least to some degree to the semantic information 
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from long-term memory. It could even be argued that the span for chunks could be 
entirely a long-term memory phenomenon. However patient data are not consistent 
with the latter proposal. For instance, a patient with verbal WM impairments and 
intact long-term memory, described by Vallar and Baddeley (1984), had a sentence 
span of five words, which was more than the single digit span of one word, but 
considerably less than the normal sentence span of approximately 16 words. 
Therefore, it is concluded that, although the chunking effect is driven by semantic 
information retrieved from long-term memory, chunks are stored in WM (Baddeley, 
2000). 
To summarise, it became increasingly clear that verbal information is not solely stored 
as phonological codes in WM. On the other hand, as memory for prose suggested, 
semantic information from long-term memory may be incorporated into the 
representations stored in WM. These lines of evidence are problematic for the 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) model ofWM in at least three ways. Firstly, none of the 
model's components is suited for the storage of semantic information. Secondly, none 
of the components was capable of storing integrated information of different types 
(e.g. phonological and semantic). The Central Executive could perform such 
integration but had no storage capacity. Thirdly, the model did not explicitly postulate 
anyon-line exchange between WM and long-term memory. An additional limitation 
of the initial model ofWM concerns rehearsal mechanisms. While the phonological 
loop was assumed to have a rehearsal sub-mechanism based on the rehearsal of 
articulatory codes, the latter evidently could not be applied for the rehearsal of visuo-
spatial information. Yet, the model did not specify any other rehearsal mechanisms. 
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Three developments of the model have attempted to address these limitations 
(Baddeley, 2000). A new slave-system component, the episodic buffer (also referred to 
as the back-up store), was added to the WM model. Its function is to store information 
that is integrated across different types (e.g. visual, phonological, etc), including 
semantic information exported into WM from long-term memory. In addition, the 
three slave-components (Le. the storage components) of WM were assumed to have 
reciprocal connections with similar sub-divisions of long-term memory: the 
phonological loop to the linguistic knowledge in long-term memory, the visuo-spatial 
sketchpad to visual semantics and the episodic WM buffer to episodic long-term 
memory (Baddeley, 2000). Finally, rehearsal in the visuo-spatial sketchpad was 
proposed to be mediated by shifts of attention from one item (or spatial location) to 
another (Smyth & Pelky, 1992; Smyth, 1996, see Chapter 8 for an extensive 
discussion of the role of attention in spatial WM). 
A Central or a specialised Executive? 
Although rehearsal in the visuo-spatial sketchpad is proposed to be mediated by shifts 
of attention, it is not clear how these shifts are related to the Central Executive (which 
is an executive and attentional system). Attentional shifts may be performed by the 
Central Executive, implying that the Central Executive takes an active part in spatial 
WM rehearsal. Since rehearsal in the phonological loop is believed to be largely 
independent of the Central Executive, this would imply a stronger association between 
the Central Executive and spatial WM, as compared to Central Executive and verbal 
WM. Furthermore, the WM model assumes that the Central Executive is by essence a 
non-storage system (Baddeley, 1986). An alternative is to postulate specific executive 
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(attentional) capacities in the slave-components. A related, but more drastic, revision 
has already been proposed by some authors (Daneman & Tardif, 1987, Shah & 
Miyake, 1996). These investigators opt for multiple executive (attentional) systems in 
WM, which are specifically associated with the storage components (e.g. verbal 
attentional resources, spatial attentional resources), instead of the Central Executive. 
The evidence cited in support of a multi-component executive system instead of a 
unitary one is that spatial span tasks that tax both storage and execution components of 
spatial WM, correlate with measures of spatial ability (e.g. spatial visualisation), but 
not with measures of verbal ability (Shah & Miyake, 1996). Similarly, verbal WM 
tasks taxing both storage and processing (reading span) correlate with verbal, but not 
spatial, ability measures. At the same time, it has been claimed that verbal and spatial 
tasks that only tax storage are poor predictors of complex verbal and spatial tasks 
(Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Perfetti & Goldman, 1976; Turner & Engle, 1989). This 
suggests a distinction between verbal and spatial modalities not only in low-level 
storage processes, but also in attentional-executive processes. 
An amodal, homogeneous WM 
A radically different way of resolving the problem of rehearsal as well as the other 
problems of the early mUlti-component WM model (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) 
discussed above, is to assume a unitary pool of WM resources used for different tasks 
(Engle et aI., 1992). Indeed, if executive resources are equally available for different 
processes, then rehearsing different types of material does not seem a problem. 
Similarly, in a unitary WM devoted to different processes and different types of 
information, it does not seem problematic to store semantic information and integrate 
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it with other types of information (e.g. phonological and visuo-spatial). For example, 
in several studies by Engle and colleagues (Engle et aI., 1992; Turner & Engle, 1989) 
digit span was measured with different types of information as digits (words or 
numbers as digits). In addition, verbal ability was measured in a set of separate tasks. 
It was shown that digit span correlated equally well with measurements of verbal 
ability when the items to be remembered were words or numbers. 
However, such an account would still need to explain in more detail how rehearsal for 
different types of information works, which has already been done quite successfully 
for some types of information (e.g. phonological) within the multi-component WM 
framework. Some clarification of how an amodal WM could work comes from recent 
biologically plausible computational work by O'Reilly and collaborators (Frank et aI., 
2001; O'Reilly et aI, 1999). These authors propose a gating mechanism that modulates 
shifts to new contents in WM. Such gating, instantiated in the brain by the 
dopaminergic circuits that project from basal ganglia into the prefrontal cortex (PFC), 
could support rehearsal of various types of information, or information modalities. 
However, studies of sub-vocal articulation show that rehearsal in verbal WM is 
associated with mechanisms of speech which do not appear active in spatial WM (see 
above the discussion of articulatory suppression). Conversely, neuroimaging literature 
indicates that rehearsal in spatial WM, and not verbal WM, tasks activates primary 
visual areas (Awh et aI., 1999, see Chapter 8). Even ifone assumes that one 
mechanism supports rehearsal, it seems that the latter would need some internal 
differentiation, or at least differentiation at the level of its connections to the peripheral 
systems (Le. speech (motor) output in verbal WM and visual perception in spatial 
WM). 
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Furthermore, critics of the unitary WM account argue that much of the evidence in its 
support come from verbal and numerical processing tasks rather than verbal and 
spatial processing tasks (Shah & Miyake, 1996). Finally, the unitary WM model 
would have to explain a number of phenomena (phonological similarity and word-
length effects, articulatory suppression and its correlates, etc.) which were elegantly 
accounted for by the multi-component WM model. The proposal of the WM as a 
unitary system has also been made in the literature on the functional neuroanatomy of 
WM, with some recent neuroimaging studies reporting no marked differences between 
the cortical regions (in particular, prefrontal regions) activated by verbal and spatial 
WM tasks (Nystrom et aI., 2000). However, as it will be mentioned in the next section, 
the evidence of cortical activity specific to WM components (e.g. Broca's area in 
verbal rehearsal) is rather persuasive. 
In conclusion, despite the limitations of its early version and the speCUlative character 
of some of the recent developments of the model, the multi-component WM model 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 1986; 2000) has accounted for a wide range of 
behavioural, neuropsychological and neuroimaging data with a relatively limited 
number of assumptions. Importantly, amongst neuroanatomical models of WM, which 
will be discussed in the next section, the most successful are also based on the multi-
component cognitive model of WM. 
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2.2. Neuro-anatomical models of WM 
It has been said above that one important reason for choosing to investigate WM is the 
accumulated knowledge regarding its cognitive architecture. Another incentive for 
choosing WM as the cognitive mechanism whose manipulation by affect would be 
studied is its functional neuroanatomy. It is a matter of consensus that the Prefrontal 
Cortex (PFC) is intimately involved in WM (Fuster, 1995; O'Reilly et al., 1999; Smith 
& Jonides, 1999). Several PFC areas, such as the dorso-Iateral, inferior-lateral areas 
and also the anterior cingulate, appear to be involved in WM tasks (Smith et al., 1998), 
as well as in the generation, perception and maintenance of most emotional states 
(Drevets & Raichle, 1998). Another consensus, reached in the neuroimaging literature 
on emotion, is that the prefrontal cortex is intimately involved in the generation, 
maintenance and control of affect (Davidson & Irwin, 1999; Raichle & Drevets, 
1998). Furthermore, there is significant overlap in the neurotransmitter systems 
subserving some forms of emotion and also believed to be involved in WM. For 
example, the processing of reward is largely reliant on dopaminergic pathways 
(Schultz et al., 1993), which are particularly dense in the PFC. The same 
neurotransmitter, dopamine, is proposed to be critical for updating WM contents 
(Frank et al., 2001; O'Reilly et al., 1999). Consequently, there are good 
neurobiological reasons to expect powerful interactions between affect and WM. 
There are several neuro-anatomical models of WM. Perhaps not surprisingly. these 
models address the same issues as WM theories in the cognitive literature, namely the 
existence of modality-specific components in WM, the dissociation between retention 
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and executive processes, the differentiation between storage and rehearsal functions 
and the nature of rehearsal in verbal and spatial WM. 
Primate studies 
The first neuroanatomical evidence for the presence of a mechanism for retaining 
information over short delays was provided from single-cell cortical recordings in 
non-human primates. A typical investigation of WM in non-human primates is 
exemplified by the following experiment by Goldman-Rakic and colleagues 
(Funahashi et aI., 1989). Monkeys were shown a small square in one of several 
locations. A short, e.g. 2.5 sec, delay followed the presentation of the square, after 
which the monkey was cued to shift its gaze to the location where the square was and 
was rewarded for doing so correctly. During the delay the activity of single neurons 
from various parts of the brains was recorded. A common finding of such studies was 
that there are cells in the prefrontal and parietal cortex, which are only active during 
the delay, their activity being linked to one specific location (Fuster, 1995). These 
cells were proposed to be part of a neural mechanism of WM, a mechanism that was 
said to maintain an active representation of relevant information in the absence of 
environmental cues (Goldman-Rakic, 1987, 1995) . 
.. What" vs. "where" in the Prefrontal Cortex 
Following the remarkable findings from the primate single-cell recordings, a large 
corpus of neuroimaging studies have attempted to reveal the neural correlates of WM 
in humans (see Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000, for a review). An important conclusion that 
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emerged early in neuroimaging literature and has been subsequently validated, is the 
role of the prefrontal and parietal cortical regions in WM (Cohen et aI., 1997; 10nides 
et aI., 1993; Paulesu et aI., 1993). It is consistent with the main outcomes from the 
primate literature. An early neuroanatomical model of WM also stems from the 
research on non-human primates and some influential theories that resulted from this 
research, such as the theory of the "what" and "where" visual streams in the primate 
brain (Mishkin & Ungerleider, 1982). The two streams were proposed to be relatively 
distinct perceptual systems, specialising in information about objects vs. their 
locations. The object ("what") and location ("where") systems were anatomically 
ascribed to the ventral and dorsal occipito-temporal cortices respectively. Based on 
studies of cytoarchitecture, i.e. the microanatomy of the cortical columns, and 
investigations of cortical connectivity, Goldman-Rakic and co-workers have 
hypothesised that the prefrontal cortex is also functionally organised according to the 
"what" vs. "where" informational domains, with a similar anatomical organisation to 
the one from posterior areas: ventral ("what") vs. dorsal ("where") (Goldman-Rakic, 
1987; Wilson et aI., 1993). These researchers have recorded single-cell activity in 
different prefrontal locations, while monkeys performed delayed response object or 
location WM tasks. Cells that were active during the delay in response to the identity 
of objects were predominantly located in the ventral PFC, whereas cells that were 
active during the delay in response to location were situated in the dorsal PFC. 
However, there have been methodological criticisms of these studies, in particular 
regarding the interpretation of results (Rushworth & Owen, 1998). Furthermore, other 
single-cell recording studies have not found a clear ventral-dorsal dissociation between 
cells encoding object vs. location information (Rao et aI., 1997). Nevertheless, even 
the authors of the latter study admitted that there may be a relative, statistical 
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predominance of domain-specific neurons in certain prefrontal areas (Miller, 2000). 
Therefore, the evidence from single-cell recordings for some form of functional 
anatomical segregation between the "what" vs. "where" WM pathways is rather 
persuasive. 
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However, it is not clear to what extent the model developed on the basis of non-human 
experimentation is applicable to WM and PFC in humans. Although a large corpus of 
neuroimaging studies have attempted to tackle this issue, there is still little consensus 
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with regard to their results. Several studies using non-spatial and spatial materials in 
WM paradigms found that they activated the ventral and dorsal divisions of the PFC 
respectively (Courtney et aI., 1996, 1998; McCarthy et aI., 1996, see Fig. 1 for the 
anatomy of the PFC in humans). Nevertheless, an equally impressive number of 
studies found no evidence for spatial (ventral regions) vs non-spatial (dorsal regions) 
organisation of the human PFC (Nystrom et aI., 2000; Postle & D'Esposito, 2000; 
Postle et aI., 2000). A recent neuroimaging study that addressed this dissociation 
found evidence of the ventral vs. dorsal streams in posterior brain regions, but not in 
the PFC (Postle et aI., 2000). Moreover, unlike earlier studies which often based their 
conclusions on separate comparisons of the conditions of interest with the baseline, 
some recent studies have directly statistically compared the spatial vs non-spatial 
conditions and failed to reveal differential patterns of activation in the PFC (Postle et 
aI., 2000, Nystrom et aI., 2000). Nevertheless, the latter investigations were justifiably 
criticised for not matching the spatial and non-spatial WM tasks on difficulty 
(Goldman-Rakic, 2000). To conclude, the validity of the functional anatomical 
organisation of the ventral and dorsal PFC according to the "what" vs. "where" 
domains needs to be further examined in humans. 
Neuroanafomical correlates o/the executive processes 
Some authors have proposed an alternative functional distinction between the ventral 
and dorsal regions of PFC, which also arose from monkey lesion studies (Petrides, 
1994). Instead of reflecting differences in domain specificity (i.e. "what" vs. "where"), 
PFC anatomy was proposed to reflect a processing difference, with the ventral region 
specialised predominantly in maintenance and the dorsal region in manipulation of 
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information (Rushworth & Owen 1998). Manipulation of information in WM is often 
referred to as executive processing, by analogy with the Central Executive component 
ofWM (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). The idea of the relative segregation of executive 
and memory functions in the PFC has received substantial neuroimaging support 
(D'Esposito et al., 1995; Rowe et al., 2000; Stem et al., 2000). Furthermore, many 
authors have claimed that the dorsal region of the PFC (i.e. the dorso-Iateral PFC, 
dIPFC, see Fig. 1) tends to show activation when manipulation of information, in 
addition to maintenance, is required. Maintenance alone often fails to activate the 
dIPFC. For example, in afunctional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) study, Rowe 
et al. (2000) implemented a delayed item recognition paradigm, in which the scans of 
the delay interval and of the response interval were separated, thanks to the temporal 
advantages of rapid fMRI scanning technology, referred to as event-relatedfMRI. The 
task presented three consecutive dots in different locations. After the delay a cursor 
appeared on the screen followed by a probe and there were two kinds of responses that 
the participants could provide depending on the probe. If the probe was a number (e.g. 
"2"), then participants needed to move the cursor with a joystick to the location of the 
second dot they saw earlier ("selection condition"). If the probe was an "X", then 
participants had to move the cursor to the location of "X" ("maintenance condition"). 
Since participants were not aware at the beginning of each trial what kind of response 
was to follow, they had to memorise the locations and temporal order of dots in both 
conditions. In only one condition the response required the selection of the correct 
response among three alternatives (the selection condition). When compared to a rest 
baseline, the scan of the delay interval (maintenance) did not reveal an increase in 
dlPFC activation. In contrast, such an increase was found in response to the interval 
when selection was performed (Rowe et aI., 2000). 
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However, investigators who oppose the idea of a processing distinction within PFC 
and that of specialisation of its dorsolateral region in manipulation rather than 
maintenance (O'Reilly et aI., 1999; in press), have argued that in paradigms such as the 
one by Rowe et aI. (2000) the condition said to require "manipulation"(Smith & 
Jonides, 1998), or "selection" (Rowe et aI., 2000), or "monitoring" (Stem et aI., 2000) 
is different in several respects from the condition thought to involve solely 
maintenance. One important difference pointed out by O'Reilly et aI. (1999) applies to 
several studies whose conclusions supported the presence of a dissociation between 
manipulation vs. maintenance in the PFC. For example, in Rowe et aI.'s (2000) 
"selection" condition, participants are presented with a number (e.g. "2"), which 
stands for the serial order of a particular location. This explicitly requires the re-coding 
of the WM content (locations) into numeric representations, a process relying on 
transfer of numeric knowledge into WM from long-term memory. In contrast, Rowe et 
aI.'s (2000) "maintenance" condition, which is the delay interval, does not explicitly 
ask for numeric encoding of serial order and it is conceivable that participants do not 
tag locations with numbers ("1,2,3") during delay and only do so during "selection" 
forced by the presentation of numbers. Thus, the difference between the "selection" 
and "maintenance" activations (dIPFC activation in the former but not the latter) could 
be due to the integration of different types of information (Le. location and number) in 
the dIPFC. 
Furthermore, O'Reilly and co-workers proposed that, in general, activation of dIPFC, 
seen only in complex WM tasks. could be explained by more abstract representations 
in the dIPFC, as compared to more detailed, feature-bound representations in other 
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regions of the PFC (e.g. ventral or orbitofrontal areas). O'Reilly et ai. (in press) 
developed a computational model which instantiated the differentiation between more 
vs. less abstract representations in the PFC, in order to simulate monkey lesion data 
that apparently indicate different functions within the PFC (Dias et aI., 1997). These 
monkey studies employed a version of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, the IDlED 
task (Roberts et aI., 1988), in which stimuli of two or more categories of stimuli 
(referred to as dimensions) are presented and the criterion is switched either within 
stimuli of the same dimension, i.e. intra-dimensionally (lD), or between dimensions, 
i.e. extra-dimensionally (ED). Monkeys with lesions to the orbitofrontal PFC are more 
impaired when they have to suppress previously, but no longer, correct responses 
within dimensions, whereas monkeys with lateral PFC damage have deficits 
responding to a different dimension and suppressing the responses to the old correct 
dimension (Dias et aI., 1997). Dias et ai. interpreted these results as indicating a 
functional dissociation within the PFC: inhibition vs. attentional shifting. In O'Reilly 
et aI.'s (in press) computational model, orbitofrontal PFC contained representations of 
stimuli within dimensions, while lateral PFC represented dimensions and not 
individual stimuli within dimensions. Although the model made no functional 
distinctions within PFC, lesions to the modelled to a similar double-dissociative 
pattern as in monkeys. Importantly, although the abstract vs. detailed differentiation is 
binary in the model, O'Reilly et ai. (in press) stress that it most likely represents a 
continuum from less to more abstract representations with the most abstract ones being 
processed in the dIPFC. Although O'Reilly and co-workers have expressed opposition 
to functional differentiation within PFC, in their models of WM they implemented 
functional differentiation between PFC and the basal ganglia, a group of structures in 
the lower part of the brain (see Fig. 2, Chapter 3). In these models basal ganglia 
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regulate the updating of contents actively maintained in the PFC through gating 
dopamine pathways that project from basal ganglia into the PFC. Hence, although the 
model does not implement maintenance vs. execution within the PFC, it does so 
between PFC and basal ganglia. 
Furthermore, despite O'Reilly and colleagues' compelling arguments against 
functional specialisation within PFC, some evidence is difficult to account for without 
resorting to functional specialisation. For instance, most theorists agree that active 
inhibition of a response tendency is a process of an executive nature (Norman & 
Shallice, 1986). In an elegant design, Smith & 10nides (1998) contrasted two verbal 
delayed item recognition tasks. The two tasks used identical stimuli and contained 
identical requirements. In one of the tasks half of the probes were non-targets on the 
current trial, but were targets on the previous trial ("recent negatives"). The other task 
was a standard item recognition task, in which current probes never appeared on the 
previous trial. The authors predicted that the task containing "recent negatives" 
requires increased inhibition, as compared to the standard task, because the processing 
of "recent negatives" demands suppressing the response from the previous trials. 
Moreover, if dlPFC would be associated predominantly with executive processing, 
higher activation in response to "recent negatives" should be found in this region. 
Indeed, the direct comparison between the "recent negatives" and the standard 
conditions revealed only one area of significant activation, the left dIPFC. An 
alternative explanation for this activation in dlPFC would be to suppose that WM 
traces last longer in the dlPFC compared to other PFC areas and that for this reason the 
similarity of probes on the current trial to the probes from the previous trial is detected 
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in the dIPFC. However this is contradicted by data showing that amongst PFC areas, 
dlPFC does not show the most sustained activity in WM tasks (Cohen et aI., 1997). 
In conclusion, it may seem that the association of some frontal regions (dIPFC) with 
"executive" processes can often be accounted for in alternative terms, without 
postulating functional differentiation within the PFC. However, this is not always the 
case and some data regarding the executive role of dlPFC is difficult to explain 
without resorting to some functional specialisation assumptions. Moreover, even 
models that oppose functional differentiation within PFC contain functional 
differentiation within the WM system (PFC vs. basal ganglia). It appears that the 
nature of processing in WM demands a trade-off between the stability of WM 
representations and the flexibility of WM contents, i.e. the ability to update WM 
effectively (O'Reilly et aI, 1999; in press). It is difficult to imagine that both 
processing tendencies can be implemented by a completely unitary, homogeneous 
system, hence the need for sub-systems dedicated preferentially, but not entirely, to 
either maintenance or "execution", and this has been captured in many theories of 
WM. The divergence between such theoretical accounts concerns more the anatomical 
correlates of the specialisation (ventral vs. dorsal PFC or PFC vs. basal ganglia) or the 
precise nature of the specialised functions, rather than the presence of functional 
specialisation. 
The functional neuroanatomy of the phonological loop and the visuo-spatial sketchpad 
A significant line of research represents the attempts to determine the neuroanatomical 
substrate of WM architectures proposed in the cognitive literature. A good starting 
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point was the very popular WM model by Baddeley and colleagues, discussed above 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974, Baddeley, 1986,2000). In a series ofneuroimaging 
experiments employing Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and fMRI as 
neuroimaging technologies, a number of researchers (Jon ides et aI., 1993, Paulesu et 
aI., 1993; Awh et aI., 1996; Smith & Jonides, 1998) tried to map the components of 
the Baddeley and Hitch (1974) WM model. The initial studies used the "cognitive 
subtraction" method (Posner et aI., 1988), based on the concept of "pure insertion" 
(Sternberg, 1969). The logic of this concept is based on a linear decomposition of 
cognitive tasks into more elementary components. Accordingly, complex cognitive 
tasks are made up of more elementary components, which simply add up so that the 
insertion of a new process does not alter the existing processes. For example, in order 
to determine the neuro-anatomical correlates of the phonological loop by cognitive 
subtraction, one needs two verbal tasks, which differ in only one process, the short-
term maintenance of information. In a PET study of verbal WM, Awh et al. (1996) 
employed two tasks, using identical materials. The participants were presented with 
several letters on the screen, followed by a probe letter, which they had to classify as 
belonging or not to the initially presented set of letters. The only difference between 
the two tasks was that the WM task had a delay inserted between the set of letters and 
the probe. According to the cognitive subtraction logic, the subtraction of brain 
activation of the no-delay (control) task from the delay (WM) task should reveal the 
anatomical correlates of WM, without confounding it with other processes (perception, 
motor response), equivalent in the two tasks. The results revealed several regions in 
the left hemisphere that showed more activation in the delay, compared to the no-delay 
tasks, i.e. prefrontal (Broca's area, the premotor area and the supplementary motor 
area: Brodmann Areas, BAs, 44 and 6) and parietal (BA 40) regions (see Fig 1). A 
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very similar, left-Iateralised pattern of activation was revealed by Paulesu et al. (1993), 
who used the same imaging technique (PET), the same tasks and the same type of 
methodology (subtraction). 
In their study, A wh et al. (1996) have also used an additional verbal WM task, in 
which participants were presented with letters in a sequence of trials and on each trial 
they had to compare the currently presented letter with the one that appeared two trials 
ago. The task is referred to as 2-back and is a version ofn-back tasks (Kirchner, 1958; 
see Chapter 9 for a detailed discussion ofn-back tasks). As a non-WM control, Awh et 
al. (1996) used the same stimuli, but asked participants to compare the letter on each 
trial to one target letter, learned before the task started. This kind of control task is 
often referred to as "O-back". The subtraction of the O-back from the 2-back task 
revealed activation of the same set ofleft prefrontal (BA 44 and BA 6) and left-
parietal (BA 40) areas. Subsequently, a large corpus of neuroimaging studies 
confirmed the left-lateralised character of activation in verbal WM tasks (for a review, 
see Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000). Moreover, left-Iateralised activation of BA 44 (Broca's 
area) in tasks containing verbal WM requirements has been one of the most reliable 
findings in the neuroimaging literature. 
Importantly, activation of Broca's area in verbal WM tasks is not confined to cognitive 
subtraction paradigms. The "pure insertion" logic of the latter has been recently 
questioned, despite its wide use in neuroimaging studies (Friston et aI., 1996). For 
example, adding memory requirements to a search task may lead to a perceptual re-
organisation, such that the activation left after subtracting the search task would not 
only reflect memory, but perceptual re-organisation as well (Smith et aI., 1998). In 
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other words, the insertion of additional processes may change the nature of the 
existing ones. Therefore, some investigators turned to the so-called parametric 
variation designs, employed earlier in neuroimaging studies of long-term memory. In a 
parametric study of verbal WM (Jonides et aI., 1997), load was varied by 
incrementally changing the value of n in an n-back task, generating 4 levels of the task 
(O-back, I-back, 2-back and 3-back). Significant monotonic increases in activation in 
response to an increasing memory load could serve as a reliable indication of role of 
that region in verbal WM. Such increases were found in several, predominantly left-
hemispheric, brain regions. Left prefrontal and left-parietal cortices showed the 
highest activity among those regions. 
Several neuroimaging studies aimed to differentiate between storage and rehearsal in 
the phonological loop (Baddeley, 1986,2000). If such differentiation can be identified 
at a neuroanatomicallevel, then a simple prediction would be that amongst left-sided 
prefrontal and parietal areas active in the verbal WM task, some had to be involved 
predominantly in storage and others in rehearsal. In the n-back task study outlined 
earlier (Awh et aI., 1996), in addition to the O-back control task, there was a control in 
which participants were repeatedly presented with the same sequence of letters and 
asked to press a key when they saw a letter and then silently rehearse it until they saw 
the next letter. If storage and rehearsal are dissociable, the subtraction of this task from 
the 2-back task should only leave the activity of areas associated with storage. Indeed, 
the authors found only activity in the parietal area and all the left prefrontal activity 
(Broca's area, left premotor and supplementary motor areas) observed in the 2-backJO-
back contrast was removed now by the control task containing rehearsal. 
37 
Part I. Emotion and cognitive processing. Background 
Paulesu et al. (1993) also had a second control involving rehearsal, which was 
contrasted with the item recognition WM task. Participants were presented with letters 
and they had to silently judge whether those letters rhymed with a target letter. It was 
assumed that rhyming judgements required sub-vocal articulatory activity, but did not 
contain memory (storage) requirements. As expected, the subtraction of this task from 
the WM task left only the left parietal activation. These results suggest that the 
prefrontal regions shown in the neuropsychological literature to be associated with 
speech generation (Broca's area, BA 44, premotor and suplementary motor areas, BA 
6, see Fig.l) are the most likely anatomical substrate for the rehearsal mechanism in 
the phonological loop. Since Broca's area has been associated with the production of 
speech, the outcomes from the imaging investigations are consistent with the proposal 
by Baddeley and collaborators (Baddeley, 1986,2000) that rehearsal of verbal material 
has the fonn of are-play of the speech (articulatory) codes. On the other hand, storage 
seems to rely on parietal regions (BA 40), and there is considerable evidence from 
conduction aphasia, caused by lesions to the left parietal cortex, of impainnents of 
storage, e.g. the inability to say words backwards, in the absence of speech production 
or rehearsal problems. 
However, while the neuroimaging evidence discussed above does suggest that left 
prefrontal and parietal areas (Broca's area, the supplimentary motor and premotor 
areas, BA 40) are the brain regions that support verbal WM, this is not evidence that 
these brain areas are specifically associated with verbal WM and do not subserve 
spatial WM as well. This issue was addressed in neuroimaging studies of spatial WM 
that used similar paradigms (mainly subtraction) and equivalent tasks (item 
identification, n-back). Such studies do not find left-Iateralised prefrontal and parietal 
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activation (Smith et aI., 1998). Moreover, some of the areas considered to be . 
intimately associated with the phonological loop (e.g. Broca's area) are rarely found 
active at all in studies of spatial WM (see Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000). When verbal and 
spatial WM are shown to activate overlapping areas (e.g. parietal areas), the activation 
tends to be left-Iateralised in verbal tasks and bilateral in spatial WM tasks (Smith et 
aI., 1998). 
There have been some reports of right-Iateralised prefrontal and parietal activity in 
spatial WM tasks. For example, Jonides et aI. (1993) used an item recognition 
paradigm similar to the one employed in a verbal WM study described above (Awh et 
aI., 1996). As in Awh et aI., there were two recognition tasks: one with a delay 
between the stimulus set and the probe (WM condition) and one without a delay 
(control task). The critical differences, compared to Awh et aI.'s verbal WM study, 
Were the stimuli and the instructions. Jonides et al. (1993) used dots instead of letters 
and asked their participants to determine whether the location of the probe dot is one 
of the locations of three dots presented earlier. The pattern of brain activation was 
clearly distinct from those found by Awh et al. (1996). As in the study of verbal WM, 
significant differences between the WM and the control task were also found in 
prefrontal (BA 47, BA 6) and parietal (BA 40) regions. However these activation foci 
were found in the right, and not the left, hemisphere. In addition right-sighted 
activation was found in one brain region, whose activity has not been observed in 
verbal WM tasks- the right anterior occipital cortex (BA 19). Predominantly right-
sided activation in spatial WM tasks was also found in other studies (e.g. Reuter-
Lorenz et aI., 2000). Additional evidence that distinguishes spatial WM from verbal 
WM is provided by behavioural, electrophysiological and neuroimaging investigations 
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of the role of vi suo-spatial attention in spatial, but not verbal, WM (this evidence is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 8). 
To summarise, WM is well described both in terms of its cognitive architecture and 
neuro-anatomical correlates (Baddeley, 2000; Smith & Jonides, 1998, 1999; Smith et 
aI., 1998). Although some issues are still awaiting investigation (e.g. integration of 
verbal and semantic memory, rehearsal and storage in spatial WM, the presence of de-
centralised attentional mechanisms), there is ample behavioural evidence for the 
functional segregation of WM and studies of functional neuroanatomy of WM provide 
additional support for this (Awh et aI., 1996; Jonides et aI., 1993; Paulesu et aI., 1993, 
Smith & Jonides, 1998). In addition there are biologically-driven computational 
models of WM which aim to integrate behavioural. neuroimaging and biochemical 
data (O'Reilly et aI., 1999,2001; in press). These models also implement a distinction 
between maintenance and executive (gating) mechanisms. 
The following chapters examine the differential involvement of the Central Executive 
WM component in cognitive tasks found to be differentially modulated by positive 
mood. 
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PART II. EFFECTS OF EMOTION ON 
ANALYTICAL AND CREATIVE TASKS: 
A CENTRAL EXECUTIVE ACCOUNT 
There is one domain that combines features otherwise shown only in isolation in the 
literatures on effects of mood on cognition discussed in Chapter 1. It is the domain 
centred on the effects of positive mood. For instance, it has been found that positive 
mood facilitates insight! creative problem-solving (Isen et aI., 1987), while impairing 
analytical (deductive) reasoning (Oaksford et aI., 1996). Importantly, the information-
processing aspects of these effects have been accounted for in terms of differential 
modulation of the Central Executive component of WM (Oaksford et aI., 1996). The 
neurobiological correlates of these effects have also been the object of careful scrutiny 
(Ashby et aI., 1999). For the above reasons the differential effects of positive mood on 
creative and analytical tasks were taken as the starting point in the current 
investigations of affect-modulated WM processing. 
The studies that are reported here (Chapters 6 and 7) are based on prior investigations 
of differential effects of positive mood on cognitive tasks. However, these studies did 
not manipulate mood. Instead their aim was to test one of the key assumptions that 
underlies the explanation of differential effects of positive mood on analytical vs. 
creative tasks in terms of the Central Executive, namely that creative and analytical 
tasks make different demands on the Central Executive. Though there are good 
reasons to believe that the latter is true and there are behavioural and neuro-biological 
data indirectly suggesting this, there has not been a direct test of the differential WM 
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demands of analytical and creative tasks. Studies 1 and 2 presented below perform 
such a test, on both the behavioural and the neurophysiological levels. 
Prior to reporting our studies we will discuss the evidence available to date regarding 
the differential effects of positive mood on insight and deductive tasks. It is important 
to review this evidence in order to see how the assumption tested in the studies 
reported later emerged from the extant literature. In Chapter 3, an outline of this 
evidence is provided. In addition, in Chapter 3 a biologically-plausible model of the 
effects of positive mood on cognition is discussed in conjunction with related 
biologically-driven computational accounts of WM processing. The link between the 
effects of positive mood and WM is further developed in Chapter 4, with an emphasis 
on the Central Executive component of WM, and predictions are formulated with 
regard to the involvement of the Central Executive in different types of tasks. In 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 it is reported how these predictions were tested. 
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Chapter 3. Differential effects of positive mood on creative (insight) vs. analytical 
(reasoning) performance 
3.1. Cognitive tasks facilitated by positive mood 
Several groups of investigators, most notably Isen and colleagues (Greene & Noice, 
1988; Estrada et aI.. 1994. 1997; Isen et aI.. 1987; Kahn & Isen. 1993). have examined 
the effects of induced positive and negative mood on several types of tasks, thought to 
tax creative processes. There are five types of tasks which are particularly relevant in 
the current context: it is possible that the facilitation of these tasks by positive mood 
can, at least in part, be explained by the interaction between positive mood and WM. 
1. A series of experiments (Estrada et aI., 1994. 1997) investigated expert problem-
solving in organisational contexts in conditions of positive or neutral mood. Positive 
mood was induced. in most cases. via small, but unexpected. monetary rewards. For 
example, in one study. professional doctors were asked to reach a diagnosis on the 
basis of a number of symptoms. These problems could only be solved by non-
traditional approaches to the presented set of symptoms. It was found that in 
conditions of positive mood participants were more likely to solve the diagnosis 
problems, i.e. they were more likely to adopt a novel. non-traditional approach 
(Estrada et aI., 1997). 
2. In another design, employed for testing the influence of positive mood on flexibility 
of choices, participants were asked to make a number of choices from the same set of 
items (e.g. food items). It was found that the elicitation of positive mood led to more 
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diverse choices. as long as the chosen items were not associated with negative 
outcomes (Kahn & Isen, 1993). 
3. The Remote Associates Test was initially designed for testing individual differences 
in creativity (Mednick, 1962). In the original version, participants were presented with 
three unrelated words and asked to generate a word, which would be associated with 
each of the original three words. Isen and colleagues (Isen et aI., 1987) employed the 
Remote Associates Test for investigating the effects of positive mood on creativity. 
The authors employed film clips as an experimental mood induction procedure. 
Participants who performed the test after watching films with a positive affective 
content generated significantly more valid remote associates compared to participants 
who saw a neutral film clip or to participants who saw no film. Participants who saw a 
negative film clip did not perform differently from the control groups. 
4. Verbal fluency, which was briefly introduced earlier in the discussion of the 
resource allocation model (see Chapter 1), is a widely employed task. In 
neuropsychological studies verbal fluency has been shown to be a reliable measure of 
frontal lobe function (Benton, 1968), with left-hemispheric dominance. This 
lateralisation pattern was confirmed in neuroimaging studies of verbal fluency, which 
reveal predominant activation in the left PFC and left parietal cortex (Phelps et aI., 
1997). The results from the neuroimaging study of the effects of experimentally 
induced depressed mood on verbal fluency (Baker et aI., 1997). discussed earlier in the 
context of the resource allocation model, showed that regional brain activity in this 
task can be modulated by negative affect. One of the important features of verbal 
fluency is that participants have to avoid repetitions of the previously generated items. 
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which implies that the latter have to be kept track of, but at the same time kept 
relatively inactive so that they do not overshadow the current response. Patients with 
damage to the frontal lobe, especially on the left side, tend to have deficits switching 
to the next response (Benton, 1968). Another interesting insight provided by studies of 
"frontal" patients is that they tend to approach the task differently. The analysis of the 
items generated by neurologically intact controls showed that they tend to apply 
certain strategies (e.g. say the items they see around them, focus on items from a 
certain category until it is exhausted, etc.). Individuals with frontal lobe damage do not 
seem to make much use of such strategies and their responses are much less 
predictable from the previous items. 
What made verbal fluency attractive to investigators of creativity (Isen et aI., 1987) is 
the requirement to suppress the preceding responses and move on to novel items. 
Creative thinking is also assumed to heavily rely on the ability to easily switch to new 
responses (Ashby et aI., 1999). Further, the generated items can be characterised in 
terms of their semantic "distance" from each other. The more able the participant is to 
inhibit previous response tendencies, the greater the "distance" between different 
items. Moreover, if the task is performed via utilisation of strategies for generating 
new items, then a creative approach would be associated with rapid shifts of strategies, 
or semantic categories to which these are applied, or with less common strategies. 
Consequently, if positive mood were to facilitate creativity in the verbal fluency task, 
it would lead to an overall advantage in terms of the number of generated items, and 
also to less common responses. This is precisely what was found in studies of effects 
of induced positive mood on verbal fluency (Greene & Noice, 1988). 
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Some interesting results were obtained by Bartolic et al. (1999) who compared the 
effects of induced positive and negative mood on verbal and spatial fluency. This 
study was already mentioned earlier in the context of interhemispheric asymmetry 
models of emotion. The authors found better verbal fluency following positive mood 
induction as compared to negative induction, with the opposite effect on spatial 
fluency, the latter being better after negative than positive mood induction. 
Unfortunately, the authors do not report the effects relative to the neutral state 
(baseline), which makes these data difficult to consider in the present context. 
Furthermore, Velten statements were used for inducing mood changes and the only 
baseline condition in the experiment was the one with no statements, i.e. there was no 
control condition with affectively neutral statements preceding verbal fluency. 
5. The fifth type of cognitive tasks, whose facilitation by positive mood has been 
documented, is insight problem-solving. The phenomenon of "insight" was first 
systematically investigated by members of the Gestalt school of psychology (Duncker, 
1945; Maier, 1931). It refers to problem situations that seem unsolvable where the 
obvious approach to the problem is not productive ("impasse" - Ohlsson, 1984a,b), but 
where the solver finds no alternatives to the obvious approach ("fixation"). However, a 
proportion of people may reach the solution rather suddenly and unexpectedly (the 
"aha" experience). Since insight problems are ill-defined, as compared to other types 
of problems, and since they often require people to transpose themselves into non-
trivial situations, a relationship between creativity and insight has been postulated by 
numerous authors (Metcalfe, 1986a,b; Ohlsson, 1984a,b). Therefore, these problems 
have attracted the interest of researchers of modulation of creativity by positive mood. 
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3.2. Positive mood and insight problems 
In an influential study of the effects of mood on creativity, Isen et al. (1987) divided 
their participants into four groups. Three groups saw film clips (with positive, negative 
and neutral affective content) and one served as a no-film control. Following the film 
clips, participants were asked to solve one insight problem (the Candle Task, Duncker, 
1945, see Fig. 4, Chapter 6, for the problem content). The authors found that in the 
positive mood condition significantly more participants found the solution, as 
compared to all other three conditions. Performance on the insight task did not 
distinguish between the negative-film, the neutral-film and the no-film conditions. Isen 
et al. (1987) concluded that positive mood facilitates insight problem-solving. This 
conclusion was strengthened by the results from an independent group (Greene & 
Noice, 1988), which also found that positive mood improved performance on the same 
insight problem as in Isen et al. (1987). 
When one carefully considers the data on the facilitatory effects of positive mood on a 
variety of tasks assumed to involve creative thinking, two kinds of questions may 
arise. Firstly, despite ecological considerations in favour of the common creativity 
thread in these tasks, they are rather different in their demands, stimuli, etc. Therefore, 
there is need for a more elaborate theoretical framework, which would explain how 
these different tasks are modulated by positive mood, beyond the mere assumption 
that they make similar creative demands. Secondly, it has been claimed above that the 
effects of positive mood on cognitive processing are rather specific. This is not 
obvious from the similar effects of positive mood on the five tasks mentioned above. 
Thus, it is necessary to examine if there are tasks with which positive mood interacts 
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in a different way. These two issues will be covered in sections 3.3 and 3.4, 
respectively. 
3.3. Positive mood and creative tasks: the dopamine theory 
A significant insight into understanding the effects of positive mood on creative 
thinking was provided by the consideration of a neurobiological factor that may playa 
crucial role both in positive affect and in cognitive processes requiring creativity- the 
neurotransmitter dopamine. Dopamine belongs to the family ofneuromodulators 
referred to as monoamines, i.e. neurochemicals made of one elementary protein 
molecule- one amine. Together with two other monoamines, epinephrine and 
norepinephrine, dopamine constitutes the subclass of catecholamines. Two 
dopaminergic systems are well-documented. The mesostriatal (or nigrostriatal) system 
consists of dopamine-producing cells in substantia nigra pars compacta that project to 
the striatum (one of the basal ganglia structures; basal ganglia- a group of nuclei at 
the base of the brain, see Fig. 2). This system is critical for the control of motor 
activity, its dysfunction leading to severe movement disturbances (e.g. Parkinson's 
disease). The second prominent dopaminergic system is referred to as the 
mesocorticolimbic system. It is composed of dopamine-producing cells in the ventral 
tegmental area, whose projections are somewhat more diverse than those of substantia 
nigra cells. Fibres from the ventral tegmental area innervate vast territories in the PFC, 
as well as the anterior cingulate, the amygdala, the hippocampus, the olfactory bulb 
and cortex, and the nucleus accumbens. The mesocorticolimbic system is intimately 
involved in processing reward stimuli (Wickens, 1990) and is particularly relevant in 
the present context. However, the two systems are interconnected, especially via the 
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amygdala and the nucleus accumbens, and functional changes in one system are 
strongly reflected in the other. 
As mentioned above, there is considerable evidence for the role of the 
mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic system in the processing of reward. For example, it 
has been established that the amount of dopamine released in the ventral tegmental 
area increases after the presentation of rewarding stimuli (Wickens, 1990). It has to be 
noted that reward, at least in humans, is closely associated with positive affect. 
Moreover, the amount of dopamine released decreases once reward becomes 
predictable (Schultz, 1992), which parallels the effects observed with elicitation of 
positive mood: gifts are more effective in inducing positive mood when they are 
unanticipated. Further, drugs that mimic the effects of dopamine (i.e. dopamine 
agonists) produce similar effects to rewarding stimuli (Beatty, 1995). Naturally 
produced substances associated with feelings of pleasure (i.e. the endorphins) 
stimulate the dopamine system, thus increasing their own effect (Harte et aI., 1995). 
Finally, neuroleptics (dopamine antagonists) are known to flatten affect or even induce 
depression (Kumari et aI., 1998). 
In addition to its well-documented role in the processing of reward (hence, in positive 
affect), the mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic system has been more recently associated 
with the ability to switch contexts or to update cognitive representations. It was 
already said above that dopamine projections originating in the ventral tegmental reach 
the PFC. Several recent experiments with animals suggested that the updating of 
previously learned WM contents is disrupted by the reduction in the dopaminergic 
innervation ofPFC (Schultz et aI., 1993). On the basis of these data, the proponents of 
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several biologically-plausible computational models of WM processing assumed that 
information in WM is only updated after dopaminergic input from the basal ganglia 
into the PFC reaches a certain threshold (O'Reilly et aI., 1999; Frank et aI., 2001). In 
other words dopaminergic projections from the basal ganglia onto PFC act as a gate 
for the information flow into WM. The increase in dopamine flow beyond a certain 
threshold opens the "gate" and WM contents can be updated. 
A model that integrates the dopamine-reward and dopamine-updating functions is the 
dopamine theory of the influence of positive mood on cognitive processing (Ashby et 
aI, 1999). The model proposes that positive mood is associated with increases in 
dopamine release in both the above-mentioned dopaminergic systems, but especially 
in the mesocorticolimbic system. The increases in dopaminergic input into cortical 
territories (e.g. PFC) facilitate certain types of cognitive processing. In concordance 
with the biologically-plausible models of WM by O'Reilly and co-workers (Frank et 
aI., 2001; O'Reilly et aI., 1999), the increase in dopaminergic turnover in the PFC 
leads to an easier updating of information WM. Ashby et al. (1999) propose a similar 
effect of dopamine in the anterior cingulate, with regard to the involvement of the 
latter in response selection. Importantly, not all increases in the amounts of dopamine 
are assumed to be beneficial. The relationship between the levels of dopamine and the 
task performance is proposed to have an inverted V-shaped function, with moderately-
high levels of dopamine being the most beneficial for certain tasks. Inappropriately 
high levels of dopamine may lead to inopportune and maladaptive switching, as 
documented in schizophrenia (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). This disorder 
is characterised by very frequent context switching and also by abnormally high levels 
of dopamine. Ashby et al. (1999) discuss a number of cognitive tasks, in particular the 
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five types of tasks presented earlier (see 3.1), and show that the facilitatory effects of 
positive mood on all these tasks can be explained in terms of increased dopaminergic 
input to the PFC and the anterior cingulate, since all five tasks critically depend on the 
ability to update or switch the response perspective. 
In conclusion, the model provides an elegant unifying account of both normal and 
abnormal performance. At the same time, Ashby et al. (1999) also state that the model 
does not predict facilitatory effects of positive mood on processes that are subserved 
by brain areas that do not receive dopaminergic projections. Furthermore, the model 
admits that high levels of dopamine can disrupt processes that are dependent on 
cortical regions rich in dopaminergic projections, but it assumes that positive mood 
rarely leads to exacerbated levels of dopamine and that it is more likely to induce 
moderate increases. Yet, as it will be proposed below, even moderate levels of positive 
mood can make WM updating inappropriately frequent! intense, with negative 
consequences for certain cognitive processes/ tasks. 
3.4. Tasks disrupted by positive mood 
In a series of carefully designed experiments, Oaksford et al. (1996) investigated the 
effects of experimentally induced positive and negative mood on analytical thinking. 
Interestingly, one of the main motivations for the authors was the finding by Isen and 
co-workers (lsen et aI., 1987) of facilitation of insight problem-solving performance 
by induced positive mood. Oaksford and colleagues attempted to determine whether 
the effects of positive mood on analytical tasks would also be facilitatory. They chose 
to employ a well-known deductive reasoning task, Wason's Selection Task (Wason, 
51 
Part II. Analytical and creative tasks: a Central Executive account 
1966, 1968). In this task participants are presented with a conditional rule and four 
instances which could potentially obey or violate the rule, and asked to choose only 
the instances that could violate the rule. The task has several versions, which have 
been classified as abstract or concrete. The main difference between the two types is 
that the concrete type presents the logical contents of the task in a real-life situation. 
Performance on abstract versions has been shown to be very low (about 4% logically 
valid responses, Wason, 1968), as compared to performance on concrete versions (up 
to 90% logically valid responses, Cheng & Hollyoak, 1985). Different versions of the 
task are discussed in detail in Chapter 6. Oaksford et al. (1996) employed a concrete 
version of Wason's Selection Task. The design and mood induction procedure were 
very similar to the ones from Isen et ai. 's (1987) study of insight problem-solving. 
Prior to the reasoning task, some participants were shown a film-clip and some were 
not. Further, there were three kinds of clips: affectively-neutral, with positive affective 
content and with negative affective content. Oaksford et ai. (1996) found that both 
positive and negative mood had a disruptive effect on reasoning performance. Positive 
mood was also found to impair performance on a Central Executive task (the Tower of 
London task, Shallice, 1982). At a general level, Oaksford et al. (1996) interpreted the 
effects of positive mood in terms of the resource allocation framework (Ellis & 
Ashbrook, 1987), with resources being reallocated in the positive mood condition 
from the reasoning task to mood-related processing. At a more detailed level, the 
authors explained the outcome in terms of the depletion of the Central Executive 
component of WM by both positive and negative induced mood. Furthermore, in 
discussing the apparent contradiction between their finding of impaired reasoning 
performance in conditions of positive mood and the facilitatory effects of positive 
mood on insight tasks found by other authors (Isen et aI., 1987), Oaksford et ai. (1996) 
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proposed that this contradiction may be explainable by differential demands of the two 
types of tasks. Reasoning was proposed to rely on Central Executive/ WM processing, 
whereas insight and other creative tasks on retrieval from long-term memory. The 
implications of this proposal are discussed in what follows. 
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Chapter 4. Positive mood and the Central Executive component of WM 
4.1. Mood, reasoning and the Central Executive 
In order to further validate their explanation based on Central Executive processes, 
Oaksford et ai. (1996) employed two additional manipulations. It has been argued that 
the demands on the Central Executive are especially high when WM is involved in 
two or more tasks concurrently (Shallice, 1988). Furthermore, syllogistic reasoning 
has been shown to rely on cortical regions reliably associated with WM (e.g. PFC). 
The use of random number generation as a concurrent task was shown to disrupt 
syllogistic reasoning (Gilhooly et aI., 1993). Consequently, Oaksford et aI's account 
that the effects of positive mood on Wason's Selection Task were caused by depletion 
of the Central Executive would predict a similar impairment of the reasoning 
performance in the presence of a concurrent task. Oaksford et ai. (1996) tested this 
prediction in their second experiment and confirmed it. Furthermore, a detailed 
analysis of participants' responses in Wason's Selection task in the first and second 
experiments revealed similar confirmatory strategies in participants' responses when 
reasoning took place in the presence of positive mood or in the presence of the 
Concurrent task. 
An alternative, more direct, way of probing the induced mood-Central Executive 
account is to take a task known to heavily depend on the Central Executive, and test 
the effects of induced positive and negative mood on this task. This was precisely 
What Oaksford et al. (1996) did in their third experiment. They chose to use the Tower 
of London Task (Shallice, 1982), developed for investigating the Supervisory 
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Attentional System (Norman & Shallice, 1986) model of the Central Executive. It was 
shown that tests of verbal and spatial ability were poor predictors of the performance 
on the Tower of London Task, taken to indicate that the task has little relationship to 
the verbal and spatial slave-systems in WM (Shallice, 1982). Consequently, it was 
argued that the task engages primarily executive processes. Oaksford et al. (1996) 
found that positive affect impairs performance on this task, as it does on Wason's 
Selection Task. In contrast, the effects of negative mood on the Tower of London Task 
were not statistically distinguishable from the affectively-neutral control. Therefore, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the explanation of disruptive effects of mood on 
reasoning in terms of the Central Executive depletion holds reliably only for positive 
mood. 
4.2. Differential effects of positive mood: different WM demands? 
The outlined evidence regarding positive mood and cognition, i.e. from studies by Isen 
et al. (1987) and Oaksford et al. (1996), strongly suggests a differential pattern of 
effects exerted by positive mood on cognitive tasks. In particular, induced positive 
mood appeared to facilitate performance on tasks requiring flexibility or creativity, but 
it seemed to hinder reasoning and other analytical performance. The facilitatory effects 
of positive mood on tasks involving creativity and cognitive flexibility have been 
explained in terms of the impact of dopaminergic circuits on the ability of rapidly and 
effectively update cognitive representations (e.g. the representations in WM) (Ashby 
et aI., 1999). On the other hand, the disruptive effects of positive mood on reasoning 
Were mimicked by the effects of a concurrent task, suggesting the relationship between 
the negative influence of positive mood and the Central Executive. Moreover, induced 
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positive mood also impaired the performance on a task which has been directly related 
to the Central Executive component ofWM, the Tower of London Task, which gives 
further credit to the explanation of the disruptive effects of positive mood on deductive 
reasoning in terms of depletion of the Central Executive resources in conditions of 
positive mood (Oaksford et aI., 1996). 
A proposal that seems to follow logically is that the two types of tasks make 
differential demands on WM processing. It is conceivable that the five types of tasks 
assumed to require creativity/cognitive flexibility, discussed in the context of 
facilitatory effects of positive mood, may not require rigorous strategy application and 
accurate memory of the intermediary processing steps. For example, the failure to 
remember accurately all the words that were generated in a verbal fluency task or 
searched in the Remote Associates test is unlikely to seriously affect performance. In 
contrast, analytical tasks seem to be critically dependent on the accuracy of 
intermediary representations in WM. Such representations can be demanding in at 
least two kinds of circumstances. 
Firstly, there are analytical tasks that require a relatively large number of intermediary 
steps (e.g. some versions of the Tower of London Task, see Eysenck & Keane, 2000) 
and the accurate maintenance of these steps can be difficult. Secondly, there are 
analytical tasks that have a large and complex set of starting conditions. These 
conditions need to be re-activated simultaneously with the response options being 
examined at any stage during the task. Such simultaneous access is likely to be very 
demanding for WM. Wason's Selection Task can be viewed as an example of such a 
task. It comprises a rather complex set of initial instructions (including the conditional 
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statement) that need to be activated with high fidelity and examined simultaneously 
with potential outcomes of choosing one of the four cards in the response set. 
Therefore, it seems likely that the control of such intermediary processing makes a 
significant demand on the Central Executive component of WM. 
On the other hand, high accuracy in intermediary processing may be detrimental for 
tasks like verbal fluency, the Remote Associates or insight problems, because it may 
impede what is essential in these tasks, namely the ability to rapidly switch among 
alternative representations/responses. Hence, it is possible that in such tasks the 
optimal strategy is a trade-off between accuracy/detail of intermediary WM contents 
and rapid/frequent updating of those contents. Since these considerations are 
somewhat speculative, one should examine the evidence that would support the claim 
that creative processes are less reliant on memory for intermediary steps than are 
analytical processes. At least with regard to one type of creative tasks, there seems to 
be compelling evidence suggesting their limited reliance on the Central Executive. 
4.3. Insight problem-solving and its demands on the Central Executive 
Three properties of insight problem-solving are of particular importance for examining 
the demands insight tasks make on WM. Firstly, insight tasks are ill-defined as 
compared to other tasks (Eysenck & Keane, 2000). For example, some analytical 
tasks, such as the Tower of London are explicit with regard to the type of allowed 
responses. Other analytical tasks (e.g. Wason's Selection Task) implicitly provide the 
complete range of possible responses, which is the total number of combinations of 
between one and four cards. Typically insight tasks are less explicit with regard to 
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such information. Hence, as has been argued above, it is likely that there is more 
information available to the problem-solver in analytical tasks and this information has 
to be manipulated in WM. 
Secondly, people are less able to verbally report the intermediary steps during insight 
problem-solving (Metcalfe, 1986a,b; Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987). Moreover, verbal 
reports were shown to hinder performance on insight tasks. For instance, Schooler et 
al. (1993) asked participants to verbalise their thoughts as they were solving analytical 
and insight problems. Concurrent verbalisation seemed to facilitate analytical 
performance, but impaired performance on insight tasks. The authors concluded that 
insight problem-solving engages processes that are not readily accessible to verbal 
report. They also compared the negative effects of verbalisation on insight with similar 
effects of verbalisation on other tasks and suggested that all these tasks seem to be less 
amenable to analytical approaches. This would be consistent with the idea that insight 
is less dependent on the types of processing that the Central Executive component of 
WM coordinates. However, the conclusions based on the effects of verbalisation on 
insight are open to the following criticism: they are based on the rather strong 
assumption that analytical approaches rely predominantly on verbal processing. Yet, 
influential theories of reasoning, considered to be analytical (Oaksford et aI., 1996), 
stress its visuo-spatial character (Johnson-Laird, 1995). 
Thirdly, people are not only less able to report the intermediary problem-solving steps 
in insight, they are also less aware of the proximity of the solution in insight tasks, as 
compared to other tasks. This leads to the unexpected character ("suddenness") of 
solution to insight tasks. In a series of ingeniously designed experiments Metcalfe and 
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Wiebe (1987), asked their participants to provide patterns-of-warmth feedback 
depending on how close they were to solving the problem. Subsequently, participants' 
patterns-of-warmth were found to be a good predictor of their solution times on 
algebra problems, but not of solution times on insight tasks. This suggests that people 
are less aware of the processes underlying insight even when such awareness does not 
need to be expressed verbally. Furthermore, these data also suggest a non-incremental, 
discontinuous character of insight problem-solving. Additional evidence for the non-
incremental character of creative processes was provided by a psychophysiological 
study in which heart-rate was measured during creative and analytical problems 
(Jausovec & Bakrasevic, 1995). A gradual, incremental increase in heart-rate preceded 
the solution to analytical tasks, whereas an abrupt increase in heart-rate happened 
before the solution to creative tasks was found. The low level of awareness in insight 
processes is in sharp contrast to what characterises WM processing, in particular its 
Central Executive functioning. It has been proposed by numerous authors that WM 
and, in particular, the Central Executive and its conceptual equivalent, the Supervisory 
Attentional System are among the most essential mechanisms subserving awareness 
(or conscious awareness) (Baddeley, 1986; Norman & Shallice; 1986; Shallice, 1988). 
4.4. More on positive mood and the Central Executive 
The above considerations are consistent with the idea that insight processes are less 
dependent on the Central Executive component of WM than are analytical processes 
(e.g. reasoning). It also seems likely that this difference between the two kinds of tasks 
could explain the differential effects of positive mood on them. Positive mood may 
induce a fast-updating processing mode, associated with relatively loose Central 
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Executive functioning, which may be beneficial for certain processes (e.g. insight), but 
detrimental to other processes (e.g. reasoning). A series of recent studies by Phillips 
(2001) appear to provide further support for this presupposition. The author examined 
the effects of positive mood on several cognitive tasks. As in Isen et aI., (1987) and 
Oaksford et al. (1996) positive mood was induced by means ofpositively-valenced 
film clips. The manipulation of interest in the study was the comparison between tasks 
that required rapid switching from one response to the next (Le. verbal fluency) with 
tasks that also require such switching, but which also require continuous control over 
the response criteria. Phillips (2001) contrasted a traditional version of verbal fluency 
and uses fluency with a modified version in which participants had to alternate 
between the two fluency tasks. 
The outcome was that positive mood led to more responses in verbal fluency and in 
uses fluency, but fewer responses when participants had to alternate between the tasks. 
Similar effects were found with the Stroop task. Positive mood speeded up responses 
When participants were asked to perform the Stroop task according to one criterium, 
but slowed down responses when participants were asked to alternate between naming 
criteria. Importantly, as shown by the levels of performance on the tasks with or 
without alternation, the observed effects of mood could not be explained in terms of 
task difficulty (e.g. with easier tasks being facilitated and harder task disrupted). 
Phillips (2001) explained the differential effect of positive mood in terms of disruption 
of the Central Executive. Evidently, this account rests on the assumption that the 
alternation of task criteria makes a higher demand on Central Executive resources, as 
compared to processing in accordance with individual criteria. This assumption has 
considerable appeal, considering the poor performance of frontal patients on tasks, 
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such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, requiring frequent shifts in the employed 
criteria. Importantly, the position held by Phillips (2001) makes a distinction between 
shifts between responses, which require relatively little Central Executive/WM 
capacity, and shifts in criteria, which require an accurate representation of the criteria 
necessary at any processing step. Furthermore, alternating tasks is in many respects 
similar to performing tasks concurrently. The latter, i.e. dual-task processing, has been 
consistently linked to the functioning of the Central Executive (Baddeley, 1986; 
Shallice, 1988). 
4.5. Testing WM differences hetween insight and analytical processes 
It has been concluded above that the literature on the modulation of cognitive 
processing by positive mood meets several important criteria. The reviewed studies 
examined the effects of normal mood, rather than clinical or sub-clinical 
manifestations of emotion, which eliminates potential cognitive confounds present in 
affective disorders. Further, in contrast to generalized effects of emotion discussed in 
Chapter 1, intriguing differential results were found with positive mood: facilitation of 
performance on some tasks (lsen et aI., 1987; Greene & Noice, 1988) and impaired 
performance on other tasks (Oaksford et aI., 1996). Importantly, such differential 
effects were also observed in tasks that were well matched psychometrically (i.e. 
alternated vs. non-alternated verbal fluency and Stroop tasks (Phillips, 200 I). 
Moreover, the differential effects of positive mood on cognitive processing have been 
explained (Oaksford et aI., 1996) in terms of a relatively well-defined and well-
investigated cognitive construct, i.e. WM and its Central Executive component 
(Baddeley and Hitch, 1974, Baddeley, 1986,2000). Finally, a neurobiological model 
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proposed to account for the facilitatory effects of positive mood can accommodate the 
disruptive effects of positive mood on some cognitive tasks (the dopamine model, 
Ashby et aI., 1999), in conjunction with recent biologically plausible computational 
models of the role of dopamine in WM (O'Reilly et aI., 1999). In particular, the model 
by O'Reilly et al. (1999) proposes that dopamine controls the balance between the 
stability vs. the plasticity ofWM contents. High levels of dopamine increase the 
likelihood of updating the WM contents. Following from the explanatory logic of 
Oaksford et al. (1996), positive mood may lead to levels of dopamine that induce 
inappropriately frequent (or extensive) updates ofWM contents in detriment of their 
stability. 
The idea that positive mood has differential effects on cognitive processes that differ 
in their demands on the Central Executive component of WM has considerable appeal. 
Nevertheless, the logical argumentation concerning the differential effects of positive 
mood on tasks requiring creativity and flexibility vs. tasks demanding accurate 
analytical processing rests largely on indirect support. There is little direct evidence 
for the differential WM involvement in creative vs. analytical tasks. Studies 1 and 2, 
reported below, represent an investigation of the WM correlates of insight and 
analytical (reasoning) processes. A direct comparison is performed between the 
Central Executive involvement in the two types of tasks both at the level of 
behavioural performance as well as at the level of brain electrical activity, recorded by 
means of Event-Related Potentials. 
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Chapter 5. Methodological considerations 
5.1. Concurrent task methodology 
The present investigation proposes to compare two types of tasks studied in the 
context of the effects of positive mood on cognition: insight tasks (Isen et aI., 1987) 
and deductive reasoning tasks (Oaksford et aI., 1996). This provides the obvious 
benefit of consistency and continuity across studies. However, given the complex 
character of such tasks, a problematic issue concerns the measurement of the amount 
ofWM processing in these tasks. With regard to recordings of brain potentials, it is 
difficult to isolate WM processing in the temporal continuum of the tasks. For 
example, if brain electrical potentials are recorded during an insight and a reasoning 
task and differences are found between the potentials corresponding to the two types 
of tasks, it would be difficult to establish the extent to which such differences arose 
from differences in WM processing. This is related to the problem of locating WM 
processes in the temporal continuum of the tasks, in order to extract the most relevant 
differences in electrical potentials. 
The use of concurrent task methodology can provide viable solutions for these 
Concerns. With regard to behavioural phenomena, it has already been mentioned that 
several authors have used concurrent tasks in order to manipulate the demands on the 
Central Executive component ofWM. Importantly, this methodology has been 
employed (e.g. Oaksford et aI., 1996) with the reasoning task that we use, Wason's 
Selection task (Wason, 1968). The logic of the use of concurrent task methodology in 
the current investigation is the following. If the same task is used as a concurrent task 
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to both the insight and the reasoning tasks, it will deplete Central Executive resources 
in both tasks. Depletion will be greatest in the task which uses considerable Central 
Executive processing. In other words, the task that is more reliant on the Central 
Executive will be more disrupted by the concurrent task. 
Concurrent task methodology can also help circumvent the problem of isolating WM 
processes in the temporal continuum of insight or reasoning tasks. The processing of a 
secondary task concurrently with an insight or a reasoning task would require the 
Central Executive to alternate between the "primary" task (insight or reasoning) and 
the concurrent task. Let us suppose that the concurrent task consists of a number of 
discrete events (stimuli) with a short duration, which require WM updating. Since it 
seems reasonable to assume that the periods of highest demand on the Central 
Executive would be associated with the alternations between the "primary" and the 
"concurrent" tasks, the brain potential recordings associated with discrete events in the 
concurrent task would reflect the extent of the Central Executive involvement. 
5.2. Event-Related Potentials and WM processing. Tile P300 component 
Electroencephalography (EEG) is the term used for recordings of brain electrical 
activity from the scalp. Segments of the EEG recording associated with (time-locked 
to) discrete stimuli are referred to as Event-Related Potentials (ERPs). In addition to 
the obvious advantage of being able to capture the periods of activity associated with 
specific events, multiple ERPs can be averaged to increase the signal-to-noise ratio 
across multiple trials time-locked to the same category of stimuli. For example, in an 
experiment comparing two classes of words (e.g. regular past-tenses and irregular 
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past-tenses, Lavric et aI., 2001), the averaging across ERPs corresponding to different 
regular items would eliminate the changes in electrical signal associated with 
idiosyncrasies in individual items and augment the electrical response to common 
characteristics (the morphological status). ERPs in response to individual stimuli are 
referred to as ERP epochs or trials. 
An important characteristic of the ERP literature is the identification of the so-called 
ERP waveform components, features of the ERP wave (e.g. peaks) with similar 
morphology (Le. shape), latency and scalp topography (Le. regions of the scalp, in 
which the component is present). Components are usually identified by a letter, 
indicating whether the component is a positive or a negative shift relative to the 
baseline, and the latency at which it usually occurs (e.g. N400- negative deflection at 
400ms postsimulus onset). A widely used approach is to employ ERP components as 
markers of specific perceptual/cognitive processes. This is thought possible whenever 
an ERP component has been systematically altered by certain experimental 
manipUlations. For example, N400 is commonly elicited by the presentation of words 
that are semantically aberrant in a given context. 
An ERP component with relevance in the current context is P300 (Le. positive 
deflection at about 300 ms post-stimulus onset). The literature on P300 is ample (see 
Polich & Kok, 1995, for a review and Donchin & Coles, 1988, for an extensive 
discussion). The explanation for this is quite simple: P300 can be found in almost any 
ERP response to a discrete stimulus, in both visual and auditory modalities (see Fig. 
3). However, the interest in P300 has also been stimulated by the sensitivity of this 
component to the complexity and novelty ofstimulL The latency of the component 
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tends to be longer and the amplitude larger for more complex relative to simpler 
stimuli (Polich & Donchin, 1988). An influential theory on the significance of P300 in 
terms of information processing proposed that P300 indexes the updating of WM 
contents (Donchin & Coles, 1988, but see Verleger, 1988, for an alternative view). 
Recent studies have supported the relationship between P300 amplitude and WM 
updating (Gevins & Cutillo, 1993). 
PJOO 
/ 
Time (ms) 
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Figure 3. The P300 peak recorded in response to counting auditory stimuli (tones). 
This task served as a control condition in Study 2 (see Chapter 7). 
More recently it has also been established that P300 is generated by several sources in 
the brain, with the largest contribution from the prefrontal cortex and the right parietal 
cortex. Importantly, the prefrontal P300 is generated earlier and is referred to as P3a, 
whereas the right-parietal P300 happens somewhat later and is referred to as P3b 
(Knight & Grabowecky, 1995). It turns out that P3a and P3b have differential 
sensitivity to experimental manipulations. In particular P3a is more sensitive to 
stimulus novelty, which is of special relevance in the context of the current 
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investigation. It has been proposed that P3a reflects the prefrontal involvement in WM 
processing (Knight & Grabowecky, 1995). 
In the present investigation, ERPs timelocked to the concurrent task were recorded. 
P300 in response to a task, which is concurrent to either an insight or an analytical 
task, was measured. If the analytical task requires large Central Executive resources, 
the interspersed concurrent task events should be more demanding and, hence, elicit a 
larger P300 than in the insight task, with the most prominent difference in P3a. 
However, it is also conceivable that larger demands on the Central Executive in the 
analytical task can lead to less attention being devoted to the concurrent task, hence, to 
a smaller P300 amplitude. In order to distinguish between these alternative 
explanations of a possible P300 difference between the analytical+concurrent and 
insight+concurrent conditions, these two conditions were compared to a control 
condition. In the latter P300 was measured solely in response to the task that acted as a 
concurrent task in the dual-task conditions. In this case, larger P300 amplitude in any 
of the dual-task conditions, compared to the control, would unambiguously be 
interpreted as greater, rather than smaller WM processing load. As mentioned earlier, 
the degree of interference in the insight and the analytical tasks provoked by the 
Concurrent task, could serve as a behavioural measure of Central Executive 
involvement. 
It has to be noted that the use of ERP waveform components is not uncontroversial. 
Firstly, there are certain issues related to the identification ofERP components. What 
appears to be a unitary waveform peak can mask temporally and spatially distinct 
components (Donchin & Heffley, 1976). There are several mathematical instruments 
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used to circumvent this problem by segmenting the ERP waveform into more 
elementary components. Two of the most commonly used tools are Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) and Independent Component Analysis (ICA). PCA has a 
relatively long history of being employed in ERP analysis (Donchin & Heffley, 1976); 
therefore it was decided to use it in the current investigation for the identification of 
components from the P300 family (see Chapter 7 for details on PCA applied to ERP 
analyses). 
Another limitation of the ERP component approach is difficulty in general ising across 
studies. For example, it is difficult to objectively determine whether a peak observed 
in one study is equivalent to the peak observed in another study. There are 
sophisticated analytical (source-localisation models) or experimental (neuroimaging, 
intra-cortical recordings) tools for circumventing this problem, but their use is not 
always an option. Reliable source-localisation algorithms have only been available 
recently and require multichannel recordings. The concurrent use ofERPs and 
neuroimaging is still in its incipient stages, whereas intra-cortical recordings can only 
be used in individuals undergoing brain surgery. A relatively simple measure is to 
employ a control condition in order to be less dependent in the interpretation of results 
on previously determined functional significance ofERP components. For example, 
let us suppose that little is known about the significance of P300 and a P300 difference 
is found in response to a secondary task administered concurrently to insight vs. 
concurrently to analytical problems. The presence of a control condition, e.g. ERPs in 
response to the secondary task administered alone can clarify the ERP results, even in 
the absence of prior knowledge about P300. As mentioned above, one can use the 
ERPs in response to the concurrent task alone as a baseline with the lowest 
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WMiCentral Executive processing load. Amongst the two conditions with concurrent 
processing (insight + secondary task or reasoning + secondary task), the condition that 
will show the largest difference from the baseline is likely to be the one with the 
highest demand on WM/Central Executive. Consequently, although a great deal is 
known about the ERP components from the P300 family, one does not have to entirely 
rely on the "cognitive significance" ofP300. On the contrary, it is beneficial to 
introduce a baseline condition in the form of the ERPs recordings of the secondary 
task administered alone. 
To reiterate, a direct comparison of the WMiCentral Executive processing in insight 
(creative) and reasoning (analytical) tasks would be performed by introducing a 
secondary (concurrent) task consisting of brief stimuli to which ERPs would be 
timelocked. The behavioural measure of WM/Central Executive processing in the 
insight and analytical tasks would be the degree of disruption by the presence of the 
concurrent task. The modulation ofERP components from the P300 family, especially 
P3a, in conditions of concurrent task processing and relative to the baseline of the 
secondary task presented alone, would represent the electrophysiological correlate of 
WM/Central Executive processing. However, prior to implementing this paradigm, the 
creative and analytical tasks had to be identified and piloted. Such pilot work was 
performed in Study 1. 
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Chapter 6. Study 1 (Pilot) 
6.1. Introduction 
The study is part of an investigation whose main hypothesis is derived from the 
literature on differential effects of positive mood on certain cognitive processes. 
Positive mood was found to facilitate performance on tasks believed to require 
creativity and flexibility (Greene & Noice, 1988; Estrada et aI., 1994, 1997; Isen et aI., 
1987), but disrupt performance on analytical tasks (e.g. deductive reasoning, Oaksford 
et aI., 1996). Biologically-driven computational accounts (Ashby et aI., 1999, O'Reilly 
et aI., 1999) are compatible with the hypothesis (Oaksford et aI., 1996) explaining 
these differential effects in terms of differential demands of creative and analytical 
tasks on the Central Executive component of WM. In order to ensure consistency and 
continuity, it was decided to employ the cognitive tasks whose differential modulation 
by positive mood is well documented: insight tasks (lsen et aI., 1987) and reasoning 
tasks (Oaksford et aI., 1996). In addition, the choice of insight tasks was also 
influenced by the presence of other behavioural and psychophysiological evidence 
suggesting a distinct mode of WM processing, as compared to other tasks. They may 
be best solved when information transferred from long-term memory is constantly and 
rapidly updated (see Oaksford et aI., 1996 and Phillips et aI., 2001, for similar 
proposals). Although the updating may involve the Central Executive/ WM, it does not 
require accurate representation of large amounts of information in WM, as in 
analytical tasks. 
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ERP methodology imposes a critical constraint on paradigms employing ERP 
recordings, which concerns the minimal number of averaged ERP trials per condition. 
Although ERP studies vary with respect to the minimal number of averaged trials, the 
consensus is to have at least 25-30 ERP trials per condition for each subject, free of 
technological or muscle artifact. Depending on whether elimination or correction of 
contaminated trials is the procedure utilised for filtering the artifact, it mayor may not 
be necessary to add ERP trials to account for the filtering. In the present ERP 
investigation it was decided to eliminate, rather than correct, ERP trials contaminated 
by artifact. This means that the minimal number of acquired ERP trials has to be larger 
than the minimal number of trials required for averaging. Based on previous ERP 
studies employing the same equipment (Brunswick & Rippon, 1994), and based on 
other ERP studies employing artifact elimination, the number of potentially 
contaminated trials was estimated as approximately 25% of the acquired trials. 
Consequently, the minimal number of acquired ERP trials per participant per condition 
was set to 40. Considering that in the present investigation the concurrent task consists 
of discrete and brief stimuli with an inter-stimulus interval (III) of at least 1.5 sec 
(shorter IIIs may lead to excessive difficulty in the primary tasks, insight and 
reasoning), the total time required for the acquisition of the minimal ERP trials per 
condition is approximately 60 sec. The main objective of the current pilot study is to 
examine how closely time-to-solution in the cognitive tasks of interest can match the 
total time required for the ERP recording. 
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6.2. Method 
Participants 
Twenty six participants (15 females and 11 males, mean age 20.1, sd 1.94, range 18-
27) received course credits for taking part in the experiment. 
Tasks 
Insight tasks 
Two well-known insight tasks were examined: the Candle problem (Duncker, 1945) 
and the Two Strings problem (Maier, 1931, see Fig. 4 for the problems). The Candle 
problem was employed by Isen et al. (1987) in their study of the effects of positive 
mood on creativity. As discussed earlier, it was discovered that participants were more 
likely to find the correct solution after positive mood was induced. There are few if 
any reports of solution times to the Candle problem (lsen et al. did not report solution 
times). In addition, there are several versions of the problem. In some versions the 
nails are not in a box, instead matches are in a box. Furthermore, sometimes the task is 
presented in a realistic set-up (with the objects being present in the room), whereas in 
other cases, only a description and a diagram are given to participants (e.g. Isen et aI., 
1987). The current investigation chose to employ the latter for practical reasons related 
to the ERP data acquisition. Despite the scarcity of data on solution times in the 
Candle problem, one assumption seems reasonable: given the ill-defined nature of 
insight tasks (Eysenck & Keane, 2000), one may expect considerable variability in 
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solution times. Hence, it was dec ided to supplement the Candle problem with another 
insight task- the Two Strings problem, in order to fill the time needed for ERP 
acquisition in the insight condition, whenever solution times in the Candle problem 
would be very short. 
ENTE R 
TRANSIT 
CHOLERA 
HEPATITIS 
HEPATITIS 
You arc an immigralion 
official. Among Ihe 
doeumenl you have 10 check 
i a medica l form . One side of 
Ihis form indicale whelher 
Ihe passenger is enlering Ihe 
country or is in Iran it, while 
Ihe other side of the form Ii ts 
names of tropica l di sea es for 
which Ihe pas enger has 
pa.sed the medical check-up. 
Your duly is 10 make ure Ihal 
passenge r who enler Ihe 
counlry have pa cd Ihe 
medical check-up for cholera 
(you have 10 make ure Ihal if 
Ihe form ays "enlering" on 
one side, Ihe olher side 
inelude holera among Ihe 
Ii I of di 'ase ). Four 
passengers arc howing you 
Iheir form s. Which oflhe 
form would you have 10 lurn 
over 10 check (as an 
experienced fficer you 
would only lurn over Ihe ne 
Ihal need 10 be turned over)? 
orrec t an we r: Ihe firsl and 
Ihe lasl (lOp 10 bollom). 
You arc in a room and Ihe on ly 
objecls you have are a lable, a 
candle and a box of nail s. The 
table slands nexllo the wall. Ilow 
would you allach Ihe candle to Ihe 
wall so that it does not drip onlo 
the table be low? There arc no 
additional objects you can usc and 
the table cannot be moved away 
from Ihe wa ll . 
olution: empty Ihe box of nai ls. 
allach illo Ihe wa ll and pul Ihe 
cand le in the box. 
Figure 4. The reasoning and insight tasks. 
Two slrings arc hanging from Ihe 
ce iling. While holding one of the 
slrings. you cannol reach the 
second simply by holding out 
your hand. Ilow would you reach 
the second str ing and hold the two 
tring at the ame time? There 
arc differenl objeels in the room. 
but none can be u ed for hooking 
Ihe econd Iring. 
Solution: tie any objecl lo Ihe 
IirSI SIring. wing it. go and lake 
Ihe second. grasp the fir I SIr ing 
when il balances toward. you. 
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The reasoning task 
Oaksford et al. (1996) examined the effects of positive mood on Wason's Selection 
task. In the original abstract version (Wason, 1968) participants are presented with a 
conditional rule, e.g. "If there is a vowel on one side, then there is an even number on 
the other" (which in formal logic corresponds to "ifp, then q"). Participants are also 
given four cards with the following characters on them: A (p), K (non-p), 2 (q) and 7 
(non-q). They are instructed that there is a character on the other side of the cards and 
asked to select only the cards that will allow them to check the rule when turned. The 
logic of deduction is bi-valent, that is, it only operates with two values of validity 
("true" or "false"), with no intermediate, graded values (e.g. "true in most cases"). 
Therefore, assuming that the statement applies to an infinite number of cases, it can 
never be confirmed, because there is always a possibility of an inconsistent case and 
because graded validity is not acceptable. In contrast, definitive invalidation is 
possible; it is sufficient to find one case that violates the statement (the falsification 
principle, Popper, 1959). Consequently, according to the logic of deduction, in 
Wason's Selection task it is of little use to tum the cards that can only confirm the 
statement (i.e. the rule), namely card "2" (q). For any letter or number that is on the 
other side of these cards, the rule will be true. On the contrary, one should select the 
cards that can potentially falsify the rule: "A" (p) and "7" (non-q). If the card "A" has 
anything but an even number on the other side, or if card "7" will have "A" on the 
other side, the rule is false. 
Participants show remarkably poor logical performance on the abstract version of the 
task, with as few as 4% of participants making the correct selections (A and 7). One 
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account of the low performance level is that in the abstract version the formal 
character of the task distracts participants' attention from the relevant aspects of the 
tasks. Instead, they focus on surface characteristics (e.g. letters and numbers: A, 2, 
etc.) and, when making the response, simply match the characters from the rule, which 
are repeated on the cards (A and 2) (Evans & Lynch, 1973). This perspective claimed 
support from experiments in which the first part of the statement was modified by 
introducing a negation: "If there is not an A on one side ... " instead of "Ifthere is an A 
on one side ... " which eliminates card A from the valid selections. It was observed that 
A was still be the most frequently selected card (Evans & Lynch, 1973). Furthermore, 
the matching explanation is consistent with the prediction that thematic (realistic) 
versions of the task, which would draw attention to the relevant aspects of the task, 
should lead to more valid selections. This was indeed found to be the case. A number 
of experiments (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Cosmides, 1989) employed what is referred 
to as "deontic" versions of Wason's Selection task, in which participants are asked to 
playa particular role (a deontic version of the task is also employed in the current 
investigation). In "deontic" versions of the task the number of valid selections is vastly 
greater than in the abstract version (sometimes reaching as much as 60%-90% of 
participants performing logically valid selections; Cheng & Holyoak, 1985). 
Ilowever, the matching account of the low performance on abstract versions of 
Wason's Seleection task has been questioned on several grounds. Firstly, it has been 
shown that matching in modified abstract versions of the task was an artifact of the use 
of negation ("if there is not an A on the one side, etc") (Oaksford & Stenning, 1992). 
Secondly, in realistic versions of the task, some 30-40% of participants still make 
invalid selections, which would be more difficult to explain in terms of matching. 
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Thirdly, the matching account would have difficulties in explaining differences in 
performance in different thematic versions of the task. For example, deontic contexts, 
in which participants enforce the rule (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985), facilitate valid 
selections. In contrast, "descriptive" deontic versions of the task, in which participants 
play the role of "observers", are associated with much poorer logical performance 
(Cosmides, 1989), which can be almost as low as performance on abstract versions of 
the task. 
An alternative to matching is the explanation of invalid selections in terms of 
participants seeking confirmatory evidence for the rule. A more recent and elaborate 
variant of this approach (Oaksford and Chater, 1994, 1996, 1998) proposes that people 
apply everyday reasoning in the selection task and that the falsification strategy from 
formal logic might not be optimal in realistic conditions. This perspective is consistent 
with developments in philosophy of science, which question the potential of 
falsification in scientific inquiry (Lacatos, 1970; Quine, 1959). When the validity of an 
assertion needs to be established in realistic conditions, validity can be seen in relative 
terms and probabilistic estimates of validity become critical. Consequently, in realistic 
circumstances, cases that can falsify are no longer by definition more informative and 
the optimality of confirmatory and falsificatory strategies is largely determined by the 
probabilities of the properties/events contained in the assertion. For example, suppose 
the assertion "If one is caught stealing, one is sent to jail" needs to be tested. Since 
both properties of "being caught stealing" and "being sent to jail" are relatively rare 
(there are many more people who are not caught stealing and are not sent to jail), it 
could be more informative to check what proportion of those who are sent to jail were 
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caught stealing, than to establish whether any of the many people who are not injail, 
were caught stealing. 
Applied to the abstract version of Wason's Selection task, this predicts that if 
participants engage in realistic hypothesis testing and treat p and q as rare (the rarity 
assumption), they would be more likely to select "2" than "7", since the former is 
potentially more informative than the latter. This is indeed the main logical "error" 
participants make in this task. Oaksford and Chater (1994) further developed their 
rational analysis model, by formalizing it in terms of Bayes' theorem. Assuming that 
the rarity assumption stands, the model makes accurate predictions with regard to the 
ranking of selections and is able to account for performance from numerous studies of 
the abstract Wason's Selection task. Recent developments of the model addressed 
criticisms related to the information measure (Evans & Over, 1996); the model was 
also extended to handle exceptions (Oaksford & Chater, 1996; 1998). 
However, the rational analysis model, developed for explaining performance on the 
abstract task, could not explain the predominance of logically valid selections in 
thematic versions of the task. Additional assumptions had to be made in order to 
account for the pattern of performance in thematic tasks. In consensus with other 
authors, Oaksford and Chater (1994) assumed that, while in the abstract selection task 
people test the rule, in some concrete (e.g. deontic) versions people use the rule. A 
good example of the latter is the particular dcontic version, in which participants are 
asked to enforce a rule (e.g. Cheng & Holyoak, 1985, see Fig. 4). The "enforcer" role 
asks participants to only attend to instances of violation, thus directly encouraging 
falsification. Oaksford and Chater (1994) have operationalised this in terms of utilities 
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that people assign to different instances (cards). Only instances that can potentially 
violate (falsify) the rule are assigned high utility and with these modifications the 
model can account for the superior logical performance in some of the realistic 
versions of Wason's Selection task. Approaches that incorporate utilities associated 
with different selections are referred to as decision-theoretic approaches, in contrast to 
information-theoretic approaches, such as Oaksford & Chater's (1994) rational 
analysis of the abstract selection task. The latter does not need to employ utilities, 
instead assuming that people seek to maximize information "for its own sake". It has 
to be noted that Bayesian decision-theoretic approaches were not restricted to thematic 
versions of Wason's task; they were also applied to the abstract task (Klauer, 1999) 
and generated some predictions that were inconsistent with the information-theoretic 
model (Oaksford & Chater, 1994). It still remains to be seen whether the empirical 
data support these predictions. 
To summarize, in the abstract selection task people perform hypothesis testing. In 
contrast, some concrete (e.g. deontic) versions of Wason's Selection task facilitate 
logically valid performance by increasing the utility of falsification. In other words, 
people engage in everyday inductive reasoning in the abstract versions of the task, 
whereas in some deontic tasks (e.g. "enforcer" tasks) they use falsificatory strategies, 
the former leading to logically valid performance. In order to explain logical errors on 
the "enforcer" task (often as frequent as 40%), the rational analysis model assumes 
that realistic hypothesis testing is the "default" strategy (Oaksford et aI., 1996) and 
that whenever concrete contexts are not sufficiently explicit (or are not well 
understood), people resort to the "default" of confirmation. The disruptive effects of 
mood on a deontic ("enforcer") version of Wason's Selection task were also explained 
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in terms of the "default" (Oaksford et aI., 1996). Positive mood was said to occupy 
Central Executive/WM resources, leading to the use of the less effortful, default, 
strategies. This explanation also accommodates the negative effects of concurrent WM 
processing on Wason's Selection task, which were similar to the effects of mood 
(Oaksford et aI., 1996). Alternative accounts of the effects of positive mood (e.g. 
participants adopting a more permissive attitude in positive mood conditions and being 
less interested in violations) would have difficulties explaining the similarity between 
the effects of positive mood and concurrent task processing on the selection task 
performance. 
As already mentioned, in the present investigation it was decided to employ the 
version of Wason's Selection task whose modulation by mood and concurrent task 
was examined by Oaksford et ai. (1996). Since "enforcer" tasks encourage deductive 
approaches, they can be more readily described as analytical, as compared to the 
standard abstract selection task whose analytical demands are less clear (Oaksford & 
Chater, 1994; Oaksford et aI., 1996). Not surprisingly, Oaksford et ai. (1996) used an 
"enforcer" version of the task (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985). Cheng & Holyoak (1985) 
had two "enforcer" tasks. In one of them participants were given the rationale of why 
they should be performing the enforcement (e.g. to prevent the spread of disease); in 
the other no rationale was given. It was found that providing the rationale facilitated 
performance (90% participants with valid selections; 60% without rationale). Since the 
rationale task was associated with near-ceiling performance, Oaksford et ai. (1996) 
chose the non-rationale task for subsequent testing in conditions of induced mood and 
concurrent task processing. Similar reasons apply to the current investigation. 
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Therefore it was decided to employ a non-rationale, "enforcer" role task, based on the 
one from Cheng & Holyoak (1985), see Fig. 4. 
Apparatus 
Two microphones, an amplifier and two speakers were used for the communication 
between the experimenter and the participants. A closed-circuit camera and a monitor 
were used for monitoring participants' gaze, while they read the instructions. 
Procedure 
Participants performed the three tasks in random order. The instructions for each task 
were given to participants on paper, one task at a time. As seen in Figure 4, the 
instruction set for each task consisted of several lines of text and a picture. For all 
three tasks, the text was on the top of the page and the picture on the bottom. 
Participants were asked to familiarise themselves with the contents of the task and tell 
the experimenter if they understood the requirements. In order to minimise the eye-
movement artifact in the ERPs, it was decided that in the subsequent ERP study 
participants would not have access to task instructions during task processing and the 
same applied to the current (pilot) study. Participants' gaze was monitored via a 
camera and approximately 5 sec after their gaze reached the part of the page where the 
text ended, participants were asked whether they understood and remembered the 
instructions. If participants asked for clarification, they were provided information 
within the limits of the task's standard instructions set. Subsequently, participants 
were asked to turn over the instructions page and attempt to solve the problem. It was 
decided to encourage careful processing of tasks and discourage speed-accuracy trade-
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offs. Therefore, participants were told that the tasks are not easy and encouraged to 
check the solution carefully before communicating it to the experimenter. Since the 
duration of the ERP recordings corresponding to each condition in the subsequent 
study would be set to 75 sec, it was imperative to determine participants' performance 
within this time interval. Hence, in the present (pilot) study participants were also 
stopped after 75 sec of thinking about the task and asked for the solution. 
Performance measures and analysis 
Performance on the two insight tasks, as in previous studies on insight (Isen et aI., 
1987; Kaufmann & Vosburg, 1997), was assessed by the presence of the correct 
response. In the Two Strings task swinging the string without tying an object was 
accepted as a correct answer. For Wason's Selection task, all selections made by each 
participant were recorded. For comparisons with insight performance, it was decided 
to use the number of participants who provided the logically valid answer in the 
selection task (Le. who chose the "Enter" and "Hepatitis" cards). 
The objective was to select the insight task closest to the selection task in terms of 
performance levels. For this purpose non-parametric tests (X2) were used to compare 
performance on each of the insight tasks with performance on Wason's Selection task. 
The same statistical test was employed for comparing the performance on the two 
insight tasks. 
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6.3. Results 
The level of performance on the insight tasks, as well as Wason's Selection task (see 
Table 1), was comparable to the level of performance observed by other authors (lsen 
et al., 1987; Kaufmann & Vosburg, 1997; Oaksford et al., 1996), despite the time limit 
and the inaccessibility of task instructions during task performance. Performance on 
Wason's Selection task was only slightly lower than performance reported by other 
authors (54% participants providing valid selections, compared to 60% in Cheng & 
Holyoak, 1985). On the two strings, the proportion of participants who provided the 
correct solution (30%) was similar to that from a previous study by Kaufmann and 
Vosburg (1997). The Candle problem was associated with better performance (61 %) 
than the one reported by Isen et al. (1987) from the neutral film group (20%). 
However, in the study by Isen et al. (1987) the positive film group had a much higher 
performance (75%). 
Table 1. Insight and reasoning performance. 
Participants ~ Total Correct 
Task ! 
Wason 26 14 
Candle 26 16 
Two-string 26 8 
Incorrect 
12 
10 
18 
Solution in less 
than 60 sec 
2 
5 
3 
The Candle problem and Wason's Selection task were associated with similar 
performance levels (X2 (l)= .31, p>.5). In contrast, fewer participants reached the 
correct solution on the Two Strings problem, relative to both the Candle problem (X2 
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(1) = 5.33, p<.025) and to Wason's Selection task (X2 (I) = 3.27, .05<p<.I), see also 
Table 1. 
As mentioned before, the minimum time for ERP acquisition was set to 60 sec. Two 
participants reported the selected cards in Wason's Selection task in less than 60 sec 
(see Table I). The two insight tasks were associated with more solutions before 60 sec. 
Three participants solved the Two Strings problem and five participants reached the 
solution to the Candle problem in less than 60 sec. 
6.4. Discussion 
The results from the pilot study provide some valuable information. Firstly, the 
idiosyncrasies of the current paradigm, i.e. the ERP constraints (time limit and 
inaccessibility of task materials), did not seem to significantly affect task performance. 
Wason's Selection task performance was only slightly lower, compared to previous 
studies (54% vs. 60%, Cheng & Holyoak, 1985). This performance difference could 
be due to the inaccessibility of task materials during reasoning. The performance level 
on the Two Strings problem was also similar to the one observed earlier (Kaufmann & 
Vosburg, 1997). The level of performance observed in the Candle problem is 
approximately equidistant from Isen et al.'s (1987) neutral and positive group 
performance levels. It is conceivable that the emotional state of our participants fell in 
between Isen et aI's neutral and positive states. Alternatively, variability, small sample 
sizes and design differences could explain these discrepancies in performance levels. 
For example, in Isen et ai's study the presence of the neutral film apparently facilitated 
performance, compared to the no-film condition (20% vs. 17%). 
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Secondly, at least at a simplified level, it seems possible to equate tasks coming from 
very distinct categories (insight and reasoning) in terms of performance. For instance, 
performance levels on the Candle problem and on Wason's Selection task were similar 
and the employed statistical procedure found no reliable difference. Thirdly, insight 
tasks show considerably more variability in solution times. 
An important decision that had to be taken after the pilot study concerned the selection 
of the insight task to be used in the ERP experiment. Performance was viewed as the 
most important criterion. Performance levels were similar on the Candle problem and 
Wason's Selection task, whereas the level of performance on the Two Strings problem 
was considerably lower than that of the other two tasks. Therefore, performance data 
seemed to strongly favour the Candle problem over the Two Strings problem. 
However, more participants reached a solution on the Candle problem in less than 60 
sec. If the same were to happen in the ERP experiment, insufficient ERP epochs would 
be collected for such participants and their data could not be used. An alternative 
would be to employ the Two Strings problem and, in order to improve performance, 
give participants more time with this problem. Nevertheless, this would also be 
problematic for several reasons. Firstly, it is not clear that more time available would 
necessarily improve performance. In fact, studies using this task with more time 
available (5min) did not find a much higher performance level than the one in the 
current pilot study (Kaufmann & Vosburg, 1997). Secondly, more time available for 
the insight task would mean that there would be more ERP trials recorded for the 
insight than for the reasoning condition. The latter could be problematic, because it 
could lead to artificial ERP differences between conditions (ERP waveforms are 
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sensitive to the amount of averaged epochs). Although one could only record the ERPs 
for the pre-set 75 sec and let task processing continue for the collection of 
performance data, this alternative is also hardly acceptable, because it could not then 
be claimed that the recorded ERPs reliably reflect critical stages of the task processing. 
Therefore, it was decided to employ the Candle problem as the primary insight task 
and the Two Strings problem as the filler insight task. For participants who would 
solve the Candle problem in less than 60 sec in the ERP study, the Two Strings 
problem would be added and the insight condition resumed until the end of the 
minimum-length recording window (60 sec). Subsequently, in these participants, the 
minimal number of ERP trials for the insight condition would be reached by 
collapsing the ERPs from the Candle problem and the Two Strings problem. For 
behavioural measures (the availability of the correct solution) only the Candle problem 
would be considered. Although this design does not completely circumvent the 
problem of the correspondence between the behavioural and ERP data, it does seem 
the best practical solution, since even in participants who solved the Candle problem 
in less than 60 sec the most rapid solution was provided in 42 sec, which would allow 
for 65% of the minimum number ofERP trials to be collected from the primary insight 
task. 
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Chapter 7. Study 2. Differences in Working Memory involvement in analytical 
and creative tasks: An ERP study 
7.1. Introduction 
In the present study behavioural and electrophysiological evidence was used for 
testing the hypothesis that analytical (e.g. reasoning) tasks are more reliant on WM 
processing than are creative (insight) tasks. Studies of positive mood and its effects on 
cognitive processing constituted the primary motivation for the formulation of this 
hypothesis. They indicate that insight problems are better solved in conditions of 
positive mood (Isen et aI., 1987). In contrast, analytical (e.g. deductive reasoning) 
performance is impaired by positive mood states (Oaksford et aI., 1996). Oaksford et 
aI. (1996) proposed that positive mood depletes the resources of the Central Executive 
component of WM, which would otherwise be available for reasoning performance. 
Indeed, in the same study reasoning was also disrupted in conditions of dual-task 
performance, which is commonly thought to put heavy demands on the Central 
Executive (Baddeley, 1986). Oaksford et al.'s Central ExecutiveIWM account was also 
supported by their findings of deficits on a Central Executive task in conditions of 
positive mood. The juxtaposition of these findings with the facilitatory effects of 
positive mood on a range of tasks thought to require creative (divergent) thinking, (e.g. 
insight problems, remote associates test, etc), leads to the hypothesis of differential 
WM involvement in the two categories of tasks. However, this prediction has not been 
directly tested at the behavioural or neurobiological level and the present study will 
attempt an investigation on both levels. 
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In addition to the above considerations, there are independent reasons for presuming 
that insight tasks are less dependent upon WM processing than are analytical tasks. 
For example, it has been claimed that solutions to creative problems, which would be 
described in information-processing terms as "ill-defined" (Eysenck & Keane, 2000; 
Iausovec & Bakracevic, 1995) are reached in a distinct fashion, they are unpredictable, 
difficult to report and they are generated suddenly (non-incrementally) in the absence 
of strategies. This is in contrast with the "well-defined" analytical problems, which 
involve systematic analysis, planning and incremental resolution. These claims are 
supported by the following findings: 
- subjective "feeling of knowing" measures and measures of the "patterns-of-warmth" 
ratings of an approaching solution substantially differ for "insight" and analytical 
problems (Metcalfe, 1986a,b; Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987); 
- the requirement to verbalise the strategies while solving insight and non-insight tasks 
differentially affected the two types of tasks, which appeared to show the relative 
inaccessibility to the subject of the stages involved in reaching the solution to the 
insight task (Schooler et aI., 1993). 
The first attempt to investigate whether the creative/analytical distinction is apparent 
or real at a biological level involved the use of heart rate measures, which were 
performed while participants were solving ill-defined (creative) and well-defined 
(analytical) problems (Iausovec and Bakracevic, 1995). A gradual increase in the 
heart-rate preceded the solution in well-defined problems and an abrupt increase 
signalled the resolution in ill-defined problems. This was interpreted as indicating the 
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incremental nature of the approach to the solution in the well-defined task and the 
"sudden" resolution in the creative task. Furthermore, an EEG study performed by the 
same group (lausovec, 1997) found more alpha power (less activation) in most scalp 
regions in ill-defined (creative) as compared to well-defined (analytical) problem-
solving. However, these findings lacked specificity with regard to either the cognitive 
or neuroanatomical mechanisms differentially involved in the two types of tasks. 
The aim of the current study is to employ more discriminative EEG/ERP measures to 
investigate such processes, in particular WM. The P300 component of the ERP has 
been shown to reflect cognitive processing demands and to be sensitive to WM 
function (Donchin & Coles, 1988), with frontal P300 components (P3a) reflecting the 
encoding of new stimuli in WM (Knight & Grabowecky, 1995). The comparison of 
P300 responses during problem-solving tasks would therefore provide a test of the 
experimental hypothesis. More specifically, the degree of frontality of the P3 family 
components, reflected by larger P300 amplitudes at frontal sites and lor by a more 
prominent presence of the P3a component, will be used as a psychophysiological 
measure of WM involvement in the reasoning and insight tasks. 
Measuring cortical responses to the WM involvement in such tasks may appear 
difficult given the problem of temporally locating WM in the problem-solving 
continuum and isolating it from other processes. This can be resolved by introducing a 
concurrent task, which would only tax the process of interest (WM in our case) and 
compete with the main task for resources available to that process. We temporally 
superimposed a concurrent WM task (CWMT) on analytical and insight tasks. CWMT 
consisted of counting discrete auditory stimuli (tones), to which ERPs could be time-
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locked. The cortical reflection of the competition between CWMT and the main 
(insight or reasoning) would be the ERPs recorded during analytical and creative 
problem-solving and time-locked to CWMT. 
Nevertheless, the interpretation of a P300 difference in amplitude could be far from 
straightforward in a concurrent task paradigm. A larger amplitude in response to the 
concurrent task can be taken to signify either less activation in the "main" task, which 
makes resources available to the concurrent one (A), or more activation in the "main" 
task, which makes processing of the concurrent task more effortful (B). In order to be 
able to clearly decide between the two mutually exclusive alternatives, in a control 
condition ERP data were collected while participants counted the tones in the absence 
of a problem-solving task. In this case, larger amplitude in response to tones with vs. 
without problem-solving would be clearly interpreted in terms of B. 
The introduction of CWMT also enables the measurement of interesting behavioural 
data. Concurrent task methodology has been successfully applied with the reasoning 
task to be employed in the current study (a deontic version of Wason's Selection task, 
Oaksford et aI., 1996). As in Oaksford et aI.'s study, the present investigation will use 
the performance drop attributable to the introduction of the concurrent task as a 
behavioural measure of Central Executive/WM involvement in the reasoning task. 
Furthermore, additional analyses of the reasoning performance will be performed in 
order to compare the pattern of responses in Wason's Selection task to well-
documented response tendencies in different versions of this task. As mentioned 
earlier, logically valid performance selections can be made if participants falsify 
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(select only the cards that can potentially falsify the rule). This is the predominant 
pattern of responses on deontic versions of the task, which encourage falsification. In 
contrast, abstract versions of the task, in which participants apply realistic hypothesis 
testing, are associated with a strong, "default" tendency to seek confirmatory evidence 
(select cards that can confirm the rule). If the presence of the concurrent task leads to 
the depletion of Central Executive resources and this in turn leads to the use of non-
analytical, "default" strategies, this should be reflected in participants' tendencies to 
confirm and falsify. More specifically, it would be expected that Central Executive 
depletion would lead to a decreased tendency to falsify and an increased tendency to 
confirm. The present study employs analytical procedures that permit the analysis of 
falsificatory and confirmatory tendencies (Oaksford & Stenning, 1992; Oaksford et aI., 
1996; Pollard & Evans, 1987). 
In addition to applying the dual-task logic to reasoning performance (Oaksford et aI., 
1996), the present study also applies it to the insight task: it is examined with vs. 
without a concurrent task. Subsequently, the reasoning task is compared to the insight 
task in terms of performance alteration caused by the concurrent task. The concurrent 
task in the present study was specifically chosen to tax the process of interest: 
counting randomly presented auditory stimuli requires continuous updating of WM. 
Relative to a concurrent task which does not specifically tax WM, the concurrent task 
employed in the present design increases the likelihood of competition for WM 
resources between the main tasks and the concurrent task. 
90 
Part II. Analytical and creative tasks: a Central Executive account 
7.2. Method 
Participants 
Group 1: 
Twenty (13 females and 7 males, mean age 19.15, sd 1.81, range 18-25) healthy right-
handed undergraduates received course credits for the participation in the study. 
Group 2: 
In order to investigate the disruptive effect of CWMT on the reasoning and insight 
tasks, data was used from 26 participants (15 females and 11 males, mean age 20.1, 
range 18-27, sd1.94) who had carried out the same problem-solving tasks in Study 1 
(pilot) under the same conditions but in the absence ofCWMT and ERP recordings. 
Apparatus 
The auditory stimuli for CWMT were generated by a computer. Two microphones, an 
amplifier and two speakers were used for the communication between the 
experimenter and the participants. A closed-circuit camera and a monitor were used 
for monitoring participants' gaze, while they read the instructions. The EEG equipment 
consisted of a NeuroScience Brain Imager (series III) and an elastic electrode cap 
(Electro-cap International Inc., Dallas, Texas). 
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Tasks (see Fig. 4) 
Analytical 
The deontic version of Wason's Selection task, with participants playing the rule 
enforcer role (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985), was employed as analytical task. This is a 
well-defined deductive reasoning task where participants have been shown to have a 
uniform interpretation of the problem instructions (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Oaksford 
et a!., 1996). 
Creative (insight) 
The Candle problem (Duncker, 1945; Isen et aI., 1987) was used as the primary task in 
this condition because it was employed in studies that served as a basis for the 
hypothesis to be tested here (lsen et aI., 1987). The primary insight task was closely 
matched with the analytical task in terms of performance (see Study 1). As Study 1 
indicated, time to solution in insight tasks is relatively unpredictable and can include 
rapid solution times. The presence of a filler insight task (the Two Strings problem, 
Maier, 1931) allowed for the acquisition of the minimal number of ERP epochs per 
subject for the insight condition, without discarding the participants who provided an 
early response to the Candle problem (which would bias the sample). 
A maximum time of75 sec was set for each of the 2 conditions, this having been 
established as the appropriate length of time for task performance and to allow the 
collection of an appropriate number of ERP epochs. 
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CWMT 
Participants were asked to silently count 50 computer-generated auditory stimuli 
(tones: 440 Hz, 200 ms) presented at pseudorandom intervals (mean 1500 ms, range 
1000-2000 ms) either alone or during their performance on the analytical and insight 
tasks. 
Procedure 
Analytical condition 
Participants sat in a sound proof and electromagnetically shielded room. On the desk 
in front of them they had the instruction set and the diagram for the problem to be 
solved. After the experimenter's command participants started reading the instructions 
for the problem and examining the diagram. Their direction of gaze was monitored via 
a camera in the participants' room. Approximately 5 seconds after their gaze reached 
the middle of the page (where the instructions ended) participants were asked if the 
task instructions were clear and provided explanations upon request. Subsequently, 
participants were asked to tum over the instruction sheet, fixate their gaze on a cross in 
front of them and attempt to solve the problem while counting the tones at the same 
time. They were instructed to press a mouse key when they thought they had reached 
the solution. They were also told that the tasks were hard and encouraged to examine 
the solution carefully before presenting it. 75 sec after task onset, participants were 
stopped and asked for the solution to the problem-solving task and also for the number 
of tones they had heard. 
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Insight condition 
Procedure was the same as above except that those participants who solved the 
primary insight problem in less than 60 seconds (corresponding to the preset minimum 
of 40 ERP epochs/ participant! condition) were given the filler insight problem and 
stopped when the total time for both problems reached 75 sec. If the response to the 
primary problem was provided in more than 60 sec, the filler task was not 
administered. 
Control ERP condition 
Participants were asked to count tones with no concurrent problem. 
The order of the analytical, creative and control conditions was randomised across 
participants. 
Data acquisition and analysis 
Behavioural measures 
Performance on the insight task (the Candle task) was measured by the number of 
participants who provided the correct solution. This was contrasted with the 
performance of Group 2 (control group, Study 1) in a X2 statistic. 
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Reasoning performance was measured in two ways: 
1. For comparing reasoning performance with insight performance, the number of 
participants who provided the logically valid selection (cards "ENTER" and 
"HEPATITIS",p and non-q) was measured and a X2 statistic was used for 
comparisons with the insight task, as well as with reasoning performance in Study 1. 
2. In order to compare the confirmatory and falsificatory tendencies in the presence vs. 
the absence (Study 1) of the concurrent task, Pollard indices (Oaksford & Stenning, 
1992, Oaksford et aI., 1996; Pollard & Evans, 1987) were computed for the present 
data, as well as for the data from Study 1. The confirmation and falsification indices 
(CI and FI, respectively), reflecting the two tendencies, were computed as follows (a 
score of one is assigned to each card selected): 
CI = (p + q) - (notp + notq) 
FI = (p + notq) - (notp + q) 
This would result in CI and FI values ranging from -2 to 2. 
Two independent samples t-tests compared CI in the current data with CI in Study 1 
and FI in the current data with FI in Study 1. The two indices are related and cannot be 
compared directly with each other. 
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Performance on the concurrent task (CWMT) was assessed by the number of errors in 
counting tones i.e. the difference between the reported number and the actual number 
of tones presented to the subject. 
As explained earlier, the present study aimed to avoid speed-accuracy trade-offs. 
Therefore participants were encouraged to check the solution carefully before 
communicating it to the experimenter. In addition, the interpretation of the response 
time for the participants providing incorrect (or invalid) solutions would be 
problematic. Therefore solution time was not measured. 
ERP acquisition 
The 28-channel (10/20 plus 9 additional sites- see Table 2) EEG, referenced to linked 
earlobes and time-locked to tones, was digitised at a sampling rate of 333 Hz for 900 
ms (75 ms pre stimulus baseline, 0.1-40 Hz bandpass, impedance < 5kO, forehead 
ground). 
Table 2. Additional electrode sites (relative to the 10/20 system). 
Electrodes (9) not 
present in the 10/20 FCTl FTC2 CPl CP2 TCPI TCP2 POI P02 
system 
Equidistant from F7& F8& Cz& Cz& C3& C4& pz& pz& 
C3 C4 P3 P4 TS T6 01 02 
Vertical and horizontal eye movements were monitored via supra-, suborbital and . 
canthal electrodes respectively. EEG and EOG trials containing positive or negative 
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amplitudes exceeding 60 m V were rejected on-line, eye-movement contaminated 
epochs were removed off-line. The minimum number of acquired epochs per condition 
was preset to 40 (corresponding to 60 sec problem-solving time) and of artifact-free 
epochs per condition to 30. The artifact-free ERPs were averaged for 3 conditions: 
control, analytical, creative. ANOV A found no statistically significant difference 
between the number of artifact-free epochs in the 3 conditions: analytical- 36.8, 
insight- 37.9, control- 39.6; F (2, 38)= 2.55, p=.l. 
ERP analysis 
Waveform analysis 
P300 amplitude was measured as (1) the largest peak amplitude within the 250-450 ms 
time window and as (2) the average amplitude across the same time-window. Four 
regions of the scalp were defined (frontal, temporal, central-parietal, occipital) and 
ERPs averaged across electrodes in the four regions for both hemispheres, which 
excluded the four midline electrodes (see Table 3). 
Both time-window average and peak ERPs were subjected to a 3-stage statistical 
analysis (see Table 6): 
Step 1. Omnibus repeated measures ANOV A 
Step 2. (following significant main effects or interactions in step!) repeated measures 
ANOV As for separate regions 
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Step 3. (following significant main effects or interactions in step 2) post-hoc t-tests 
within regions. 
Table 3. Scalp regions in the ERP analysis (averages across electrode sites). 
Region (4) Hemisphere (2) Electrode (24) 
Frontal (FR) FR Left Fpl, F3, F7, FTCI 
FR Right Fp2, F4, F8, FTC2 
Central-Parietal (CP) CP Left C3, CPI, P3 
CP Right C4, CP2, P4 
Temporal (T) T Left T3, T5, TCPI 
T Right T4, T6, TCP2 
Occipital (0) o Left 01, POI 
o Right 02, P02 
Greenhouse-Geiser corrections were applied for ANOV A results and Holm's 
Bonferroni procedure was used to control for a-inflation in multiple t-tests. Only 
corrected p-values are reported. 
Hemispheres were averaged within regions unless preceded by a significant interaction 
involving the hemisphere factor. Factor Group, corresponding to reasoning 
performance (valid/invalid selections) did not enter ANOV A because of a small 
number of participants with valid selections (5), but separate exploratory t-tests were 
performed to compare the two subgroups (valid/invalid selections) in all scalp regions. 
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Principal Components Analysis (PCA) 
peA is a type of factor analysis which has been successfully used for the temporal 
decomposition of the ERP waveform and its recognised advantages, relative to the 
visual inspection ofERPs, are its objectivity and sensitivity (Donchin & Heffley, 
1976). Importantly, peA outcomes are often consistent with visual identification of 
the most common ERP waveform components. Yet, it provides additional detail and 
robustness to the identification of waveform components. This can be particularly 
useful, because often what appears as a unitary feature of the ERP waveform is a 
concatenation of relatively distinct events (e.g. P3a and P3b). Furthermore, electrical 
events can sometimes cancel each other and not be visible in the ERP waveform, but 
they would be identified by peA. Technically, peA segments the ERP waveform into 
relatively distinct time intervals (events), by finding the most reliable patterns of 
covariance between time-points in the ERP recording. For example, ifERPs are 
sampled at 333 Hz, there is approximately one value of the ERP signal (or time-point) 
recorded for every 3 ms. If the first 100 points show strong covariance, the peA treats 
them as representing roughly one event with the duration of 100 time-points * 3 ms = 
0.3 sec. These distinct events in the ERP waveform are referred to in the peA as 
principal components or FACTORS (peA "factors" will appear henceforth in capital 
italics to avoid confusion with ANOV A factors). Furthermore, in addition to this 
temporal dimension, peA also automatically provides spatial information by 
computing the so-called/actor loadings corresponding to each ERP recording site 
(electrode). Loadings reflect the extent of the presence of different events (FACTORS) 
at different electrode sites. 
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Thus, for a more thorough investigation of the sub-differentiation of the P300 
component, as well as for segmenting the ERP waveforms and establishing other 
potential components, a PCA on covariance matrices, varimax rotated, with all time-
points at all electrode sites as variables, was performed for the reasoning and insight 
conditions. Since the control condition was only of interest for interpreting features of 
the waveform (P300 amplitude), it did not enter the PCA; additional levels decrease 
the reliability and accuracy of the PCA outcomes. Separate PCAs for the reasoning 
and insight conditions were used for determining the PCA FACTOR(S) corresponding 
to the P300 time window as well as for ensuring that PCA FACTORS had roughly the 
same time latencies (i.e. happened at the same time) in both conditions. The combined 
reasoning/insight PCA was used for obtaining FACTOR scores for each subject, in 
each condition, at each electrode site. Only the scores for the FACTORS which 
exceeded the eigenvalue of 1 and explained more than 5% of the variance (the 
commonly employed cut-off) were subjected to the same stepwise analysis as 
waveform amplitude, with an extra-step: the omnibus ANOV A was run initially with 
an additional factor- PCA FACTORS, with 6 levels (see Table 7). Subject to 
significant main effects or interactions involving this ANOV A factor, individual 
ANOVAs for each PCA FACTOR were performed (only three of the latter resulted in 
significant differences and are reported in Table 7). 
7.3. Results 
Behavioural data 
While there was no statistically significant difference between the number of 
participants who solved the insight problem correctly with vs. without CWMT (Group 
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1 vs. Group 2), reasoning performance was significantly impaired by the presence of 
the concurrent task (see Table 4). This was also reflected by better insight than 
reasoning performance with CWMT: X2 (1)= 3.75, p=.05, and the lack of statistical 
differences between the tasks in the previous study not employing CWMT: X2 (l)= 
.31, p>.5). 
Table 4. Reasoning and insight performance. 
Reasoning Insight 
Subject groups No Correct Incorrect Grl vs. Gr2 Correct Incorrect Grl vs. Gr2 
subj solution solution (X2, df, p) solution solution (X2, df, p) 
Group 1 (with CWMT) 20 5 15 11 9 
Group 2 (no CWMT) 26 14 12 3.88, 1, <.05 16 10 .01, 1, >.9 
Participants had a stronger tendency to confirm in the presence of the concurrent task, 
as indicated by higher CIs in Group 1, as compared to Group 2 (Study 1; t (44) = 2.23, 
p<.05, see also Table 5). Furthermore, participants showed a weaker falsificatory 
tendency in the presence of the concurrent task, as indicated by significantly lower FIs 
in Group 1, relative to Group 2 (t (44) = -2.02, p=.05). 
Participants' accuracy in counting tones in the 3 conditions was statistically 
indistinguishable (mean N errors: during reasoning: .9, during insight: .8 control. .6, F 
(2,38)= 2.48, p>.l). 
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Table 5. Selection frequencies and the Pollard indices (Wason's Selection task). 
Group 2 (Study I; no CWMT) Group 1 (test group; with CWMT) 
Selec-tions No CI FI Selec- No CI FI 
subj mean SO mean SO tions subj mean SO mean SO 
p& notq 14 0.65 0.93 1.27 0.87 P & notq 5 1.25 0.85 0.75 0.85 
p&q 7 p& q 10 
p 4 P 4 
Other Other 
ERPdata 
Waveform analysis (see Table 6). Statistically significant interactions, involving 
condition, region and group (participants who provided correct/incorrect responses in 
the creative condition) were found for both peak and time window average measures 
ofP300. In the peak ANOVA the hemisphere factor was also significant in these 
interactions. ANOV As for separate regions found the main effect of condition only at 
frontal sites (see Fig. 5), followed by significant t-tests between the reasoning and 
insight as well as reasoning and control conditions in the frontal region (in both 
comparisons the amplitude was larger in response to counting tones during reasoning, 
see Fig. 6). 
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Figure 5. ERPs for the three conditions at all 28 electrode sites, averaged across 
participants (view from above, right on the right). Two left-frontal electrodes, displayed 
on a blue background (F3 and F7), showed the largest statistical difference in P300 (see 
also Fig. 6 for magnified waveforms at the F3 electrode). 
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Table 6. ERP analysis. Types of analyses are shown as columns, stages- as rows. 
Type of ERP data analysis -+ Time window 
3-stage statistical analysis ~ (250-450ms) 
Stage 1. Repeated measures 
ANOV A (Omnibus) 
Statistically significant results 
(F, df, dfer, p). 
Stage 2. Regions repeated 
measures ANOV As 
Statistically significant results 
(F, df, dfer, p). 
Stage 3. ttests: type, number of 
comparisons, variable tested 
Statistically significant results 
(t, df, p). 
Condition (3) x Region (4) x 
Hemisph (2) x Group 
(correct/incorrect solution to 
insight task) (2) 
Cond x Region (2.90, 6, 108, 
<.05) 
Cond x Reg x Group (2.94, 
6,108, <.05) 
Condition (3) X Group (2) 
Frontal region: 
Condition 
(4.43,2,36, <.025) 
Paired-samples, 
nr-3, Condition in the frontal 
region 
Frontal region: 
1. Analyt/Cre 
(2.92,19, <.05) 
2. AnalytiContr 
(2.22,19, <.05 one-tailed) 
Largest peak 
(250-450ms) 
Condition (3) x Region (4) x 
Hemisph (2) x Group 
(correct/incorrect solution to 
insight task) (2) 
Cond x Region 
x Hem x Group 
(2.67, 6, 108, <.05) 
Condition (3) X Hem (2) X 
Group (2) 
Frontal region: 
Condition 
(5.53,2,36, <.01) 
Paired-samples, 
nr-3, Condition in the frontal 
region 
Frontal region: 
1. Analyt/Cre 
(3.42, <.01, 19) 
2. Analyt/Contr 
(2.22, 19, <.05 one-tailed) 
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Factor I (Fronta l difference) 
Figure 6. Top: The P300 difference shown at one of the frontal sites (F3). Bottom: 
Loadings of the 6 factors extracted by the PCA. The two factors that overlapped P300 
and showed the difference across conditions are plotted in bold . 
No significant differences were found between the insight and control conditions. The 
exploratory t-tests comparing participants who had valid vs. invalid selections in the 
reasoning task were not significant. 
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PCA (see Fig. 6) revealed 6 FACTORS in both the reasoning and insight conditions. 
Two FACTORS temporally overlapped the P300 peak (as revealed by the separate 
reasoning and insight PCAs). This indicates that P300 is not a unitary ERP 
component, but rather, it is likely to originate from at least two sources. Significant 
interactions (Condition X Region X Hemisphere and Region X PCA FACTORS) in the 
initial Onmibus ANOVA, were followed by comparisons of PC A FACTORS in the 
reasoning and insight (see Table 7). Only the two PCA FACTORS that temporally 
overlapped P300 showed significant main effects or interactions, followed by 
significant effects in ANOVAs for separate regions or t-tests. The FACTOR that 
corresponded to the earlier part of the P300 was only different in the frontal region (as 
revealed by ANOVA main effect of condition in that region), whereas the FACTOR 
corresponding to the second part of the P300 was different in all regions with a 
laterality (left) effect in frontal, central-parietal and temporal regions. In both cases the 
scores were higher (which reflects a more prominent presence of the FACTOR) in the 
reasoning condition than in the insight condition. A third PCA FACTOR showed the 
main effect of Group, not followed by any significant differences in the post-hoc 
comparisons between the two groups (correct/incorrect responders in the creative 
task). 
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Table 7. PCA results. The three PCA FACTORS which were associated with 
significant ANOV A results are shown as columns. 
4-stage statistical analysis 
Stage I. Repeated measures 
ANOVA (Omnibus) 
Statistically significant 
results (F, df, dfer, pl. 
Stage 2. Repeated measures 
ANOV A for individual PCA 
factors 
Statistically significant 
results (F, df, df er, p). 
Stage 3. Regions repeated 
measures ANOV As 
Statistically significant 
results (F, df, dfer, pl. 
Stage 4. ttests: type, number 
of comparisons, variable 
tested 
Statistically significant 
results (t, df, p). 
PCA analysis 
Condition (2) x Region (4) x Hemisph (2) x PCA factor (6) x Group (correct/incorrect solution 
to insight task) (2) 
Cond x Region x Hem (2.79, 3, 54, <.05) 
Region x PCA factor (10.04,15,270, <.001) 
Factorl: 267-435ms 
Condition (2) x Region (4) x 
Hemisph(2) x Group (2) 
Cond x Region (5.41, 3, 54 
<.025) 
Cond x Region x Group 
(2 .. 94, 3, 54 <.05) 
Condition (2) X Group (2) 
Frontal region: 
Condition 
(6.03, I, IS, <.025) 
Not Applicable 
Not Applicable 
Factor2: 360-46Sms 
Condition (2) x Region (4) x 
Hemisph (2) x Group (2) 
Cond (6.16, I, 18, <.025) 
Cond x Region (3.12,3, 
54<.05) 
Cond x Region x Hem (5.22, 
3,54<.01) 
Condition (2) X Hem (2) X 
Group (2) 
Main effect of Cond in all 4 
regions: FR (9.65, I, 18, 
<.01), CP (8.27, I, 18, <.01), 
T (8.86, I, 18, <.01) 0 (6.35, 
1,18, <.025) Cond x Hem in 
2 reg: CP (4.95, I, 18, <.05), 
T (16.54, I, 18, <.005) 
Paired-samples, total nr- 6, 
For Condition in FR, CP and 
T regions in both Left and 
Right Hem. 
A nalytical/Crea tive 
Only in the Left Hem, in 
the regions: FR (3.S7, 
19,<.01.). CP (3.46,19, 
<.025), T (5.62,19, <.01) 
Factor3: 612-692ms 
Condition (2) x Region (4) x 
Hemisph(2) x Group (2) 
Group 
(8.72, I, IS, < 01) 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
Independent samples, nr- 4, 
comparing the groups in the 
4 regions 
None reached significance 
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7.4. Discussion 
This study employed a novel approach to the ERP investigation of higher-order 
cognitive tasks. It allowed us to objectively assess the distinctive nature of creative 
(insight) as opposed to analytical (reasoning) processes and to identify the source of 
these differences. Both behavioural and electrophysiological data indicate that the 
introduction of the concurrent task has more profound consequences for reasoning 
than insight performance. There are two main reasons for interpreting the effects of the 
concurrent processing on reasoning performance in terms of competition for WM 
resources. It is widely believed that dual-task performance makes a strong demand on 
WM and, in particular, on its Central Executive component (Baddeley, 1986). In 
addition, the concurrent task used in the present study (CWMT) was specifically 
chosen to involve few representations from long-term memory, but to require frequent 
WM updates (i.e. at each tone counted). Therefore, the present results are taken as 
suggesting more reliance on Central Executive/WM function of analytical (reasoning) 
processes, as compared to creative (insight) processes. 
Behavioural differences 
At the behavioural level, the differential effect of CWMT on the two types of tasks 
was reflected by impairments of reasoning performance in the absence of significant 
effects of concurrent processing on the insight task (see Table 4). There were 
significantly fewer participants who made valid selections in Wason's Selection task in 
the presence ofCWMT, as compared to the processing of the selection task alone 
(control group, Study 1). Furthermore, while the Candle (insight) problem and 
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Wason's Selection task were associated with similar perfonnance levels in the absence 
of CWMT (Study 1), the introduction of CWMT altered that leading to a higher 
perfonnance level in the Candle problem. 
A more detailed analysis of reasoning perfonnance (the Pollard indices) clearly 
indicated that in the presence of CWMT participants had a much higher tendency to 
look for confinnatory, than falsificatory evidence (see Table 5). The Confinnation 
Index was significantly higher with CWMT, whereas the Falsification Index was 
considerably lower with CWMT. According to Oaksford et al. (1996) and the optimal 
data selection model presented earlier, confinnation is a default strategy in Wason's 
Selection task, not accompanied by thorough analysis of individual selections. In 
contrast, some deontic versions of the task (e.g. those in which participants play the 
"enforcer" role), encourage analytical perfonnance, by manipulating the relative utility 
of individual selections. For example, the "enforcer" task, employed in the current 
study, encourages falsification by increasing the utility of cards that can potentially 
falsify and decreasing the utility of cards that can only confirm. Therefore, the fact that 
the depletion of the Central Executive component of WM by CWMT led to more 
confirmation and less falsification can be viewed as a further suggestion that 
participants engaged in less analytical processing in the presence of CWMT and 
instead resorted to a "default" strategy. 
The present findings of impainnents of analytical perfonnance in conditions of 
CWMT are very similar to the results from Oaksford et al.' s (1996) study. 
Nevertheless, the current paradigm also contrasted the effects of CWMT on analytical 
processes with its effects on creative (insight) processes. Unlike analytical 
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performance, insight performance did not seem to be affected considerably by the 
presence of the concurrent task, which is consistent with the indirect evidence 
reviewed earlier suggesting that insight requires less Central Executive/WM 
processing. 
ERP differences 
At the electrophysiological level, the WM difference between the reasoning and the 
insight tasks was reflected by the difference in P300 amplitude measured both as peak 
size and average amplitude (see Table 6). It was larger at frontal sites in the reasoning 
condition as compared to the insight condition (see Figures 5 and 6). Furthermore, P3 
amplitude was also larger in the reasoning than in the control condition (in the latter 
participants only counted tones and had no reasoning or insight task to perform). In 
contrast, the P300 amplitude was the same in the insight and the control conditions. In 
other words, the ERPs in response to CWMT contained a larger P300 at the frontal 
sites when CWMT was performed concurrently with the reasoning task, as compared 
to CWMT alone or CWMT and the insight task. Therefore, there seems to be little 
doubt that the larger P300 amplitude in this case reflects competition for resources 
between the analytical task and CWMT. Those are most likely WM resources, as 
suggested by the association between P3000 and WM and by the more frontal P300 
scalp distribution in the analytical condition as compared to the creative and control 
(see Fig. 7). Since frontal P3 family components are believed to reflect WM encoding 
(Knight & Grabowecky, 1995), the ERP difference appears to reflect more effortful 
WM updating in the CWMT when it is temporally superimposed upon reasoning. 
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4 mV (positive) 
OmV 
- 4 mV (negative) 
Figure 7. The scalp distribution of the P300 voltage computed as a time window 
amplitude average (250-450 ms). The positive and negative areas of the scalp are 
represented by different line patterns. The light area shows the highest P300 
amplitude. From the left to the right: analytical, creative, control. The analytical 
condition shows a pronounced frontal scalp distribution, whereas in the other two 
conditions it is more posterior. 
PCA 
The PCA outcomes confirmed the main findings of the waveform analysis (differences 
were only found in the P300 temporal range and not in other peA FACTORS, see Fig. 
6). Furthermore, this analysis brought valuable additional information. It appears that 
the observed P300 difference is not uniform, but rather, it originates in at least two 
sources, likely to be the generators ofP3a (the early, more frontal) and P3b (the late, 
broadly distributed). This is consistent with the literature on the cortical generators of 
P300 (Knight & Grabowecky, 1995). The differential condition effect (larger 
component scores corresponding to reasoning vs. insight) was found in both PCA 
factors likely to reflect P3a and P3b waveform components (see Table 7). However, 
the frontality of the P300 difference revealed in the ERP waveform analysis (see Fig. 
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7) emphasizes the role played by the neural generator of P3a in the analytical task 
(PCA FACTOR 1, see Table 7). 
Going back to the predictions 
The predictions in the present investigation were motivated primarily by previous 
findings of differential effects of positive mood on creative vs. analytical (reasoning) 
tasks (Isen et aI., 1987, Oksford et aI., 1996) and the interpretation of impairments of 
reasoning performance in terms of the depletion of Central Executive/WM resources 
in conditions of positive mood (Oaksford et aI., 1996). We argued that this account 
lacked a direct comparison of WM involvement in creative vs. reasoning tasks. Such a 
comparison was performed in the present investigation at both the level of behavioural 
performance, as well as at the level of electrical activity originating in the cortex. As 
shown above, the outcome from this comparison supports the prediction that insight 
and analytical tasks make differential demands on Central Executive/WM processing. 
A recent neuroimaging study (Houde et aI., 2001) is worth mentioning in the context 
of the current results. The authors employed a version oftheWason's task containing 
negations (Evans & Lynch, 1973) and geometrical figures as task materials. 
Participants were divided into two groups. Both groups were trained on a standard 
abstract version of the selection task. However, one of the groups received in addition 
to the standard instructions a supplementary text, containing sentences such as the 
following: "In this problem the source of the error lies in a habit we all have of 
concentrating on cards with the letter or number mentioned in the rule ... ". The authors 
termed this logical-emotional training. They interpreted the poor logical performance 
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of their subject prior to training in terms of the matching bias (Evans & Lynch, 1973). 
It was found that the logic-only training failed to significantly reduce the bias. In 
contrast, the logical-emotional training eliminated the bias in 90% of the participants. 
Furthermore, the PET scans performed in both groups of participants revealed that in 
participants who had logical-emotional training, and not in those who had logic-only 
training, the post-training scans contained more frontal activation, relative to the pre-
training scans (the latter contained predominantly posterior activation in the sensory 
areas). Although the study had methodological drawbacks (e.g. it is not clear whether 
the instructions in the logical-emotional indeed motivated subjects at the emotional 
level or they were simply better understood by the subjects), it does seem that after the 
logical-emotional training the subjects approached the task more analytically, as 
indicated by superior performance. Importantly, this condition was characterized by 
more frontal activation, which parallels the patter of ERP results from the current 
study (potentials are more frontal in the analytical task). 
Limitations and critical points 
Although both on the behavioural level and the level of brain electrical responses the 
results suggest differential WM involvement in insight as compared to reasoning 
(analytical) tasks, there are some limitations which complicate the interpretations of 
the present results. 
One potential problem concerns the use of concurrent task methodology in ERP 
paradigms. Monsell (personal communication, 2001) argued that some activity in the 
main task (i.e. insight and reasoning tasks in the current paradigm) may be left 
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undetected by the ERPs, because they are timelocked to the concurrent task (tone 
counting in the current paradigm). More precisely, there are at least two kinds of 
circumstances under which processing of the main task may be undetected by the 
physiological recordings time-locked to a secondary task. Firstly, the processing of the 
primary and the secondary task may run somewhat in parallel and additionally be 
uncorrelated. In this case, the physiological response to the secondary (concurrent) 
task may not reflect the processing of the main task. Secondly, even if the tasks are 
processed sequentially, there is a possibility that the processing of the main task (e.g. 
the insight problem) can be interleaved with processing the concurrent task, therefore 
avoiding competition! interference between tasks. Both arguments appear to be valid 
in general. However, they do not seem to undermine the present conclusion of 
differential Central Executive/ WM involvement in insight and analytical tasks. It is 
believed that the Central Executive (or the Supervisory Attentional System) processes 
information in a serial manner (Baddeley, 1986; Shallice, 1988). This is consistent 
with the limited capacity of WM and also with the sequential character of conscious 
processes, for which WM serves as a workspace. Hence, even if there are some 
processes in the insight task happening in parallel with the concurrent task, not 
detected by the current method, these are likely to be automatic and not be associated 
with WM functioning. With regard to the second possibility, i.e. the insight and the 
concurrent tasks being processed in an interleaved non-conflictual manner: this would 
support the claim that insight processes do not require accurate maintenance of 
intermediary information. In contrast, inter-leaving reasoning and counting seems to 
affect the former, precisely because substantial amounts of intermediary information 
need to be kept constantly active (in WM) for successful reasoning performance. 
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Another, perhaps more serious, limitation of the current investigation is the possibility 
for the data to be explained in terms of differential involvement of different WM 
components in insight vs. analytical tasks, rather than one task requiring more WM 
resources than the other. The concurrent task employed in Study 2 (i.e. tone counting) 
is likely to rely on verbal processes. Therefore, it could involve one of the two WM 
"slave-systems", the phonological loop, more than the other, the visuo-spatial 
sketchpad. It is conceivable that the analytical task (Wason's Selection task) conflicted 
more with the concurrent task because both require phonological loop processes, 
whereas the insight task could rely more on the vi suo-spatial sketchpad. Although this 
possibility is highly speculative, there is some neuroimaging evidence (Goel et al. 
1997) that deductive reasoning activates regions of the brain thought to implement the 
phonological loop (Broca's area). This possibility could potentially question the 
interpretation of the results from Study 2 in terms of the analytical task making a 
stronger demand on the Central Executive component of WM. However, Oaksford et 
al. (1996) have also found that concurrent task processing impaired performance on 
Wason's Selection task. Importantly, the concurrent task employed by Oaksford et al. 
(monitoring of luggage on an X-ray machine) cannot be claimed to be closely 
associated with the phonological loop. 
Therefore, it seems that the interpretation of both the behavioural and ERP results 
from Study 2 in terms of WM differences is the most plausible account. It is consistent 
with the results from Oaksford et al.'s (1996) investigations of the effects of 
concurrent task processing on reasoning performance. It is also consistent with the 
literature suggesting less reliance of insight on incremental processes associated with 
awareness of the processing stages (Metcalfe, 1986a,b; Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987). 
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More importantly, it supports the explanation of differential effects of positive mood 
on insight (facilitation) and reasoning (suppression) in terms of distinct demands that 
these tasks make on the Central Executive/WM (Oaksford et aI., 1996). 
7.5. Effects of mood on other WM components 
The two studies presented above investigated an account of the differential effects of 
positive mood on creative vs. analytical tasks. Its central concept concerns the Central 
Executive, a component ofWM (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Since the Central 
Executive, or its analogue, the Supervisory Attentional System (Norman & ShaIlice, 
1986), are viewed as mechanisms for prioritization of goals/ behaviours, significant 
interactions between emotion and these executive attention components ofWM are 
predictable. It would be interesting to see whether emotions can selectively interact 
with the so-called "slave" components of WM, which are thought to specialize in 
storage. We will attempt to show that the storage components ofWM contain their 
own attentional resources and that the latter can also be selectively modulated by 
emotion. A set of precise predictions will be formulated with regard to emotional 
states that may interact with these attentional resources. Since the literature on effects 
of mood on cognition contains little evidence on this, it was decided to directly 
manipulate mood concurrently with verbal and spatial WM tasks. 
There are important considerations with regard to the type of affect to manipulate. The 
effects of positive mood on cognitive processes served as the basis for Studies 1 and 2. 
However, it is difficult to precisely characterize positive mood induced experimentally 
(e.g. by film clips) (Gross & Levenson, 1995). Moreover, it has been proposed that the 
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neurobiological correlates of different positive affective states (e.g. appetitive vs. 
consummatory states) are rather different (Davidson, 1998). Although similar 
problems exist with the precise identification of experimentally-evoked negative 
emotions, certain types of negative affect (e.g. fear or disgust) are easier to predict and 
induce and they can be identified unambiguosly. In addition, in many mood induction 
procedures positive mood is often more difficult to elicit than negative mood 
(Davidson, personal communication, 1999). This is even more so when mood 
induction is concurrent (temporally superimposed) to a cognitive task. In contrast, 
certain forms of negative affect can be more easily induced, especially if induction is 
concurrent to the cognitive tasks. Consequently, it was decided to investigate the 
modulation of verbal and spatial sub-systems of WM by experimentally induced 
negative affect. 
As mentioned above, one limitation associated with the use of complex cognitive 
tasks, such as the insight tasks or reasoning tasks employed in Studies 1 and 2, is the 
difficulty in estimating the contribution of verbal and spatial sub-mechanisms of WM. 
Therefore, it was decided to identify tasks whose preferential reliance on verbal or 
spatial WM would be well-documented. 
The next chapter will introduce the evidence suggesting that WM storage components 
may rely at least in part on their own attentional resources and that the latter can be 
modulated by emotion. Finally it will investigate WM components' modulation by 
affect in paradigms which temporally superimpose WM processing and 
experimentally induced affect. 
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PART III. EFFECTS OF EMOTION 
ON VERBAL AND SPATIAL WM 
Chapter 8. Attention, spatial WM and anxiety. The hypothesis 
The current investigation set out to test the possibility of specific effects of affective 
states on verbal vs. spatial WM. Recent evidence of differences between rehearsal in 
verbal WM and rehearsal in spatial WM, at both the behavioural and neuroanatomical 
levels, can serve as a prolific ground for hypotheses regarding the effects of certain 
emotions. The key phenomenon here is visual attention. 
8.1. Visuo-spatial attention and reltearsal in tlte visuo-spatial sketcltpad 
Behavioural evidence 
The original muteness of the model by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) with regard to 
rehearsal in the visuo-spatial sketchpad was addressed as follows. In the same way 
rehearsal in the phonological loop largely relies upon articulatory (i.e. motor) codes, it 
was initially proposed (Baddeley, 1986) that rehearsal of visuo-spatial information 
may rely upon eye-movement programs. However, although there are data suggesting 
some role of eye-movements in spatial WM, there is also evidence that spatial WM is 
possible in the absence of eye-movements (Smyth, 1996). Moreover, there is also 
neuroimaging evidence suggesting that eye-movement programs are not the primary 
rehearsal mechanism in spatial WM. For example, an fMRI study that examined brain 
activation in response in spatial WM on one hand and in saccadic eye-movements on 
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the other hand, found distinct regions in the frontal cortex associated with the two 
types of processes (Petit et aI., 1998). A recent version of the idea that spatial WM 
may be based on motor programs (Chieffi et aI., 1999) adopts a more general 
perspective: it is proposed that a large variety of motor codes can support short-term 
memory for spatial locations (e.g. eye-movements, motor programs for hand 
movement, etc.). The condition is that these motor codes need to be associated with 
movement toward a spatial location. Indeed, some evidence has indicated that, for 
example, spatially directed arm movements can interfere with spatial WM 
representations (Smyth & Pelky, 1992). Although the explanation of both verbal and 
spatial rehearsal in terms of similar mechanisms (motor programs) has considerable 
appeal, it fails to account for neuroanatomical data. Single-cell recordings in non-
human primates have shown the presence in the prefrontal cortex of neurons active 
during the delay only, neurons active during both the delay and the movement and 
neurons active during the movement only (Carlson et aI., 1997). Importantly, 70% of 
the neurons whose activity was recorded were active during the delay only. This 
suggests that the encoding of the sensory stimuli in WM cannot be explained solely in 
terms of motor codes. 
An alternative account was proposed by Smyth and colleagues (Smyth & Pelky, 1992, 
Smyth & Scholey, 1994) and it was recently re-iterated by the proponents of the 
original multi-component WM model (Baddeley, 2000). The account states that 
rehearsal in spatial WM is based on shifts of attention from item to item. Smyth and 
Scholey (1994) studied performance on a traditional measure of spatial memory span, 
the Corsi Blocks test. Participants viewed an array of boxes on a computer screen, 
while a subset of these boxes was indicated one at a time. After a 12.5 sec delay the 
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Participants were required to recall the spatial sequence by touching the appropriate 
boxes in the order in which they were presented. The results showed that if 
participants were engaged in secondary tasks requiring shifts of attention during the 
delay, spatial memory performance was impaired, whereas secondary tasks not 
requiring attentional shifts did not affect spatial WM performance. A subsequent study 
showed that the same effect was obtained when participants were asked to maintain a 
fixation throughout the delay period, which rules out the interpretation in terms of a 
shifts of gaze (eye-movement programs) generating the interference (Smyth, 1996). 
Similar results, based on an interference paradigm, were also obtained by A wh et al. 
(1998), who gave their participants a colour classification task during the delay 
interval of a spatial WM task. The colour classification task came in two versions: in 
one, stimuli appeared in different locations on the screen and participants had to shift 
their attention; in the other, stimuli appeared in a fixed location. Spatial WM 
performance was disrupted only by the colour classification task requiring attentional 
shifts. 
Further evidence for the role of attention in spatial WM was provided by Awh et al. 
(1998). The investigators reasoned that if rehearsal in spatial WM is based on 
attentional shifts, then stimuli presented during the delay would be processed more 
efficiently if they appear in the same locations as the spatial WM locations being 
rehearsed. This was indeed found to be the case. Participants performed a spatial WM 
task in which a letter (the cue) appeared in a specific location on the computer screen. 
In one condition participants had to memorise the location of the letter and in another 
condition its identity. After a delay, a probe letter was presented on the screen and 
participants had to decide whether it was the same locationlletter as the cue. During 
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the delay, false fonts were presented either in the same location as the cue or not, and 
Participants made speeded keypresses to indicate their shape. As predicted by the 
authors, it was found that false-fonts presented in the same locations as the cue 
locations were processed faster. If this was due to a simple attentional effect (e.g. 
during delay attention is still directed to cue locations), then the facilitatory effect 
should have been found irrespective of the material that had to be remembered 
(locations or letters). Yet, the effect was only found in the memory for locations 
condition. Awh and collaborators (Awh et aI., 1999,2000) have also provided 
neuroimaging and electrophysiological evidence for the attentional basis of spatial 
WM rehearsal (see next section). 
Neuroanatomical evidence 
Recent studies indicate that storage and rehearsal in spatial WM can also be 
dissociated at the neuroanatomicalleveI. Moreover, the mechanism of rehearsal in 
spatial WM appears to be different from rehearsal in verbal WM. N euroimaging and 
psychophysiological data support the account on spatial WM proposed in the cognitive 
literature (e.g. Smyth and Scholey, 1994, see above), that rehearsal in spatial WM is 
based on attention shifts. Awh and colleagues (Awh et aI., 1999) performed a 
neuroimaging study, based on the same logic as in their behavioural study of spatial 
WM (Awh et aI., 1998). In the latter the authors reasoned that if rehearsal in spatial 
WM is based on shifts of attention, then stimuli presented during the delay in the 
rehearsed locations would be processed better than stimuli presented in other 
locations. Behavioural data confirmed that supposition. The same logic applied to 
neuroimaging would predict that brain visual areas corresponding to the regions of the 
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visual field in which the rehearsed locations were presented before, should be more 
active than other visual areas, even if the entire visual field is equally stimulated 
during the delay. This was indeed what Awh et ai. (1999) found in their fMRI study. 
Indirect evidence for the relationship between attention and spatial WM also comes 
from comparisons of activation patterns in studies of spatial WM and studies of spatial 
attention (see Awh et aI., 1999), which reveal considerable overlap, especially in the 
right PFC. 
Further evidence for the functional overlap between spatial WM and attention comes 
from psychophysiology. In an ERP study by Awh et ai. (2000) participants were 
presented with "behaviourally irrelevant probes" (i.e. visual stimuli, to which they did 
not have to respond) during the delay period of a spatial (WM) delayed item 
recognition task. The stimuli appeared either in the to be remembered locations or 
elsewhere. In another condition (spatial attention condition), the same "behaviourally 
irrelevant probes" were presented in addition to targets, to which participants were 
cued to attend. In this condition the irrelevant probes were also presented in the same 
locations as the targets or elsewhere. In the spatial WM condition, the amplitude of the 
ERP signal in response to irrelevant probes was enhanced (PI and Nl components) 
when these appeared in the same locations as the to be remembered locations. A very 
similar enhancement was observed in the non-memory, spatial attention condition: the 
amplitude of the ERPs in response to irrelevant probes was greater whenever they 
appeared in the location to which participants were cued to attend. Statistical analysis 
showed that the ERP effects of positioning the irrelevant probes were 
indistinguishable in the spatial WM and the attention conditions. The scalp topography 
of the PI and N 1 differences was also highly similar in the two conditions. These 
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psychophysiological data indicate that the similarity between the mechanisms of 
spatial WM and attention can be detected as early as 100 ms after stimulus onset (the 
approximate timing of PI and Nl components). 
To summarise, spatial WM seems to be largely reliant on shifts of visual attention 
from location to location. In contrast, rehearsal in verbal WM seems to show little 
relation to visual attention. Concurrent visual attention tasks during verbal WM tasks 
have little effect on verbal WM performance. Furthermore, presenting visual stimuli in 
the same locations as letters in a verbal WM task does not facilitate processing of 
verbal stimuli, as it does to processing of locations. Finally, during the retention delay 
fMRI signal in visual areas was greatest in the visual areas corresponding to the 
rehearsed locations in spatial, but not verbal, WM tasks. 
8.2. Anxiety and attention 
There is one emotion believed to be intimately associated with attention- anxiety. 
Attentional biases in highly anxious individuals (see also Chapter 1) have been 
systematically investigated for some time (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Mogg et aI., 
1994; Williams et aI., 1988). The theory by Mathews and colleagues (Mathews et aI., 
1997; Williams et aI., 1988) postulated that highly anxious individuals show a 
facilitatory attentional bias in processing material with negative affective content. In 
other words, high trait-anxiety individuals are faster at detecting negative stimuli. The 
behaviour of low-anxiety individuals seemed initially to be the opposite of that of 
highly anxious individuals. Low trait anxiety participants were slower at detecting 
negative stimuli, as compared with stimuli with neutral content (Williams et aI., 1988). 
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Although this was interpreted as an indication of a "protective" bias in low-anxiety 
individuals, a number of investigators questioned the ecological validity of these 
results, especially in terms of their evolutionary significance. A high threshold for 
potentially threatening stimuli would hardly improve one's chances for survival. 
Consequently, investigators attempted to diversify the test materials utilised in such 
experiments. 
One particularly important dimension in the context of high vs. low trait anxiety was 
the degree to which negative stimuli were seen as threatening. It was soon found that 
negative stimuli that were seen as threatening by highly anxious individuals were often 
not seen as such by low trait-anxiety participants. Furthermore, whenever negative 
stimuli were perceived as threatening by low-anxiety participants, these participants 
showed the same attentional bias as anxious participants: they were faster at detecting 
targets in a set of potentially threatening stimuli (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Whatever 
the implications of these results for trait-anxiety, in the current context it suffices to 
conclude that at equivalent levels of perceived threat the behaviour of low-anxiety 
individuals is similar to that of highly-anxious individuals: they show a facilitatory 
bias in processing threatening stimuli relative to neutral stimuli ("attention to threat"). 
Consequently, it can be concluded that visual attention in a state of intense anxiety 
(e.g. fear) is largely dedicated to processing the potential source of threat (i.e. 
"attention to threat"). Based on what was said earlier about attention and spatial WM, 
the temporal superimposition of an intense state of anxiety upon a spatial WM task is 
likely to result in competition for attentional resources and, hence, in impaired spatial 
WM performance. In contrast, verbal WM is less dependent on visual attention and 
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therefore would be less affected by fear and the associated "attention to threat". 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that an intense state of anxiety would disrupt spatial, but 
not verbal, WM. 
In the next stage, the question that arises is: what should be used as a model of intense 
anXiety? An option would be to administer verbal and spatial WM tasks to individuals 
with high trait-anxiety. Indeed, this paradigm is explored in Part IV. However, there 
are at least two reasons for being cautious regarding trait anxiety as a suitable model 
for testing the above hypothesis of selective spatial WM disruption. Firstly, some 
studies of trait anxiety and WM concluded that anxious individuals in fact tend to have 
greater impairments on verbal WM tasks (Ikeda et aI., 1996; Lee, 1999). We show in 
part IV that high trait anxiety leads to equal spatial and verbal WM disruption, 
suggesting that Central Executive resources of WM are more affected than its storage 
("slave") components. Yet, a possibility remains that verbal WM deficits in high-trait 
anxiety are at least in part caused by verbal ruminations depleting storage capacity. 
This would be an impediment for using trait anxiety in order to test selective attention-
related effects on WM. Using anxiety (fear) evocation in healthy participants is less 
likely to be associated with an exacerbated tendency to ruminate. Secondly, it has 
already been discussed earlier (see Chapter 1) that the effects of clinical (anxiety 
disorders) or sub-clinical (trait anxiety) manifestation of affect can be confounded by 
the effects of other cognitive variables from the profile of such individuals. Hence, we 
have opted for employing evoked affective states in healthy participants in laboratory 
conditions. The following chapter will discuss two critical methodological issues: the 
selection of the anxiety elicitation procedure and the choice of verbal and spatial WM 
tasks. 
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Chapter 9. Methodological issues: affect induction and WM tasks 
9.1. Affect induction and validation 
Existing affect evocation paradigms have been criticized for employing methods of 
emotion evocation that require active and effortful cooperation from participants. For 
example, the Velten Mood Induction Procedure (Velten, 1967) requires the subject to 
consciously try to feel a certain emotion (e.g., sadness) or valence (e.g., negative). 
Even if the manipulation has an effect on the cognitive performance, it is impossible to 
determine whether differences in performance are associated with the resultant 
affective state or with the cognitive effort necessary in achieving the affective state 
(Buchwald et aI., 1981). 
Other methods of affect induction that are not dependent on effortful conscious 
modulation such as affectively-Iaden pictures, movies, or music, have also drawn 
criticism (Gross & Levenson, 1995; Philippot, 1993,). Several major objections have 
been raised. Firstly, there are usually large individual differences in the potency of 
such manipulations due to differential histories with the stimuli prior to viewing them 
in the laboratory. Secondly, affectively-Iaden film clips generally evoke a constellation 
of emotions (e.g., sadness and disgust to a film depicting famine victims). Thirdly, 
such procedures often fail to produce homogeneous or constant intensity affect as 
people tend to react very briefly to particular scenes or pictures and not others in the 
same film clip (Davidson et aI., 1990). Finally, although the presentation of 
affectively-Iaden material does not require or depend upon effortful conscious 
modulation of affect, these procedures do not entirely resolve the problem of potential 
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cognitive confounds. Affectively-charged pictures or film clips require certain amount 
of cognitive processing which may very well be correlated with the affective 
dimension of the material (e.g. there may be less in-depth processing of pictures that 
evoke disgust). 
Another major problem arises from the fact that the affective manipUlation is typically 
done before the cognitive task. Even if the affect manipulation was successful in 
achieving the desired effect, it is very difficult to objectively assess whether 
Participants are still experiencing this effect during the cognitive task. Many of the 
affect induction procedures (Velten statements, films) are not amenable to concurrent 
Use with cognitive tasks, because they are cognitively demanding. Music can be 
employed for concurrent affect induction. However, the presentation of music can be 
associated with cognitive processes that may be difficult to control for. 
Therefore, to overcome limitations of existing paradigms the affect manipulation 
procedure employed for investigating the effects of emotion on cognitive processing 
needs to: 
- make minimal or no explicit demands on the subject to co-operate 
- involve minimal cognitive processing 
- minimize individual differences in learning history 
- evoke a relatively "pure" and steady level of affect 
- be superimposed in time upon the cognitive task 
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These requirements make the threat of shock and related anxiety-evoking 
pseudoconditioning procedures (Chua et aI., 1999; Grillon et aI., 1991, 1993) 
particularly suitable for studies of effects of affect of cognition. This procedure 
minimizes individual differences in learning history, requires no explicit cooperation 
from the subject, has no explicit cognitive demands, evokes a relatively "pure" and 
steady state of anxiety, and allows for concurrent cognitive task performance and 
affect induction and assessment. Furthermore, psychophysiological data such as startle 
blink reflex (Grill on et aI., 1993) and skin conductance data (Chua et aI., 1999) 
provide evidence for the presence of anxiety induced by threat of shock. Finally, 
recent neuroimaging studies have provided valuable insights into the neuroanatomical 
substrate of anxiety induced by threat of shock (Chua et aI., 1999). 
In addition, a common problem of studies employing affect induction is the exclusive 
use of self-report measures to validate the affective manipulation. With the Velten 
technique, in particular, there are strong demand characteristics to answer a certain 
way as participants are not blind to the intended effect of the manipUlation and can 
infer how they should answer. In general, the reliability of self-report measures has 
been questioned on the basis of being too subjective as they require participants to 
both introspect and infer how the manipulation made them feel and recall (Scherer, 
1993). Also, self-report requires self-monitoring, which can make significant 
cognitive demands. Furthermore, self-monitoring may be more demanding in some 
affective states relative to others, which can be problematic in comparing different 
types of affect. 
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In the current investigation, in addition to self-report measures collected after 
cognitive performance, online unobtrusive and objective psychophysiological 
measures (Electromyography and heart-rate recordings) were taken in order to validate 
the presence of the target affective state (anxiety/fear). 
9.2. Verbal and spatial WM tasks 
Cognitive tasks typically employed in published reports of affect-cognition 
interactions have often involved several cognitive mechanisms such as WM, 
inferential thinking, long-term memory retrieval, etc. which may interact with one 
another in a complicated, potentially non-linear fashion and are difficult to 
disentangle. This problem has been discussed in Part II with regard to insight and 
reasoning tasks and their demands on WM. An example from the studies of effects of 
mood on verbal and spatial tasks are the tasks employed by Bartolic et al. (1999), i.e. 
verbal and figural fluency. Verbal fluency is considered to involve the Central 
Executive component of WM, primarily with regard to rapid switching to new items. 
Support for this supposition has come both from clinical studies showing that patients 
with WM deficits have impaired verbal fluency (Benton & Hamster, 1983), and from 
neuroimaging studies that found activation of brain areas associated with WM in 
verbal fluency tasks (Phelps et aI., 1997). Nevertheless, verbal fluency also heavily 
relies on long-term memory. Consequently, it may sometimes be difficult to isolate the 
process of interest (WM in the current context). Not surprisingly, Bartolic et aI. (1999) 
did not make any claims about the nature of the cognitive processes modulated by 
mood in their study and limited the conclusions to considerations of functional 
neuroanatomy in mood states and fluency tasks. 
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A related problem is that of the relatively unconstrained character of some cognitive 
tasks, where there is little control over the strategies that can be used (e.g. insight 
tasks, verbal fluency, remote associates). A further issue concerns the neuroanatomical 
circuitry subserving many of the tasks used in investigations of mood-cognition 
interactions. Often it is either largely unknown (as in the case of insight tasks), or 
indirectly inferred (Zarahn & Aguire, 2000), or very diverse (as in deductive 
reasoning, Goel et aI., 1997). In addition, many cognitive tasks are likely to be 
sensitive to large individual differences in strategy. This problem is exacerbated by the 
fact that such tasks are generally not amenable to invasive non-human animal 
experimentation. In addition, tasks thought to have different cognitive or 
neurobiological profiles are difficult to match psychometrically. For example tasks 
thought to differentially involve the two hemispheres (e.g. Bartolic et aI., 1999) are 
rarely psychometrically matched on perceptual, motor and performance dimensions 
(Davidson et aI., 1990). 
Therefore, in order to investigate the influence of affect on WM processing, one 
requires a cognitive task fulfilling the following criteria. It must: 1) not involve long-
term memory processing, 2) constrain idiosyncratic strategies and have sound 
psychometric properties, 3) be well-matched psychometrically (applicable to two or 
more tasks), and 4) be well characterised in terms of functional neuroanatomy. 
WM is well characterized in terms of functional neuroanatomy in both humans 
(Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000, Smith & Jonides, 1999) and non-human primates 
(Goldman-Rakic, 1989). Moreover, there are WM tasks that involve little or no long-
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term memory processing. Examples of such tasks are item recognition tasks and n-
back tasks. In item recognition tasks (Sternberg, 1966) participants are presented with 
a number of items (letters, objects, etc) and, after a delay, presented with a stimulus 
which they either recognise or not as part of the initial set. In n-back tasks (Cohen et 
aI., 1997; Gevins et aI, 1996) stimuli are presented on the screen in trials and 
participants are required to match the stimulus currently presented on the screen with 
the stimulus presented a number of trials previously: n represents the number of trials 
before (e.g. in the 2-back (n=2) participants need to match the current stimulus with 
the stimuli presented two trials previously). In both tasks responses are binary. In the 
item recognition task the response is 'same' if the stimulus is part of the initial set of 
items and 'different' ifit is not one of the initially presented set of items. In the n-back 
task the response is 'same' if the stimulus is the same as the one seen n trials ago and 
'different' ifit was not the same (stimuli to which the correct response is 'same' are 
referred to as targets and the ones to which the correct response is 'different' as 
nontargets ). 
As both item recognition and n-back tasks require virtually no prior knowledge and 
make no demand on long-term memory (for a comparison, verbal fluency tasks require 
lexical knowledge), they constrain idiosyncratic strategies and have sound 
psychometric properties (Gray, 2001). In addition, task difficulty can be controlled by 
altering the load parametrically (e.g., Braver et aI., 1997) or by altering the number of 
potential responses and their similarity (e.g., letters that sound similar would make 
verbal versions of these tasks harder). Furthermore, distinctions within WM (verbal 
versus spatial versus object) can be made by virtually keeping the stimulus material 
identical and only modifying the instructions (Nystrom et aI., 2000; Smith & Jonides, 
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1999). This is particularly important in the context of the current investigation of 
verbal and spatial WM. Finally, both item recognition and n-back WM tasks have 
played a critical role in functional neuroimaging studies of WM (Cabeza & Nyberg, 
2000; Smith & Jonides, 1999). 
In addition to fulfilling each of the previously described criteria, n-back tasks have 
several important additional advantages when compared to item recognition tasks. n-
back tasks are continuous performance tasks in which trials are presented in blocks 
with a relatively constant processing load. In contrast, in item recognition tasks 
processing is discontinuous, with marked differences between different parts of the 
trial (presentation, delay, recognition). Due to their continuous character, n-back tasks 
can be operationalized both as a continuum (in blocks) or in discrete units (trials). For 
example, n-back tasks are equally suited for either relatively lengthy affective state 
paradigms (blocks) or shorter manipulations (single trials). Moreover, this feature of 
n-back tasks is especially conducive to electrophysiological and neuroimaging studies 
(see Part IV). In light of such considerations, the n-back tasks seem an optimal choice 
for a research paradigm to investigate affect-WM interactions (Gray, 1999,2001). 
Furthermore the modulation of n-back (2-back) tasks by experimentally induced mood 
has already been investigated (Gray, 2001) and the results showed differential effects 
of mood on verbal and spatial WM. 
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Chapter 10. Study 3: Developing verbal and spatial n-back tasks. Pilot studies 
10.1. Introduction 
Despite their numerous advantages, there are a number of important concerns 
regarding n-back tasks used by other investigators (e.g., Braver et aI., 1997; Cohen et 
aI., 1997; Gevins et aI., 1996; Gray, 1999,2000). In most cases the average accuracy is 
above 90%, which might prove problematic in an affect manipUlation study. Accuracy 
in easy tasks may be insensitive to experimental manipulations and one of the factors 
(but not the only one) contributing to this is the ceiling effect. In a binary response 
task, such as the n-back tasks, guessing leads to a performance of approximately 50% 
correct responses. The optimal performance level for a task subjected to additional 
manipulations (e.g. evocation of affect) is equidistant from chance (50% in n-back) 
and maximum performance (100%), i.e. it is 75% correct responses. Some studies 
using n-back tasks did approach this performance level (e.g. Nystrom et aI., 2000). 
Unfortunately, the verbal, spatial and object n-back tasks used in this study were not 
well matched for performance (e.g. there were significantly fewer correct responses in 
the spatial task than in the verbal task). 
Another aspect of previously employed n-back task which may be problematic is the 
ratio between "targets" (trials on which the response should be "same") and "non-
targets" (trials on which the response should be "different"). Many studies to date 
(Cohen et aI., 1997; Gevins et aI., 1996; Gray, 2001; Nystrom et aI., 2000) utilised a 
30%170% target/non-target ratio, i.e. an uneven number of correct "same" and 
"different" responses. There are reasons to presume that such distribution of responses 
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can be problematic. If participants become aware of the uneven distribution, there is a 
strong bias for non-targets. In other words, responding with "different" in all trials 
would lead to an accuracy of 70% correct. Potentially, participants could respond with 
"same" only when they were very confident and have "different" as default whenever 
they are somewhat uncertain. Evidently, such a strategy would not be desirable for at 
least two reasons. Firstly, the help of the default would decrease the WM demand 
during the task. Secondly, such a strategy would artificially elevate the overall 
performance and performance on targets. Hence, if there is evidence that participants 
are indeed aware of the uneven distribution of targets and non-targets, then there is a 
potential for the default strategy and a 50150 ratio should be used instead. 
An important aspect of the use of abstract shapes and spatial location as stimuli in 
memory experiments is that verbal labels can be applied to the stimuli so that they can 
be subsequently rehearsed verbally. Some investigators who employed spatial and 
object n-back WM tasks (Nystrom et aI., 2000) asked their participants if they had 
used such labelling and they reported doing so in the object n-back task. Evidently, the 
use of such strategies can have serious repercussions on the outcomes of experiments 
whose main objective is to perform verbal vs. spatial, verbal vs. non-verbal, etc 
comparisons. It has to be mentioned that the stimuli employed in spatial and object 
tasks can encourage the use of verbal strategies. For example, in spatial n-back tasks, 
studies often employ a limited number oflocations (e.g. four or six) that are perfectly 
symmetric relative to the centre and show little overlap. Such locations are easy to 
label. In contrast if one dramatically increases the number of locations (e.g. Nystrom 
et aI., 2000) or makes them more overlapping and less symmetric, the use of labels is 
more problematic. However, one has to bear in mind that increasing the number, 
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overlap and asymmetry of locations also increases difficulty and, hence, lowers 
performance. For example, in Nystrom et aI's (2000) neuroimaging study performance 
level was significantly lower in the 3-back spatial WM task than in the 3-back verbal 
WMtask. 
To reiterate, there were several concerns regarding previously used n-back tasks that 
had to be addressed. Accuracy levels of over 90% were considered too high in the 
context of concurrent mood manipulation and its effects. Furthermore, verbal and 
spatial n-back tasks had to be well matched for difficulty. In addition, it had to be 
established whether participants are aware of uneven distributions of targets and non-
targets, since this may lead to the use of default strategies. Finally, in spatial n-back 
tasks it is imperative to reduce the use of verbal strategies by manipulating the 
stimulus locations so that they become less amenable to labelling. However, one has to 
bear in mind that the above-mentioned requirements are not independent. For example, 
increasing the number, overlap and asymmetry of locations also increases difficulty 
and, hence, lowers performance. Consequently, pilot work is needed to develop tasks 
that simultaneously satisfy these constraints. Four pilot studies were performed in 
order to address the above requirements. 
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10.2. Method 
Participants 
Twenty nine participants (17 females and 12 males, mean age 19.82, sd 1.71, range 
19-24) took part in the four pilot studies, for which they received course credits. The 
numbers of participants who took part in each study are presented in Table 8. 
Apparatus 
A Pentium 100 MHz PC was used for task presentation and collection of behavioural 
data (accuracy and RT). 
The present verbal and spatial n-back WM tasks (Gray, 1999,2001) have identical 
stimuli, and are distinguished only by their instructions. As illustrated in Figure 8, 
stimuli are presented in trials on a computer screen (IBM compatible, 17' monitor). 
Each trial consists of the 500 ms presentation of a square box with several instances of 
the same letter inside, in upper or lower case font. The box with letters is 
superimposed upon a background configuration of randomly arrayed letters and it 
appears in six different locations. During the 2500 ms inter-trial interval the 
background is displayed alone. In both verbal and spatial versions of the task, 
participants have to decide whether the stimulus is the same ("target") or different 
("non-target") from that displayed n trials ago (hence, n-back). In the present pilot 
studies 2-back (n=2) and 3-back (n=3) tasks were tested. Participants are also 
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instructed to respond with the ir ri ght hand as quickly and accurately as possible by 
pressing "s" (same) for targets and "d" (different) fo r non-targets. 
N-back tasks 
Verbal 
"same" 
+ 
Sp 
BkH~~ "different" 9 k I b bb f 
H D bb t 
L k b b ktt:}' ~ --=:-- BH KKK F r I 9 k KK bf H K K he 
L kf b JG k m b g j c 
--." ~ 8 H F 
gk1
kkk ~ atia l I I H Db I ~I~ 
L k k k [9!]J' --", -=:--- 8 B BB I d F t ".·'ol /.\:- ~ .... ;. J 9 BB K b f 
H B B B he 
.. .. JG k®,' --", ~ B H C CC F 
"different" [~~: ":':, 'i.'~:".~t;';,,] 9 k CC bf 
H C C he 
L kf b JG 
--." 
-=--
"sanle" I I 
Figure 8. The verbal and spatial n-back tasks employed in the present investi gation. 
The fi gure shows the 3-back version which was the end result of the four pilot studies. 
In the verbal version, participants are instructed to pay attention to the identity of the 
letter contained in the box and ignore its location. Letters are displayed in both upper 
and lower-case in order to reduce the reliance on visual information and increase the 
reliance on phonological and articulatory codes in the verbal task. Therefore, 
participants are also told to ignore the case of the letter. In the spatial version, 
participants are instructed to attend to the location of the box and ignore the letters . 
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N-back trials were grouped into blocks. In the 2-back version there were 102 trials per 
block, which left 100 response trials (the first two trials were no-response trials, since 
there was nothing to compare them to); in the 3-back version there were 103 trials per 
block. A computer program was developed in order to generate blocks of 
letters/locations while simultaneously satisfying the following constraints: 
- target/non-target ratio (30%170% in pilot studies 1 and 2; 50%/50% in studies 3 and 
4) 
- equal probabilities of different letters and locations 
- equal probabilities of upper and lowercase letters for each letter used 
- the repetition of one letter/location three times in a row not more than once per block 
- the repetition of one response ("same") three times in a row not more than once per 
block 
Procedure 
In all pilot studies participants performed six n-back blocks, three consecutive verbal 
blocks (first block/practice) and three consecutive spatial blocks (first block/practice), 
with the order of verbal and spatial blocks counterbalanced. 
137 
Part III. Effects of emotion on verbal and spatial WM 
10.3. Results and discussion 
Table 8. Pilot n-back results. 
Task Sample Revisions Accuracy % SD t test 
characteristic size Verbal Spatial Verbal Spatial 
Pilot 2-back, 30170 7 N/A 93.7 91.4 7.1 7.7 .82 
1 targlnontarg p(6».4 
Pilot 2-back, 30170 8 Shorten trial 88.5 89.3 7.9 8.3 -.22 
2 targlnontarg duration 3- p(7».5 
2.5sec 
- 3-back instead 
Pilot 3-back, 50150 8 of2-back; 8S.8 76.6 7.7 9.1 6.17 
3 targ/nontarg 50/50 targl p(7)<.0 
nontarg ratio; 01 
asymmetric 
posit in Spatial 
-Pilot 3-back, 50/S0 6 6 instead of 10 77.4 76.4 7.6 7.4 .31 
4 targlnontarg letters in p(S».S 
Verbal 
-
Pilot study 1 
In the first study the 2-back verbal and spatial versions of the task, developed by Gray 
(1999) were employed. The target/non-target ratio was 30%170%. There were ten 
possible letters, all consonants, and six possible positions. The symmetry of the 
locations was such that if all locations were projected on the screen at the same time 
and a horizontal line drawn through the middle of the screen, the image on the top half 
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would represent the mirror of the bottom half. If a vertical line were drawn through the 
middle of the screen, the image on the right half would represent the mirror of the left 
half. 
The average performance on the task was over 90% correct responses in both verbal 
and spatial tasks (see Table 8). Performance on the verbal n-back task seemed 
somewhat higher, but this difference was not significant (see Table 8). 
Discussion 
The tasks seemed relatively well matched on performance, with a slight advantage for 
the verbal task. However, the level of performance indicated that the tasks were rather 
trivial. Easy tasks can be insensitive to affect manipulation and there is an example of 
such insensitivity coming from a paradigm that employed threat of shock (Chua et aI., 
1999). Furthermore, as argued above, if the induced affect would have a facilitatory 
effect on any of the tasks, it could be undetected because of a potential ceiling effect. 
Therefore, it was decided to increase task difficulty. As a first measure it was decided 
to reduce the duration of the trial in order to reduce rehearsal. It was thought that this 
would have a larger impact on the verbal task, thus reducing the difference between 
the tasks. Another measure to increase difficulty was suggested by the examination of 
the task materials generated for Pilot 1. A substantial proportion of trials were targets 
in both the verbal and the spatial tasks. Although participants are instructed to attend 
only to one attribute in any given block (letter or location), it is conceivable that, at 
least to some degree, participants would keep track of both letters and locations. In this 
case, the systematic correspondence of targets in the verbal task to targets in the spatial 
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task could lead to facilitatory cross-talk (any task block could be viewed both as verbal 
and spatial). Therefore, it was decided to have the correspondence between what were 
targets and non-targets completely uninformative (50%). In other words, in half of the 
cases what is a target under verbal instructions would also be a target under spatial 
instructions, and in half of the cases it would not. Since in the task materials used in 
the first pilot study this was not controlled for, it was hoped that it would decrease 
performance to a certain extent. 
In addition, the next pilot collected critical information on strategies employed by 
participants in the tasks. Firstly, it was important to establish whether participants 
were aware of the uneven distribution of targets and non-targets (30170 ratio). If they 
were aware, this could lead, as discussed earlier, to default strategies and less WM 
processing. Secondly, it was also important to determine whether participants resorted 
at all to labelling in the spatial task. If the latter were the case, then the two tasks 
would reveal little about differences in verbal and spatial WM. Therefore, in pilot 
study 2, participants were asked about the distribution of "same" and "different" 
responses and they were also asked about the strategy they employed in the spatial 
task. 
Pilot study 2 
It seems that the two changes led to some reduction in performance, especially, as it 
was hoped, in the verbal task (see Table 8). However, performance fell only slightly, 
with an accuracy of almost 90% in both tasks. Most participants reported labelling 
locations (e.g. top right, bottom right, etc). All participants were aware of the 
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numerical dominance of non-targets. Finally, most participants reported using labels 
sometimes in the spatial task. 
Discussion 
The attempts to lower performance to desirable levels (approx 75%) had only limitted 
effect. Hence, it was decided to resort to a more radical change replace the 2-back 
tasks with 3-back tasks. The literature suggests that performance in 3-back tasks is 
substantially lower than in 2-back tasks (Nystrom et al., 2000). 
The knowledge that participants acquired about the distribution of targets and non-
targets suggested that at least in certain portions of the task blocks participants could 
employ "default strategies". The inspection of several blocks of participants' responses 
confirmed that there were sequences of 4-6 consecutive trials, in which participants 
responded with "different", but there were no such sequences of "same" responses, 
indicating that participants may indeed have perceived "different" as a default. 
Therefore, it was decided to modify the distribution of targets and non-targets to 
50/50. 
It was also imperative to re-design the locations in the spatial task, so that labelling 
strategies would be harder to use. Locations were made asymmetric and the degree of 
their overlap increased, which made it more difficult to find unique labels for each 
location. The number of locations was kept the same as in the previous pilot studies 
(six). As in pilot study 2 participants were asked about strategies they used in the 
spatial task. 
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Pilot study 3 
Performance fell substantially on both tasks. However the drop was much deeper in 
the spatial task (see Table 8), which gave rise to a significant difference between the 
two tasks (better accuracy in the verbal task). Only one participant (out of eight) 
reported using labels in the spatial task. 
Discussion 
The radical changes to the tasks led to significant effects on performance in the desired 
direction. However, performance on the verbal task was significantly higher. Hence, it 
was decided to selectively manipulate the verbal task. In order to reduce performance 
it was decided to capitalise on the well-documented phonological similarity effect 
described earlier in the context of evidence that supports the existence of the 
phonological loop. It was found that phonological similarity decreased the efficiency 
of the phonological loop, presumably because phonological (articulatory) codes 
representing similar phonemes overlap (Baddeley, 1966). Consequently, in the context 
of the present verbal n-back task, it was presumed that the increase in the average 
phonological similarity would lead to a more difficult retention ofletter items. Four 
letters were excluded from the initial set often letters, so that some of the remaining 
six letters show significant phonological similarity (the latter was operationalized 
according to norms from Daugherty & Seidenberg, 1994). 
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Pilot study 4 
Perfonnance on the verbal task dropped considerably as a result of the manipulation of 
phonological similarity. Consequently, there was no significant difference in 
perfonnance between the verbal and spatial tasks (see Table 8). 
Discussion 
Pilot 4 fulfilled the criteria concerning task difficulty: perfonnance on both n-back 
tasks was close to the optimal level of 75%. Furthennore, the tasks were well-matched 
on perfonnance. Also, the fact that in both the verbal and the spatial tasks there is an 
equal number of items (six letters and six locations) can be seen as a further 
advantage. Finally, two other characteristics of the tasks (the even distribution of 
targets and non-targets as well as the asymmetry and overlap in the spatial locations) 
were important gains in avoiding as much as possible the use of "default" or labelling 
strategies. A drawback of the above-described pilot studies concerns the small sample 
sizes. However, the manipulations expected to affect perfonnance on the n-back tasks, 
for the most part, reached their objectives (e.g. increasing phonological similarity 
made the verbal n-back task more difficult). Furthennore, data the subsequent studies 
(see Chapters 11 and 12) confinned the accuracy levels obtained in the final pilot 
study. 
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Chapter 11. Study 4: Effects of threat-of-shock anxiety on verbal and spatial WM 
11.1. Introduction 
The present study sought to test a novel, specific hypothesis of a selective effect of 
anxiety (fear) on spatial WM performance. We base our account on the possibility of a 
systematic association between certain types of affect and specific cognitive 
mechanisms. For example, positive mood may stimulate exploratory behaviour 
through rapid and non-selective WM updating, which could explain its facilitatory 
effects on creative tasks (Ashby et aI., 1999; Isen, 1987), but disruptive effects on 
analytical (e.g. reasoning) tasks (Oaksford et aI., 1996). Similarly, intense states of 
anxiety provoked by threatening circumstances (i.e. fear) are associated with an 
increased attention to potentially threatening stimuli, i.e. attention to threat (Mathews 
et aI., 1997). Although the threshold for perceiving negative stimuli as threatening is 
different for individuals with high vs. low trait-anxiety, once the threshold is reached, 
increased visuo-spatial attention to threatening stimuli is common for both low and 
high anxiety groups (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). On the other hand, rehearsal in spatial 
WM is at least partially reliant on shifts of visuo-spatial attention, as indicated by 
behavioural (Awh et aI., 1998; Smyth & Scholey, 1994), neuroimaging (Awh et aI., 
1999) and electrophysiological (Awh et aI., 2000) findings discussed earlier. 
Moreover, WM tasks that require continuous manipulation of the information in WM, 
e.g. n-back tasks, may be particularly demanding with regard to such attentional 
resources. For example, Gevins et aI. (1996) recorded brain activity during verbal and 
spatial n-back tasks using Event-Related Potentials (ERPs). Spatial trials showed a 
larger ERP deflection around 200 ms post-stimulus onset (P200), interpreted by the 
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authors in terms of attentional processes, because P200 has previously been associated 
with modulation of visual attention. 
Based on the above considerations, it is hypothesized that attention may represent the 
point of overlap between anxiety and spatial WM. If so, attentional processing 
associated with threat-evoked anxiety (fear) should limit visuo-spatial attentional 
resources during a demanding WM task and impair spatial, but not verbal, WM. 
Studies that investigated the effects of experimentally induced negative mood on 
verbal and spatial WM are not numerous (Gray, 2001; Ikeda et aI., 1996; Lee, 1999; 
Markham & Darke, 1991). Three of these studies employed test-anxiety (Ikeda et aI., 
1996; Lee, 1999; Markham & Darke, 1991), which is rather different from threat-of-
shock anxiety. The mood manipUlation employed by Gray (2001) may be closer in 
terms of the elicited affective state. Gray compared the effects of mood induced by 
means of affectively-Iaden film clips on verbal and spatial 2-back tasks (the tasks in 
the present study are based on Gray's tasks). The author did not attempt to induce 
specific affective states and conceptualised the induced emotions as "positive" and 
"negative". However, the films utilised in the negative mood condition (about 
Halloween) were likely to induce anxiety. Although Gray (1999, 2001) reports the 
comparison of n-back performance in the affective states relative to each other and not 
to the baseline. a re-analysis comparing spatial WM performance following anxiety-
inducing content vs. following neutral films (baseline), revealed impaired performance 
following Halloween clips, relative to baseline (Gray, personal communication, 2001). 
Therefore, there are indications that anxiety (or fear) can have a detrimental effect on 
spatial WM. However, it has to be noted that the negative mood induction also 
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impaired verbal n-back performance in Gray's (1999, 2001) studies. The limitations of 
the affect evocation procedure employed by Gray (2001), as well as of other evocation 
techniques, have already been discussed. The present investigation used an alternative 
technique for the evocation of anxiety (fear), namely threat of shock. This procedure 
requires no explicit co-operation from participants, limits the amount of cognitive 
processing to the basic attention to threat, minimizes individual differences in learning 
history, and allows for concurrent cognitive task performance and affect induction and 
assessment. Furthermore, neuroimaging studies have provided evidence regarding the 
neuroanatomical correlates of anxiety evoked by threat-of-shock (Chua et aI., 1999). 
In addition, many of the investigations mentioned above relied exclusively on self-
report measures for verifying the emotion induction, which leaves unanswered 
questions concerning the extent to which emotional states were in fact experienced 
during the cognitive tasks (Scherer, 1993). In addition to self-report, the present study 
utilised objective on-line psychophysiological measurement of affect. Two 
psychophysiological techniques were selected for this purpose. Electromyographic 
(EMG) corrugator superchilii recordings monitor spontaneous activity in facial 
muscles in the vicinity of the eye. The acoustic startle eye-blink reflex EMG measures 
the amplitude of the response of orbicularis oculi muscle in response to short bursts of 
white noise. The sensitivity to affective state of both corrugator and startle recordings 
is well-investigated (Sirota et aI., 1987). Anxiety states were shown to augment the 
intensity of spontaneous corrugator superchilii activity and increase the amplitude of 
startle responses, via the activation of the sympathetic division of the autonomic 
nervous system (Vrana & Lang, 1990). Importantly, the objectivity of these techniques 
stems from the relatively automatic character of sympathetic activity. 
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11.2. Method 
Participants 
Fifty-five right-handed participants were recruited from the Introductory Psychology 
SUbject Pool at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and through advertising with 
flyers and paid $25.00 US for their participation. Handedness was assessed using the 
Chapman & Chapman (1987) inventory. Participants with a history of neurological or 
psychiatric disorder or prior exposure to electric stimulation were not selected. Fifteen 
participants' data were discarded due to performance at the chance level (below 55% 
mean accuracy per WM type) or equipment malfunction. Two participants reported 
during the session previous experience with electric stimulation and were dropped 
from the analysis. Data from the remaining 38 participants (20 females and 18 males, 
mean age 20.63, sd 1.76, range 18-25) entered the analysis. 
Apparatus 
A Pentium 100 MHz PC was used for task presentation and collection of behavioural 
data (accuracy and RT). A modified Coulbourn stimulus isolator and a pair of silver 
cup electrodes were used for the generation and delivery of electric shocks. A 
Coulbourn S81-02 noise generator, a Coulbourn S82-24 audio-mixer amplifier and 
Radio Shack Optimus LV -20 headphones were used for the generation and delivery of 
startle probes. EMG were recorded using Sensormedics mini-electrodes, SAl 
Bioelectric amplifiers (SA Instrumentation Co., Caroga Lake, NY), rectified and 
147 
Part III. Effects of emotion on verbal and spatial WM 
integrated using a Coulboum S76-01 contour and stored using a 12-bit analog-to-
digital board (Analogic Corporation, Wakefield, MA). 
WMtasks 
Verbal and spatial 3-back WM tasks from Study 3 (Chapter 10, see Fig. 8) were 
employed. Their psychometric properties satisfied all the requirements set for the WM 
tasks earlier. 
Experimental design (see Fig. 9) 
VERBAL 
Practice (safe) 
00000 ••• ~ Shock (trial 40) 
• • • •• • • • 
00000 • 
~ Shock (trial 80) 
•••••••• 
SAFETY 
00000 ••• 
TIlREAT 
Practice (safe) 
00000 ••• ~ Shock (trial 70) 
........ ~ 
00000 ••• 
••••• 
\\ Shock (trial 90) 
. . . \ 
00000 ••• 
WM block (103 trials) 
00000 ••• SPATIAL 
Fig. 9. Study 4. A graphic representation of the experimental design with an emphasis 
on the mood manipulation paradigm. 
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An experimental session was divided into two parts with a short break in-between. 
Each part corresponded to a WM type, verbal or spatial (counterbalanced across 
participants) and consisted of five 401.5 sec long WM blocks (103 trials each), the 
first representing practice and the next four the test blocks. Among test blocks half 
were associated with threat of shock (threat blocks) and half with safety (safety 
blocks). Practice blocks were also safe. Shock and safety blocks were always 
interleaved such that there were never two blocks of the same type in a row. The order 
of blocks (safety-threat-safety ... or threat-safety-threat. .. ) was counterbalanced across 
participants. 
Threat and safety blocks were signaled by three means: 
- an instruction screen with the words "Shock Block" or "Safety Block", was 
displayed at the beginning of each block for 90 sec (which coincided with startle 
probes baseline period in half of the blocks); 
- two colours- olive green and dark blue matched on brightness and saturation, 
corresponded to either safety or threat, counterbalanced across participants; 
- the experimenter entered the test room and connected (before threat) or disconnected 
(before safety) the shock electrodes into/from the shock box on subject's desk. 
Participants were administered electric shocks once in each threat block, at different 
times within the block: in trials 40, 80, 70 and 90 of threat blocks 1, 2, 3 and 4, 
respectively. 
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While corrugator supercilii EMG was collected in all blocks, data on the startle 
eye blink reflex was only collected in the two practice blocks and half of the test blocks 
(two per WM type, one per affect condition). It was decided to have half of the test 
blocks free of startle probes in order to control for the potential effect of probes (alone 
or in interaction with the affect manipulation) on performance. The order of blocks 
with startle probes was fixed: practice, 2nd and 3rd in each part of the session (each 
WM type). The combined counterbalancing across: WM type in the first block (2), 
affect manipulation the first block (2, safety or threat) and colour (2) resulted in 
2*2*2=8 possible test schedules (e.g. Verbal- first, first block- Safety, blue = Threat), 
which were counterbalanced across participants (full counterbalancing was not 
achieved, with two schedules being slightly under-represented). 
Procedure and instructions 
Before performing the task participants were provided with general information on the 
experimental procedure. They were told that they would perform two memory tasks 
(one in the first part of the experiment and the other in the second part) under 
conditions of stress and that mild electric shocks will be used as stress elicitors. They 
were also instructed that between 1 and 5 unpleasant but not particularly painful 
shocks would be administered during the session and that each shock would be 
increasingly strong. Then participants were shown the equipment used in the 
experiment and were applied the EMG and shock electrodes. The latter and a small 
connector on the desk, where shock electrodes were to be plugged in (referred to as 
"shock box") were indicated to participants as the source of electric stimulation. In the 
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following stage the first WM task was introduced (the verbal or the spatiaI3-back) and 
participants performed the practice block, presented to the subject as safe; electrodes 
were not connected to the shock box. After practice participants were informed that 
they would perform a number (not specified) of task blocks ofthe same length as the 
practice and that some of them would be safe, while in some electric shocks would be 
likely to occur. Participants were also told that threat and safety blocks were 
distinguished by instruction screen content and colour of the stimuli, and that the 
experimenter would connect/disconnect the shock electrodes according to the block 
valence. During WM blocks, participants were monitored from the control room via a 
VHS camera and monitor. Participants had a 7 min break between the two parts of the 
experiment. After the last task block they filled in the self-report forms and the 
questionnaires. The duration of the session was approximately 2.5 hours. 
Self-report 
13 single-item visual-analog scales (Bond & Lader, 1974) provided participants' 
retrospective assessment of a variety of affective states during the experiment. Each 
scale, represented by a 100mm line, corresponded to one of 13 adjectives, describing 
the affective state: amused, angry, anxious, aroused, ashamed, disgusted, 
embarrassed, excited, guilty, happy, proud, relieved, sad. An additional 100 mm scale 
was given to the participants for the assessment of the strength of shock. 
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Electric shocks generation and delivery 
A total of four shocks per subject (4 rnA, 20 ms, constant current, bipolar sqr-wave, 
4ms per cycle), one per WM block, were delivered to a pair of electrodes affixed 
superficially to the left wrist (targeting left median nerve). Within the WM trials 
(3000ms) shocks always occurred at 2000 ms after the trial onset. 
Acoustic startle probes 
Acoustic startle probes were bursts of white noise, 50 ms in duration 95 dB, and with a 
nearly instantaneous rise time. 16 probes (interprobe interval 18 +/- 3 sec.; 6 trials +/-
1) per block were generated in certain WM blocks (see Experimental design). The first 
five were delivered during the instruction screen (90 sec) and served as baseline. 
Within a trial (3000 ms) probes were randomly delivered at either 1500 ms or 2500 ms 
after the trial onset. 
Startle eyeblink reflex and corrugator activity acquisition and analysis 
Raw and integrated EMG from orbicularis oculi and corrugator supercilii muscle 
regions were collected via two pairs of mini-electrodes placed directly below the left 
eye (Vrana et aI., 1988) and above the medial portion of the left eyebrow respectively 
(as suggested by Fridlund & Cacioppo, 1986). A fifth mini-electrode was placed in the 
centre of the forehead and used as ground. Impedances for all mini-electrode pairs 
were less than 20 kOhms. Raw signals were amplified 10000 times after being filtered 
with aI-800 Hz bandpass. The amplified raw corrugator signals were submitted to 
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analysis. The raw signals originating over orbicularis oculi after passing through a 
Rockland 30 Hz highpass filter, were rectified and integrated with the time constant 
set at 20 ms. Both raw and integrated signals were digitized and stored at 250 Hz on a 
Pentium 100 MHz PC throughout the WM blocks using SnapStream software (HEM 
data corporation, Springfield, MI). Recording equipment was calibrated before and 
after each session. The units for raw and integrated EMG were microvolts LV). 
Orbicularis oculi EMG in response to acoustic startle probes was reduced to eyeblink 
reflex magnitude using the following procedure. Automatic peak and onset detection 
was performed on the integrated EMG response to each probe using an in-house 
software package. Each response was reviewed and approximately 40% of eyeblinks 
were excluded from further analysis due to excessive noise (spontaneous eyeblinks, 
unusually high amounts of integrated EMG during the baseline) during the 50 ms 
prestartle baseline or because the onset ofthe integrated EMG eyeblink reflex 
happened later than 20 ms after the startle probe. Eyeblink reflex magnitudes (in _V) 
were calculated by subtracting the amount of integrated EMG at reflex onset from the 
peak amplitude (maximum amount of integrated EMG between 20 and 120 ms 
following probe onset). Probes with no perceptible eyeblink reflex were assigned the 
amplitude of zero and included in the analysis. Finally, eyblink reflex magnitudes 
were z-transformed within participants and within WM blocks due to large individual 
differences in the distribution of this measure. Blinks that were more than 3 Standard 
Deviations (SD) above the mean for a given subject were excluded. 
Raw EMG activity over the corrugator supercilii muscle was reduced to average 
power density LV2IHz) within a broad EMG band ranging from 45 to 200 Hz. In 
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order to do this, raw EMG signals were first extracted through a Hamming window, 
then FFT transfonned. Finally power density values were z-transfonned within 
participants. 
Behavioural data collection and analysis 
Dependent behavioural measures were accuracy and reaction time (RT). Accuracy was 
represented by the number of correct responses in every WM block and RTs for 
correct responses were averaged within WM blocks. 
Several analytical strategies were employed. The simplest analysis was to compare 
threat and safety blocks without excluding any trials. However, it is conceivable that 
electric shocks (one in each block) might have been powerful sensory stimuli, which 
could partially or totally erase the current memory content. Moreover, since shocks 
were only administered to the left wrist, the stimulation would reach predominantly 
the right hemisphere and potentially lead to a selective effect on spatial WM, if one 
assumes right-hemispheric dominance in spatial WM. In order to control for this, at 
the first stage (thereafter referred to as all-4 analysis) four trials immediately following 
shock in threat blocks and the trials with the same order in safety blocks were 
excluded from the analysis: in these trials items held in memory at moment of electric 
stimulation were needed for responding (see Fig. 10). 
Nevertheless, the first analytical strategy did not seem entirely satisfactory. To 
completely eliminate the confound of shock itself, a final analytical strategy was 
applied: separate analyses were run for the trials preceding (pre-shock) and following 
154 
Part 1II. Effects of emotion on verbal and spatial WM 
shock (post-shock); from the latter four trials were subtracted exactly as in the all-4 
analysis. 
Figure 10. The all-4 analysis. 
Furthermore, since shocks occurred in different trials across threat blocks (see 
Experimental design and Fig. 9), in order to have equal number of analysed trials per 
condition, the smallest number of trials were analysed as follows: 
- for pre-shock it was 40 (the earliest shock occurred in trial 40); 
- for post-shock it was 9 (the latest shock occurred in trial 90, four trials were dropped 
because of association with shock : 90+9+4= \ 03). 
All 3 analyses (all-4 , pre- and post-shock) were run for both accuracy and RT. Only 
pre- and post-shock analyses were run for the EMG data . 
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Statistical analysis 
Eyeblink reflex magnitudes were subjected to a 3-way ANDV A with WM (verbal I 
spatial), Affect (safety Ithreat) as within-participants factors and Gender as a between-
participants factor. 
Accuracy, RT, corrugator power-density and scores on the 13 self-report adjectives 
were subjected to 4-way ANDV As with an additional within-participants factor: Probe 
(startle probe present I not present). t-tests were used as post-hoc comparisons. 
Prior to running correlational analyses the following variables were computed: 
accuracy decrement = accuracy (Safety) - accuracy (Threat) 
anxiety measure 1 (corrugator) = corrugator power-density (Threat) - corrugator 
power density (Safety) 
anxiety measure 2 (startle) = startle eyeblink magnitude (Threat) - startle eyeblink 
magnitude (Safety) 
anxiety measure 3 (self-report) (for each adjective) = score (Threat) - score (Safety). 
Correlational analyses were run between accuracy decrement and the three measures 
of anxiety. RT was not included in the correlational analysis, since the RT analyses 
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found no significant effects or interactions involving factor Affect, confirmed by post-
hoc tests. 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied for violations of sphericity in ANOV As. 
Holm's Bonferroni procedure was used to control for a-inflation in multiple 
comparisons in both post-hoc tests and correlations. Only corrected p-values are 
reported. 
11.3. Results 
Self-report (for descriptive statistics see Table 9) 
ANOV A revealed significant main effects of Affect and Adjective as well as a 
significant Affect X Adjective interaction (see Table 10). Post-hoc tests revealed 
significant differences in two adjectives: "anxious" and "aroused". In both scores were 
higher for Threat as compared to Safety blocks. 
PsycllOphysiological data 
Startle eye blink amplitude 
A large number of participants (11) had to be dropped from the analysis due to 
excessive noise in the data. No reliable main effects or interactions were found for the 
remaining participants. 
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Table 9. Means and standard deviations for two self-report scales (which showed 
significant effects) and the corrugator power density. 
Safety Threat 
Self-report (nun) mean SD mean SD 
Anxious 0.94 1.13 2.65 1.02 
Aroused 0.79 0.98 1.67 1.43 
corrugator L V2/Hz) 2878.13 2121.00 3671.64 2339.27 
Corrugator power density (for descriptive statistics see Table 9) 
The pre- and post- shock analyses revealed a significant main effect of Affect, 
followed by significant Verbal Threat vs. Verbal Safety and Spatial Threat vs. Spatial 
Safety t-tests (see Table 10), showing higher corrugator power-density in threat blocks 
as compared to safety blocks (see Fig. 11). No main effect or interaction involving 
WM type approached significance. 
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Figure 11. Corrugator power density (collapsed across WM types). Henseforth error 
bars in figures represent the Standard Error (SE). 
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Table 10. Statistically significant results. 
Statisticall~ significant effects 
Analysis ANOVA t tests 
Factors Main effects Interaction (corrected for multiple 
comparisons) 
AII-4 No WM X Affect No 
RT trials F( 1 ,36)= 12.25,p<.OO2 
WM No Verb/Spat (Safety), 
Pre- F(l ,36)= 12.54, t(37)=3.27, p<.OO3 
shock p<.OO2 Verb/Spat (Threat), 
t(37)=3.71, p<.OO2 
WM WM X Affect X 
F(l,36)=6.75, Gender No 
Post- p<.OI5 F(I,36)=7.66, p<.OI 
shock WM X Affect 
WM (females) 
X F(l,36)=5.34, p<.04 
Affect 
X WMXAffed Safetyrrhreat (WM Spat) 
Accuracy AII-4 Probe No F(1,36)=4.99, p<.032 t(37)=3.54, p<.OOl 
trials X 
Gender No WMXAffed Safetyrrhreat (WM Spat) 
Pre- F(1,36)=7.81, p<.008 t(37)=2.07, p<.05 
shock 
Affect X Probe No 
F{1 136}=3.91 p=.05 
Affect SafetylThreat (WM Verb) 
Post- F(l,36)=14.7, t(37)=3.75, p<.OO2 
shock p<.OOI SafetylThreat (WM Spatial) 
t(37)=2.4, p<.022 
Affect X Probe Probe / No Probe (Safety) 
F{ 1136}=4.81 p<.035 t{37}=2.361 p<.024 
Affect 
Corrugator Pre- F(I,36)=41.77, No Threat/Safety (Corrug 
power- shock p<.OOI Verb) 
density (z- t(37)=5.74, p<.OOI 
scores) Threat/Safety (Corrug 
Spat) 
t{37}"" 5.0421!<.OOI 
Affect 
Post- F(I,36)=41.74, Threat/Safety (Corrug 
shock p<.OOI Verb) 
t(37)=6.23, p<.OOOI 
Threat/Safety (Corrug 
Spat) 
t{37}=3.842 I!<.OO2 
Affect Affect, 
Self-report (shock X F(I,35)=25.1 I, Affect/Adjective Threat/Safety 
intensity + 13 Adject p<.OOOI F(12,201)=18.07 Anxious, t(37)=8.7, p<.OI 
adjectives) X p<.OOOl Aroused, t(37)=5.23, p<.OI 
Gender Adjective 
F(12, 
157)=23.66, 
p<.OOI 
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Behavioural data 
Accuracy (for descriptive statistics see Table 11) 
No main effect ofWM type was found in any of the analyses. Similar results were 
obtained in two analyses (all-4 and pre-shock). Both revealed a statistically significant 
WM X Affect interaction, followed by significant post-hoc tests that found decrements 
in spatial WM performance in Treat as compared to Safety (see Table 10 and Fig. 12). 
In the all-4 analysis the Threat verbal and Safety verbal conditions were associated 
with similar levels of accuracy (see table 11). In the pre-shock analysis Threat was 
associated with better Threat verbal accuracy relative to Safety verbal, but the t-test 
did not reach significance (t(37) = -1.68, p>.OI). 
Table 11. Means and standard deviations for accuracy and reaction time for all three 
analytical strategies. RTs for males and females are shown for the analysis that found 
sognificant interactions involving Gender (post-shock analysis). 
Behavioural Verbal WM Spatial WM 
Analysis measure Safety Threat Safety Threat 
mean SO mean SO mean SO mean SO 
AII-4 accuracy (%) 79.55 12.36 79.40 12.42 82.83 11.01 79.70 11.13 
RT (ms) 1068.74256.92 1042.02257.06 951.56211.26 948.38219.35 
Pre-shock accuracy (%) 80.65 12.82 82.68 12.48 84.99 10.61 82.25 11.26 
RT (ms) 1091.97248.66 1083.77 269.05 972.86 198.89 961.69240.49 
Post-shock accuracy (%) 80.56 14.88 70.76 16.22 82.31 14.26 75.73 13.39 
RT(ms) 1051.76314.56 1016.90315.31 947.16239.63 929.87229.73 
RT in females 1116.63 310.02 1030.42 341.08 926.12202.67 960.79225.90 
RT in males 979.68 312.24 1001.88 293.10 970.54279.23 895.51235.50 
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The pre-shock analysis also revealed a marginally significant Affect X Startle Probe 
interaction not followed by significant post-hoc tests (see Table 10). 
The post-shock analysis did not reveal a significant WM X Affect interaction (see 
Table 10). It found instead a significant main effect of Affect (followed by significant 
t-tests for both verbal and spatial WM types, indicating lower accuracy in Threat vs. 
Safety) and a significant Affect X Startle Probe interaction, followed by a significant t-
test showing lower accuracy with vs. without startle probes in Safety blocks. 
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Figure 12. Pre-shock accuracy, represented as the number of correct responses out of 
37 (corresponding to the first 40 trials, in a 3-back the first 3 trials of each WM block 
are no-response trials). 
Reaction time (for descriptive statistics see Table 11) 
Two of the RT analyses (pre- and post-shock) found a significant main effect ofWM 
type, followed by significant post-hoc tests that revealed faster responses in the spatial 
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as compared to the verbal WM task (in both Threat and Safety, see Table 10). 
Reaction times were somewhat shorter in Threat than Safety for both WM types, but 
this was more pronounced in verbal WM. This was reflected in the significant WM X 
Affect interaction in the all-4 analysis. However, the post-hoc tests, comparing Threat 
vs. Safety reaction times were not significant. A similar speed-up in the WM blocks in 
which shocks were administered was suggested in female participants by the WM X 
Affect X Gender interaction in the post-shock analysis, but it too was not followed by 
significant post-hoc tests. 
Correlations 
No correlations reached significance after the adjustment for multiple comparisons. 
11.4. Discussion 
One of the key objectives of the study was to induce the affective state (anxiety) 
concurrently, and not prior, to the WM tasks. The presence of anxiety during the 
memory task was confirmed both by self-report measures (adjectives "anxious" and 
"aroused"), and by psychophysiological techniques (see Fig. 11 and Table 9). 
Consistent with the extant literature (Vrana & Lang, 1990) and with our expectations, 
corrugator recordings revealed increased muscle activity in conditions of Threat, as 
compared to Safety, for both WM types. Importantly, the fact that only two out of 13 
self-report adjectives ("anxious" and "aroused") showed a reliable difference between 
Threat and Safety seems to suggest that affect-induction was rather selective (see 
Table 10). 
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The results from the present study are highly consistent with the hypothesised 
selective disruption of spatial n-back WM performance in conditions of anxiety (fear). 
Two of the accuracy analyses, i.e. the analysis of all trials with the exception of four 
trials immediately following shock and the analysis of the trials that preceded shock, 
found that only spatial WM performance was impaired in the Threat condition, as 
compared to the Safety condition (see Fig. 12). In contrast, verbal WM performance 
remained unchanged from Safety to Threat. This was indicated by the significant WM 
by Affect interactions, followed by significant t-tests for spatial WM. The outcomes 
from the analysis of trials after shock (post-shock) did not reveal such selectivity: both 
verbal and spatial WM were disrupted in conditions of Threat, relative to Safety (see 
Table 10). It seems that differential effects were only obtained in a relatively "pure" 
state of anxiety and that the emotional state following the shock may have included 
other types of affect (e.g. anger, embarrassment, etc). In addition, the physiological 
effects of electrical stimulation may have been quite strong in the WM trials following 
shock and the exclusion of four trials may have not been sufficient to control for this 
factor (see below for more discussion of this issue). Although the reaction time 
analyses seemed to suggest that participants were somewhat faster in the spatial WM 
task (collapsed across Threat and Safety), none of the accuracy analyses found the 
main effect of WM, which indicates that the verbal and spatial n-back tasks were well 
matched on performance. 
Participants responded somewhat faster in the Threat blocks, compared to Safety 
blocks (though these effects are not reliable as shown by post-hoc tests). However, this 
cannot be taken as an indication of speed-accuracy trade-offs. The speed-up effect of 
Threat was larger for verbal WM, and a speed-accuracy trade-off would predict that 
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verbal, not spatial, WM performance should be lower in Threat blocks. The accuracy 
data show the opposite. Some interesting effects of startle probes were also 
discovered. For instance, the post-shock analysis showed that in the absence of threat 
the probes were associated with lower WM performance, as indicated by Affect by 
Probe interaction and the significant post-hoc tests. 
A legitimate question to be asked is whether the spatial n-back is not more sensitive to 
any disruption as compared to the verbal n-back. If that would be the case, the 
specificity of the effect reported here could be questioned. In the post-shock analysis 
performance was equally impaired on the verbal and the spatial WM tasks, suggesting 
that the two tasks are not disproportionately susceptible to disruption. 
Limitations 
Despite the convergence of findings from the analyses of WM performance, the 
conclusion that the selective disruption of spatial WM performance is entirely 
attributable to the change in affective state cannot be reached. Electric shocks were 
employed in the study in order to standardise the state of anxiety across different 
participants (different expectations of the strength of shock may have lead to more 
variability in the level of induced anxiety). Furthermore, it was considered important 
to preserve a relatively steady level of anxiety in a lengthy paradigm and shocks were 
expected to contribute in this respect. Nevertheless, the physiological effects of 
electrical stimulation are complex and difficult to control even by exclusion of WM 
trials. Furthermore, shock as sensory stimulation could potentially account for the 
effect. 
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Another drawback of the current study is the large loss of participants from the 
analysis (17 out of 55 in the accuracy, RT, self-report and corrugator analyses, and 28 
out of 55 in the startle analysis). The main reason for this loss was the technical 
sophistication of the experiment; there were four on-line control systems, which had to 
be integrated: the system presenting the WM task and collecting accuracy and R T 
data, the system generating acoustic startle probes, the system recording the EMG 
(corrugator and startle) and the system generating the electric shocks. There was a 
high risk of interference between these systems. In addition, the paradigm was long 
(over two hours) and tiring, and participants had to do the lengthy session with five 
sensors surrounding their eyes and with the shock electrodes affixed to their wrist. 
This may have led to lower performance levels in some participants. 
Finally, another limitation of the study is the lack of significant correlations between 
performance spatial WM decrement and the measures of affect, which precludes one 
from drawing firm conclusions. Therefore, it was decided to address all these concerns 
in the next study. 
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Chapter 12. Study 5: WM and threat, but no shock. Resolving methodological 
issues 
12.1. Introduction 
We sought to test our hypothesis by employing a more rigorous paradigm, relative to 
the previous study. The first, most important concern that had to be addressed was the 
use of electric shock. Importantly, threat-of-shock does not imply the delivery of 
shocks. Since electric shocks can be a powerful confounding variable, the current 
design is limited to threat-of-shock and does not at any point contain shock delivery. 
A further modification, as compared to Study 4, concerned the paradigm. In the 
previous study the use of startle eye-blink recordings greatly increased the duration of 
the session: every WM block had to be performed with and without startle probes, to 
control for the possible interaction of affect and probes. Furthermore, every WM block 
containing EMG recordings had to include a baseline period. In the present study the 
duration of the session was reduced by three times (from approximately 140 min to 45 
min) by using a different physiological on-line measure of affective state, heart-rate 
recordings. The presence of threat has unequivocally been associated with increased 
sympathetic activity, resulting in increased heart-rate (Ax, 1953; Palomba et aI., 2000). 
This permitted a reduction in the duration of the WM tasks. The elimination of shock 
delivery and the use of heart-rate also helped reduce the amount of equipment that 
needed to be coordinated, thus reducing the risk of data loss. 
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Finally, it was decided to directly test the relationship between the strength of evoked 
anxiety (as measured by heart-rate and self-report) and changes in WM performance 
using appropriate analytical techniques. It has been recently shown (Gray, 2001) that 
differences in participants' responsiveness to emotion induction can provide additional 
insight when linked to WM performance. 
This resulted in a short and efficient design, which contained in one condition threat of 
shock, but no shock delivery. 
12.2. Method 
Participants 
39 right-handed students with no history of neurological or psychiatric disorder were 
paid 10 pounds sterling for participating in the study after providing informed written 
consent. Two participants withdrew from the session after practice. Data from one 
participant were discarded because of near-chance accuracy (chance= 50%), leaving 
36 participants (18 females, 18 males, mean age 20; sd= 1.76, range 18-25). 
Apparatus 
A Pentium 100 MHz PC was used for task presentation and collection of behavioural 
data (accuracy and RT). POLAR heart-rate monitor and chest strap were used for 
heart-rate recordings. A pair oftin sensors were used for mimicking shock electrodes. 
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N-hack WM tasks 
The study employed the same verbal and spatial 3-back WM tasks as in Study 4, with 
two differences. Firstly, the number of trials in verbal and spatial WM blocks was 
reduced from 103 to 37. Secondly, in both the Safety and Threat conditions, the verbal 
and spatial WM blocks were presented back-to-back. 
Procedure (see Fig. 13) 
Before starting the experiment, participants were told that the experiment consists of 
two parts: in the first part they would practice two memory tasks and in the second 
part stress would be induced while they would perform the memory tasks. 
Subsequently, participants performed Part 1. This part included three practice n-back 
blocks: one verbal n-back block (5 min), one spatial n-back block (5 min) and one n-
back block, half of which was verbal and half spatial (4 min in total). A 3-min rest was 
given after Part 1. 
Part 2 was preceded by another set of instructions, which informed participants that 
between one and three unpleasant but not particularly painful shocks would be 
administered during the next n-back block and that each shock would be increasingly 
stronger. Participants were also told that shocks were not related to task performance. 
Consequently participants were given the written consent form for Part 2. For 
participants who did not consent (two), the session was terminated. Those who 
provided their consent for Part 2 were shown the shock equipment (fake) used in the 
experiment and were affixed shock electrodes (fake). Subsequently they performed an 
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n-back block identical to the third practice block (half-verbal and half-spatial , order 
counterbalanced across participants, total duration 4 min), containing two instruction 
screens with the words "Shock Block". This constituted the Threat condition. 
Importantly, shocks were not administered at any point during the experiment. 
Verbal WM Half of the subjects 
[ Spatial WM 
Verbal WM - Spatial WM 
Verbal WM - S atial WM 
Half of the subjects Verbal WM - Spatial WM 
Verbal WM 
Spatial WM 
Verbal WM - Spatial WM 
o Practice 
D Safety 
Threat 
Verbal WM - Spatial WM 
Verbal WM - atial WM 
Figure 13. Study 5. Experimental design. 
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The Safety condition was represented by an equivalent n-back block, distinguished 
only by instruction screens with the words "Safety Block". Half of the participants had 
the Safety block at the end of Part 1, after the three practice blocks. To counterbalance 
for the order of Safety and Threat blocks, the other half of the participants had the 
Safety block after the threat block (i.e. in Part 2). 
Participants were debriefed at the end of the experiment, after completing the self-
report scales (see below) and the reason for the non-delivery of shock explained. 
Self-report 
After the experimental session, participants provided a retrospective assessment of 
their affective state during Threat and Safety, by making a vertical mark on each of 
five lOOmm-Iong lines, i.e. visual analog scales (Bond & Lader, 1974) corresponding 
to the adjectives anxious, excited, scared, sad, aroused. 
Heart-rate 
The absolute number of heartbeats per condition was derived on-line from the 
electrocardiogram and subsequently reduced to the mean heart-rate (beats per minute). 
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Statistical analysis 
Heart-rate and self-report 
Participants' heart-rate was submitted to an ANOV A with Affect (safety/threat) and 
Task (verbal n-back/spatial n-back) as repeated measure variables and Gender as a 
between-participants variable. 
A similar ANOVA was performed for self-report: Adjective (scores on the five visual-
analog scales) X Affect X Gender. 
Accuracy and RT 
As an initial step, accuracy and RT were subjected to a generalized ANOV AI 
regression with Task and Affect as repeated measures, Gender as a between-
participants variable and HeartRateDifference (HRDif) as a continuous independent 
variable. HRDif was computed as the difference between heart-rates during Threat 
and Safety. To further investigate the relationship between n-back performance and 
the intensity of threat-evoked affect, similar generalized ANOVAs were performed 
with differences in self-report scores replacing HRDif as continuous independent 
variable, e.g. FearDifference (FearDif) = difference between self-reported fear (visual 
analog scale, adjective scared) in Threat as compared to Safety. Only adjectives that 
showed significant Threat vs. Safety differences in the self-report analysis were 
entered as continuous independent variables. 
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Post-hoc analysis and corrections 
T-tests and correlations were employed as post-hoc analyses. T-tests were performed 
subject to significant ANOV A interactions involving repeated measure variables (e.g. 
Task, Affect). If independent continuous variables (e.g. HRDif) showed significant 
ANOVA interactions, correlations (Pearson's r) were computed between these and 
Performance Decrement (PDcr= Accuracy-in-Safety minus Accuracy-in-Threat). Such 
correlations would clarify the relationship between heart-rate (or self-report measures), 
affective state and WM performance. For example, a significant positive correlation 
between HRDif and PDcr would mean that the higher the heart-rate in Threat as 
compared to Safety, the lower the performance in Threat relative to Safety. 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied for violations of sphericity in ANOV As. 
Holm's procedure was used to control for a-inflation in mUltiple t-tests and 
correlations. Only corrected p-values are reported. 
12.3. Results 
Self-report (for descriptive statistics see Table 12) 
Scores on several visual analog scales differentiated Threat from Safety. The ANOVA 
significant main effect of Affect (F(I,34)=172.13, p<.OOOI) and Adjective X Affect 
interaction (F( 4,136)=32.24, p<.OO 1) were followed by significant post-hoc t-tests 
comparing Threat vs. Safety for adjectives scared (t(35)=10.64, p<.OOI), anxious 
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(t(35)=10.23, p<.OOI), excited (t(35)=5.94, p<.OOI), and aroused (t(35)=2.95, p<.05) 
(see Figure 14). 
Table 12. Means and standard deviations for scores on visual-analog scales. 
Anxious 
Excited 
Self-report Scared 
(mm) 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
o 
Sad 
Aroused 
Safety WM blocks 
mean SD 
26.03 23.50 
21.36 22.18 
15.69 20.81 
9.30 13.74 
10.44 19.57 
Anxious Excited Scared 
Threat WM blocks 
mean SD 
72.11 21.39 
50.75 29.55 
62.83 27.53 
10.13 15.45 
17.30 23.78 
Sad Aroused 
Figure 14. Scores on visual analog scales (collapsed across WM types). 
Heart-rate (for descriptive statistics see Table 13) 
The analysis of heart-rate found significant main effects of Affect (F(1,34)=8.46, 
p<.OI) with higher heart-rate in Threat than Safety (see Figure 15), and Task 
o Safety 
• Threat 
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(F(1,34)=9.24, p<.OI) with higher heart-rate in Verbal n-back than in Spatial n-back. 
However, not all participants showed increases in heart-rate under threat of shock. For 
this reason, in some analyses of the effect of anxiety on WM performance, we focused 
only on the 24 who did show increases, i.e., those for whom there was objective 
evidence of a successful emotion induction. 
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Figure 15. Heart rate in the verbal and spatial WM tasks in safety and threat. 
Table 13. Means and standard deviations for heart-rate, accuracy and reaction time. 
Verbal WM Spatial WM 
Safety Threat Safety Threat 
mean SD mean SD mean SD mean SD 
Heart-rate (b/min) 83.80 11.06 87.69 13.60 81.97 11.85 85.33 12.64 
Accuracy 1 (%) 78.22 12.25 74.01 17.41 80.46 9.19 73.65 13.61 
Accuracy 2 (%) 77.81 11.38 76.90 15.71 81.03 8.50 72.77 13.59 
RT (ms) 1063.5 302.1 1063.64 313.22 990.15 275.32 1036.44 324.29 
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Accuracy (for descriptive statistics see Table 13) 
Our key prediction was an interaction of Affect (threat vs. safety) with Task (verbal 
vs. spatial) on WM performance. As expected, there were substantial individual 
differences in participants' responsiveness to the emotion induction. We therefore 
sought to control for and capitalize on these differences in the strength of the induction 
when assessing the key interaction of interest (Gray, 2001). Firstly, across all 
participants, we statistically controlled for individual differences based on 
physiological (HRDif) and self-report (FearDif) measures. Secondly, we focused only 
on participants with objective evidence for a successful emotion induction: the 
increase in their heart-rate in Threat as compared to Safety (HRDif). 
In the first analysis of WM performance, we included measures of individual 
differences in the strength of the emotion induction as a continuous variable. The test 
of the 3-way Affect X Task X Strength-of-induction interaction affords a natural test 
of the hypothesis. It imposes the additional constraint that the interaction of interest be 
strongest for those participants experiencing the strongest emotional state. Testing this 
3-way interaction by ANOV A revealed a significant Task X Affect X HRDif 
interaction (F(1,33)=4.49, p<.05). Similarly, the Task X Affect X FearDif interaction 
approached significance (F(I,33)=3.86, p=.058). The pattern of selective spatial n-
back disruption was fully confirmed by post-hoc t-tests. Among t-tests comparing 
Threat and Safety blocks for both n-back types as well as verbal and spatial n-back 
blocks for both Affect types, only one was significant: Spatial Safety vs Spatial Threat 
(t(35)=3.16, p<.05). Moreover, there was a significant positive correlation of 
PDcrSpatial with HRDif (r(36)=.44, p<.O I). The correlation of PDcrSpatial with 
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FearDifwas also positive, but it did not reach significance (r(36)=.21, p=.22). The 
same correlations ofPdcrVerbal were non-significant (r(36)=-.09, p>.6 and r(36)=-.I, 
p>.5 respectively). These interactions and correlations suggest that the more anxiety 
the participants reported and the higher their heart-rate in the Threat condition, the 
more impaired was their spatial, but not verbal, n-back performance. 
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Figure 16. Accuracy in participants who showed increased heart-rate in Threat 
compared to Safety WM blocks. 
In the second analysis, we focused only on the 24 participants with increased heart-
rate during Threat than Safety. Testing the key 2-way interaction by ANOVA revealed 
a significant Task X Affect interaction (F(1,23)=3.95, p=.05) (see Figure 16). In post-
hoc t-tests, the effect of Affect was significant for the spatial task (t(23) = 3.04, 
P<.007) but not the verbal task (t(23) = 0.56, p=.5). 
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Reaction time (for descriptive statistics see Table 13) 
Participants tended to respond slower in Threat as compared to Safety in spatial, but 
not verbal, n-back tasks (see Figure 17). However, ANOVA interactions involving 
Task and Affect did not reach significance. 
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Figure 17. Reaction time in verbal and spatial WM tasks in safety and threat (data 
from all subjects). 
12.4. Discussion 
The results clearly indicate a differential effect of threat-evoked anxiety on spatial vs. 
verbal WM. Performance on spatial, but not verbal, n-back was significantly impaired 
when participants had higher heart rate and reported being more fearful in conditions 
of Threat as compared to Safety, which emphasizes the specificity of the effect (see 
Figure 16). Importantly, similar results were obtained when self-report (adjective 
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scared) or physiological (heart-rate) measures of the difference in anxiety were used as 
independent continuous variables. Note that accuracy analyses found no significant 
main effect of Task type, and post-hoc tests revealed no significant differences 
between verbal and spatial n-back tasks in Safety. This indicates that the verbal and 
spatial n-back tasks were well matched on difficulty. 
The RT findings did not find reliable differences between Threat and Safety (see 
Figure 17), but they indicated that there was no speed-accuracy trade off in the spatial 
WM task, i.e. the poorer accuracy during threat was not caused by the tendency to 
respond faster. The current study used objective, on-line measurement of the induced 
affect. Participants' heart-rate was higher during Threat as compared to Safety blocks, 
for both verbal and spatial n-back tasks, as revealed by ANOV A and post-hoc tests 
(see Figure 15). In conjunction with the self-reported differences on adjectives scared, 
anxious, excited and aroused (see Figure 14), it suggests that anxiety was successfully 
evoked by threat-of-shock for both verbal and spatial tasks, which rules out the 
potential interpretation of the observed spatial n-back accuracy decrement in terms of 
selective inhibition of anxiety during the verbal task. Higher heart-rate associated with 
verbal as compared to spatial n-back in both Affect conditions, indicated by the 
significant main effect of Task, could be explained by more muscular activity during 
rehearsal in the verbal task (participants were not discouraged from overtly rehearsing 
letters). 
The current results not only confirm our previous findings (Study 4), but they resolve 
important methodological issues. Current outcomes rule out the interpretation of the 
previously observed selective disruption of spatial WM in terms of the effects of 
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electric stimulation, because the current paradigm did not employ shock delivery. The 
systematic relationship between the increase in heart-rate and self-reported fear and 
the decrement in spatial n-back performance, revealed by ANOV As with continuous 
independent variables and by correlations, is an important novel result, since it 
provides further validation to the selective character of threat-anxiety effects on spatial 
WM. 
12.5. Conclusions andfurther questions 
Visual attention and executive attention 
Study 5 provided further support to the general proposal that specific types of affect 
are closely associated with certain cognitive mechanisms. Since the latter mechanisms 
can also be critical for cognitive functioning, this will predictably lead to conflicting 
demands. The specific case investigated in Studies 3 and 4 was that of the 
hypothesised overlap between intense anxiety (fear) and spatial WM. Visual attention 
has been proposed as the focus of overlap. The literature shows that in both normal 
and sub-clinical populations, the presence of threat leads to an increased (visual) 
attention to potentially threatening stimuli. At the same time, rehearsal of locations in 
spatial WM (and, possibly, in the recently postulated episodic WM buffer, Baddeley, 
2000) is largely reliant on shifts of visual attention. In contrast, rehearsal in verbal 
WM seems to be predominantly based on the re-play of sub-vocal motor codes (which 
are also used during speech). Hence, in the current investigation, it was presumed that 
the processing of demanding spatial and verbal WM tasks (spatiaI3-back task) in a 
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threatening environment would lead to a selective impairment of spatial WM 
performance. This prediction was fully confirmed. 
Nevertheless, there are some important issues, which remain unclear. One of them is 
the applicability of the term of "attention", used to interpret the present outcomes. In 
the literature, there are at least two uses of this term. One, more traditional, refers to 
the ability to filter out the sensory information from the environment, by preferentially 
processing input from some sensory channels (Duncan, 1980). Since attention in this 
sense is closely associated with perception, it is also modality-specific (e.g. visual 
attention), although evidence suggests that information from different modalities can 
be integrated at early processing stages (e.g. fear conditioning in the amygdala, 
LeDoux, 1996). 
The second, broader use of the term "attention" or "executive attention" or "attentional 
selection" is used to characterise systems like the Central Executive (Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1974) or the Supervisory Attentional System (Norman & Shallice, 1986). Such 
systems are thought to serve as on-line super-ordinate decision-making instances, 
receiving information about the needs of the organism, as well information about the 
means for satisfying those needs. The term "attention" in this context refers to the 
limited on-line capacity of such systems. 
The literature on attention to threat in anxiety and studies of attentional shifts in spatial 
WM refer to the first use of the term "attention". Consequently, our investigation also 
refers to this use, as indicated earlier by the expressions "visual attention" or "visuo-
spatial attention". However, there may be intimate links between visuo-spatial and 
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"executive" attention. Both involve prioritisation of information, be it sensory 
information or goals and motor programs. In other words, visuo-spatial attention can 
also be seen as an executive-attentional system. Not surprisingly, the brain regions 
associated with the two constructs also largely overlap (e.g. the dIPFC, the anterior 
cingulate cortex). It is not clear yet precisely how vi suo-spatial attention is related to 
"executive attention" or "executive control". If the two are relatively distinct, this 
would mean that spatial WM has its own pool of executive-attentional resources, 
represented by vi suo-spatial attention. This would further be consistent with the 
proposal by some authors that executive attention is not completely centralised (as the 
Central Executive is) and is at least in part distributed. In relation to our results, this 
could imply that components of WM, e.g. verbal and spatial WM, rely on relatively 
segregated executive/attentional resources, of which some are affected by threat-
induced anxiety (fear) and some are not. 
Alternatively, it is possible that executive/attentional resources are strictly centralised, 
as is Baddeley and colleagues' Central Executive (Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Hitch, 
1974), with an asymmetry in the involvement of executive-attentional resources in 
verbal vs. spatial WM, the former (the phonological loop) being less reliant on such 
resources. Indeed, it has already been mentioned that rehearsal in spatial WM has been 
difficult to conceptualise within the original WM model. At least in part, the difficulty 
seems to arise from the properties of the sensory input that is fed into verbal and 
spatial WM. Auditory information is serial and can only be integrated over time. 
Speech is also represented as auditory codes, hence, it is also serial. In contrast, visual 
information is processed largely in parallel, with some, but possibly less stringent, 
need for temporal integration. Therefore, it conceivable that verbal WM, which is 
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closely associated with auditory perception and speech, is better equipped for retaining 
serial order than spatial (and visuaVobject) WM. This is an advantage in most WM 
tasks, because the latter (some item recognition tasks and especially n-back tasks) 
require memory for serial order. This argument predicts that spatial and visuaVobject 
WM tasks should be more difficult than verbal WM tasks when the tasks require 
memory for serial order. There is evidence in support of this prediction. Nystrom et al. 
(2000) have directly compared n-back visuaVobject WM tasks with verbal WM tasks, 
as well as spatial WM tasks with verbal WM tasks. When the value of n was the same 
for the compared tasks (e.g. 2-back spatial vs. 2-back verbal task), the spatial and the 
visual/object tasks were associated with considerably lower performance than the 
verbal n-back task. Furthermore, in order to match the tasks on difficulty the authors 
switched to a 3-back in the verbal task, which was then compared to a 2-back 
visuaVobject WM task. Our pilot work with n-back tasks contains similar suggestions. 
Pilot 3 found that the change from a 2-back to a 3-back affected spatial WM 
performance more than it affected verbal WM performance and additional 
modifications of the verbal n-back task were needed for equating the performance 
levels (Pilot 4). 
The above considerations together with the results from Studies 3 and 4 can be seen as 
indicating an asymmetry in the reliance of verbal and spatial WM on 
executive/attentional resources. At a close examination, however, it could still be 
argued that there may be different kinds of attentional mechanisms involved in the two 
WM components. Therefore, the present results regarding the selective effects of 
anxiety (fear) on spatial WM, explained in terms of overlap in visual attention, cannot 
be readily used for broader generalisations. It is possible that the effects of anxiety on 
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visual attention would not generalise to the broader construct of executive attention. In 
order to examine this, one would need to investigate the effects of anxiety states, 
which are not circumscribed to a specific threatening stimulus, e.g. test-anxiety. 
Test anxiety and trait anxiety 
The use of test-anxiety may also help answer another important question, regarding 
the affect used in Studies 3 and 4. It is unclear whether the effect of intense, 
circumscribed threat can be generalised to anxiety states, which are less acute and 
which are not associated with a specific threatening stimulus or event. The studies that 
directly compared the effects oftest-anxiety on verbal and spatial WM performance 
seemed to find that, in contrast to our findings of selective spatial WM disruption by 
threat-of-shock anxiety, test-anxiety impairs predominantly verbal WM performance 
(Ikeda et aI., 1996; Lee, 1999). There is a theory that could reconcile these 
divergences. 
The model by Heller and colleagues (Heller & Nitschke, 1998; Heller et aI., 1995) 
makes a distinction between anxious apprehension (i.e. worry) and anxious arousal 
(i.e. panic). The two types of anxiety, though not mutually exclusive, are proposed to 
engage different cognitive processes (e.g. anxious apprehension is associated with 
verbal ruminations), different physiological characteristics (e.g. anxious arousal is 
associated with physiological hyper-arousal and somatic tension), and involve distinct 
patterns of brain activity, i.e. greater left-frontal activity in anxious apprehension and 
greater right-parietal activity in anxious arousal. It seems that test-anxiety would more 
closely match anxious apprehension, whereas threat-of-shock anxiety elicited in the 
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current study would be an instance of anxious arousal, as confirmed by our 
physiological recordings. If anxiety types, described in the terms of the Heller and 
colleagues, have differential effects on WM, this could explain the differences in the 
effects of threat-of-shock anxiety on WM (predominantly spatial deficits) vs. test-
anxiety on WM (predominantly verbal deficits). Threat-of-shock (anxious arousal) 
may have more impact on the Central Executive, whereas test-anxiety (anxious 
apprehension) may affect more the phonological loop. However Eysenck and Calvo 
(1992) and other authors (Darke, 1988) stressed that test-anxiety has a strong effect on 
both the Central Executive and the phonological loop, based on studies of verbal tasks 
thought to involve both of these WM components. Furthermore, Eysenck and Calvo's 
processing efficiency theory of trait- and test-anxiety proposes that the effects on the 
Central Executive are particularly strong. It is difficult to reach a conclusion based on 
these considerations. Therefore, it would appear useful to examine the effects of trait-
and test-anxiety on the same verbal and spatial WM tasks that showed differential 
sensitivity to threat-of-shock anxiety (fear). This was one of the objectives of the 
investigations described in Part IV. 
Anxiety, WM and interhemispheric asymmetries 
So far, we have not discussed the potential neuroanatomical correlates of the effect 
observed in Studies 3 and 4. It would be tempting to hypothesize (Bartolic et aI., 1999; 
Gray, 2001) that the functional anatomy underlying this effect is interpretable in terms 
of prefrontal (Davidson, 1992) or parietal (Heller & Nitschke, 1998) interhemispheric 
asymmetries, with more left-hemispheric activity associated with approach emotions 
and more right-hemispheric activity associated with withdrawal emotions. Indeed, 
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evidence from recordings of brain electrical activity have associated anxious arousal 
with greater right-parietal activity (Heller & Nitschke, 1998) and some neuroimaging 
studies found greater right-prefrontal cortex (PFC) activity in anxious arousal (Rauch 
et aI., 1997). Furthermore, there is substantial evidence that attention is right-
lateralised in the prefrontal and parietal areas (see Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000, for a 
review) and that there is some tendency of right-Iateralisation in spatial WM tasks in 
roughly the same cortical regions (Awh et aI., 1999; Reuter-Lorenz et aI., 2000; Smith 
et aI., 1998). 
However, other neuroimaging evidence suggests that caution is needed in drawing 
such conclusions. A recent study of threat-of shock anxiety found not right-, but left-
lateralised activation in the (orbitofrontal) PFC (Chua et aI., 1999). It could be 
objected, though, that the model of prefrontal asymmetry in emotion (Davidson, 1992, 
1995) refers to the dorso-Iateral (dl) and not orbitofrontal territories in the PFC. 
Davidson and colleagues have argued that in order to reveal asymmetric activity of 
brain hemispheres, direct statistical comparisons of homologous areas in the two 
hemispheres are needed and such comparisons should not be limited to the brain areas 
where main effects where found (Davidson & Irwin, 1999). Since these requirements 
were not fulfilled by Chua et aI.'s (1999) study, it could be argued that their study 
failed to detect the asymmetry in the dIPFC. 
On the other hand, it is not clear whether the PFC division, central to Davidson's 
model (dIPFC) shows asymmetry in WM tasks. Although for some PFC regions 
(Broca's area, suplimentary motor areas) such asymmetry is relatively well-established 
(see Chapter 1), these areas lie outside the dorso-Iateral (dl) part ofPFC (see Fig. 1, 
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Chapter 1). The activation of dlPFC in WM tasks was sometimes lateralised and 
sometimes bilateral (see Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000, for a review). Importantly, direct 
left-right comparisons, as suggested by Davidson and co-workers (Davidson & Irwin, 
• 
1999) were almost never performed. This is especially so with regard to n-back tasks. 
The second study described in Part IV will address this issue, by performing direct left 
hemisphere-right hemisphere comparisons of dlPFC activity in the 3-back tasks 
investigated in Part III. 
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PART IV. THREAT AND SPATIAL WM: 
THE GENERALITY OF THE EFFECT AND ITS 
NEUROANATOMICAL CORRELATES 
Chapter 13. Study 6: Test-anxiety, trait anxiety and performance on verbal and 
spatial 3-back WM tasks 
13.1. Introduction 
The model of the influence of anxiety on cognitive performance proposed by Eysenck 
and Calvo (1992, see also Chapter 1) is probably the most elaborated account of the 
effects of trait- and test-anxiety on tasks involving WM processing. It was built on 
earlier theoretical contributions concerning the impact of anxiety on cognitive 
processing. The model incorporates a key proposal by Liebert and Morris (1967) that 
anxiety impairs cognitive performance, because anxiety-related ideation (i.e. worry) 
interferes with attention to task-relevant information. Furthermore, the model by 
Eysenck and Calvo also incorporates the valuable suggestion by Humphreys and 
Revelle (1984), see also Revelle (1987), that anxiety is more likely to impair tasks 
which have increased short-term memory demands. 
One of the original aspects ofEysenk and Calvo's framework is represented by their 
attempts to include in the model dynamic aspects of the control of resources allocated 
to the cognitive task. For example, although anxious rumination (worry) depletes the 
resources allocated to cognitive processing, a motivational mechanism triggers the 
allocation of additional resources to the cognitive task, so that the absolute amount of 
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resources given to the cognitive task is restored. A likely consequence is that, although 
there is effectively the same amount of resources available for the task in the presence 
vs. the absence oftest-anxiety, the total resources used during the task, including 
resources occupied by worry, are larger in conditions oftest-anxiety. Hence, efficiency 
of processing is lower in anxiety. In order to emphasise the distinction between 
effectiveness and efficiency in test-anxiety Eysenck and Calvo termed their framework 
the processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). The processing efficiency 
aspect of the model makes several interesting predictions. 
Firstly, it predicts that only difficult tasks will be impaired in conditions oftest-anxiety 
and tasks of moderate difficulty will not be affected. In tasks of low to moderate 
difficulty the system (e.g. WM) should have enough capacity to compensate for the 
resource depletion caused by anxiety. There is substantial evidence showing that test-
anxiety affects primarily high-difficulty tasks (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). Secondly, 
processing efficiency predicts that the effects of anxiety should be most evident when 
the level of difficulty in a particular task is increased, or a concurrent task is inserted. 
Both predictions are well supported by data (Calvo & Alamo, 1987; Eysenck, 1989). 
As mentioned above, the applicability of the model by Eysenck and .~alvo to WM 
. . 
processing largely stems from the ideas of Humphreys and Revelle (1984), i.e. anxiety 
primarily affects short-term memory processes, and of Liebert and Morris (1967), i.e. 
worry interferes with attention to the task. However, Eysenck and Calvo went on 
further to examine the effects of test-anxiety on components of WM (Baddeley, 1986; 
Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). The authors of the processing efficiency theory reviewed a 
significant corpus of studies that employed tasks taxing WM and concluded that test-
ISS 
Part IV. Threat and spatial WM: the generality of the effect 
and its neuroanatomical correlates 
anxiety disrupts the Central Executive and, to some extent, the phonological loop 
component of WM. Tasks thought to require executive processes show a larger 
performance drop in conditions of trait/test-anxiety than tasks that do not make large 
executive demands (e.g. digit span) (Darke, 1988). 
However, most of the studies which served as empirical ground for the processing 
efficiency theory employed verbal tasks, which invariably depended on the 
phonological loop. In contrast the executive/attentional dimension was varied: verbal 
tasks with executive demands were more affected than verbal tasks requiring storage 
only. Consequently, the model may underestimate the influence oftest-anxiety on the 
phonological loop. The few studies that directly compared the effects oftest-anxiety 
on tasks that do vs. do not rely on the phonological loop, i.e. verbal and spatial WM 
processes, found that the verbal tasks were more disrupted (Ikeda et al., 1996; Lee, 
1999; Markham & Darke, 1991). Although these authors did not rule out the effects of 
trait/test-anxiety on executive processes in WM, they stress the verbal character of 
. anxious ruminations. For example, Markham & Darke (1991) concluded that "anxiety 
acts as a secondary task, interfering with those verbal tasks that make heavy demands 
on working memory" (p. 107). This is somewhat inconsistent with the processing 
efficiency theory assumption that centra~ modality-independent executive resources 
are the most affected by trait/test-anxiety. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the 
verbal and spatial WM tasks employed by these authors (Ikeda et aI., 1996; Lee, 1999; 
Markham & Darke, 1991) suffered from some limitations. Firstly, the tasks were 
complex (e.g. verbal reasoning), consisting of many cognitive processes, and it is not 
clear how well they isolated WM functioning. Secondly, the tasks were not matched 
for stimulus material and difficulty. 
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The present study employs the verbal and spatial 3-back WM tasks, developed in 
Study 3 (pilot work) and used in conditions of threat-of-shock in Studies 4 and 5. It 
aims to measure performance on these tasks in conditions of high vs. low trait-anxiety, 
in order to test two main sets of predictions. Firstly, trait-anxiety is not circumscribed 
to specific stimuli, and, hence, would not be expected to trigger an orienting response 
and engage visuo-spatial attention It has an impact on attention at the level of 
behavioural priorities, i.e. at the executive level. Therefore, if the attentional resources 
used by spatial WM are of central and executive nature, it would be expected that trait-
anxiety would selectively impair spatial WM performance, just as threat-of-shock did 
in Studies 4 and 5. Conversely, equal disruption of verbal and spatial WM, or more 
verbal WM disruption in trait-anxiety, would suggest that visual-spatial attention and 
executive attention rely on largely distinct mechanisms and that stimulus-bound 
anxiety (fear) can be distinguished from fuzzier anxiety states, such as test-anxiety. 
Secondly, if, as the processing efficiency framework suggests, trait-anxiety has a 
greater impact on the Central Executive than on the phonological loop, then verbal and 
spatial n-back performance should be equally affected. Conversely, if test-anxiety 
makes substantial storage demands on the phonological loop, and it acts as a 
secondary verbal task (Markhman & Darke, 1991), then verbal n-back WM 
performance should be more affected. 
In order to ensure significant manifestations of test-anxiety one can pre-select the 
participants ofa study based on their proneness to test-anxiety. A measure of such 
proneness is the background level of anxiety, operationalised as trait-anxiety. It has 
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been well established that trait-anxiety is a good predictor oftest-anxiety and for this 
reason the contribution of the two is difficult to disentangle (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). 
Trait anxiety is a more reliable measure than state-anxiety, since the former reflects a 
stable characteristic of the personality and its measures are less affected by 
circumstantial variability. For instance, in the current study participants filled in the 
trait-anxiety scales twice (at selection and at test), the two being distanced in time by 
several months. In contrast, state-anxiety scales are only filled in once, at test. 
Therefore, trait-anxiety measures were viewed as more reliable predictors of test-
anxiety relative to state-anxiety measures. Hence, in the present study, participants 
with a wide range of trait-anxiety scores were pre-selected and subsequently divided in 
two groups in accordance with their trait-anxiety scores. The two groups were also 
compared in their levels ofpre- and post-test state-anxiety measures. Finally, the main 
experimental manipulation was to compare the low and high trait-anxiety groups in 
terms of verbal and spatial n-back WM performance. 
13.2. Method 
Participants 
Potential participants were selected from a pool of3479 students, who completed 
personality questionnaires at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (USA). The 
selection criteria were the scores on the BISIBAS scales (Behavioral Inhibition and 
Behavioral Activation Scales, Carver & White, 1994). After screening of3479 
individuals, participants with high BIS (upper 30%) and low BAS (lower 30%) scores 
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and those with the reversed profile were invited to participate in an EEG experiment 
and 66 of them agreed to do so, receiving course credits for their participation. 
The BISIBAS personality scales were specifically designed to measure two 
fundamental personality dimensions, proposed by Gray (1982): anxiety and 
impulsivity. Gray (1982, 1994) further proposed that the two personality dimensions 
reflect the functioning of two relatively distinct neurological systems. BISIBAS scores 
show high correlations with other measures of trait-anxiety, e.g. STAl (the State-Trait-
Anxiety-Inventory, Spielberger, 1983). In the current sample the correlation between 
STAl-trait and BIS (Behavioral Inhibition Scale) was 0.70, p<.OOOI and the 
correlation between STAl-trait and BAS (Behavioral Activation Scale) was -0.72, 
p<.OOO1. 
Eight participants had to be discarded from the analysis for the following reasons. 
Three participants' data showed that they did not understand the requirements of the n-
back tasks. Five participants performed at chance (accuracy below 55% in either the 
verbal or the spatial n-back task). The remaining 58 participants (29 females, 29 
males), mean age 19.85, sd 1.96, range 19-26) entered the analysis. 
Apparatus 
A Pentium 100 MHz PC was used for task presentation and collection of behavioural 
data (accuracy and RT). 
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Procedure 
Verbal and spatial3-back WM tasks (see Part II, Studies 3, 4 and 5) were administered 
in the second half of an EEG experiment. Participants performed one practice and two 
test blocks for each task (verbal and spatial). The order of the verbal and spatial tasks 
was counterbalanced across participants. All WM blocks (practice and test, verbal and 
spatial) contained the same number of trials: 79, leaving 76 responses per WM block 
(in the 3-back the first 3 trials are no-response trials). 
Trait and test-anxiety measures 
Two measures of anxiety were employed. Firstly, the BISIBAS scales were 
administered several months before the study and potentials participants were pre-
selected into the following two groups: 
- highBIS/lowBAS (upper 30% on the BIS scale and lower 30% on the BAS scale) 
-lowBISlhighBAS (lower 30% on the BIS scale and upper 30% on the BAS scale) 
Only individuals from the pre-selected two groups were proposed to participate in the 
study. Immediately prior to the experimental session, participants' ~.cores on the 
. . 
BISIBAS scales were collected for the second time. Individuals whose original 
BISIBAS profile was confirmed (43 out 58 participants) were selected in the two study 
groups: highBIS/lowBAS (22 participants) and 10wBISihighBAS (21 participants). 
The two groups were compared on WM performance measures (accuracy and RT). In 
addition, correlations between WM performance and BISIBAS scores were computed. 
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The State-Trait-Anxiety-Inventory (STAl; Spielberger, 1983) was used as the second 
measure of anxiety. Participants were screened for trait anxiety several months before 
the experiment, as well as immediately prior to the start of the experiment. The 58-
participant sample was divided by median split in accordance with trait anxiety scores 
(highST Al -trait and 10wST Al -trait). 
State-anxiety was measured by administering STAl-state before the beginning of the 
experimental session (pre-test anxiety) and immediately after the session (post-test 
anxiety). 
WM performance 
As in the previous studies, WM performance was measured as the absolute number of 
correct responses (accuracy) and the average reaction time (RT) for correct responses. 
Data analysis 
State-anxiety 
Independent samples t-tests were used to compare the highBIS/lowBAS and 
10wBISihighBAS groups, as well as the highS TAl-trait and 10wSTAl-trait, in both 
measures ofSTAl-state anxiety (pre- and post-test STAl-state scores). 
194 
Part IV. Threat and spatial WM: the generality of the effect 
and its neuroanatomical correlates 
WM per/romance 
Two ANOY As were run as follows (with both accuracy and RT data): 
1. WM verbal vs. spatial (within subjects factor) X GROUP highBIS/lowBAS vs 
10wBISlhighBAS (between subjects factor) X GENDER (between subjects factor). 
2. WM verbal vs. spatial (within subjects factor) X GROUP highS TAl-trait and 
lowS TAl-trait (between subjects factor) X GENDER (between subjects factor). 
Correlations (Pearson's r) were computed between measures of anxiety (the STAI-
trait, STAI-state and BIS scales) and WM performance measures (accuracy and RT). 
The pre- and post-test STAI-state scores were averaged together prior to computing 
the correlations. 
Holm's Bonferroni procedure was used to control for a.-inflation in multiple (-tests 
and correlations. Unless noted otherwise, only corrected p-values are reported. 
13.3. Results 
Test-anxiety (see Table 14 and Fig. 18) 
The (-tests comparing pre-test and post-test ST AI-state scores were all highly 
significant, with more state-anxiety reported by the high-trait anxiety group: 
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- highBIS/lowBAS vs. lowBISlhighBAS: pre-test t(41) = 4.39, p<.OOI; post-test t(41) 
= 2.73, p<.OI; 
- highSTAI-trait vs. lowSTAI-trait: pre-test t(56) = 4.98, p<.OOI; post-test t(56) = 
3.47, p<.OOl. 
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Figure 18. Test-anxiety scores comparing the groups preselected according to the 
trait-anxiety profile. 
WM performance 
Accuracy (see Table 14 and Fig. 19) 
Both accuracy ANOVAs revealed a significant main effect of GROUP, with better 
WM accuracy in the low trait-anxiety group: 
1. highBIS/IowBAS and 10wBIS/highBAS as levels in factor GROUP: F (1,39) = 4.60, 
p<.04. 
2. highSTAI-trait and 10wSTAI-trait as levels in factor GROUP: F (1,54) = 5.11, 
p<.03. 
No other main effects or interactions approached significance. 
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Figure 19. Accuracy in high- vs low-trait anxiety participants (BISIBAS selection). 
RT(see Table 14 and Fig. 20) 
Similar results were obtained in the RT analysis. 
The ANOV A with highBIS/lowBAS and lowBISlhighBAS as levels in factor GROUP 
found a marginally non-significant main effect of GROUP (F (1,39) = 3.31, p<.075), 
with faster responses in the low-anxiety group. It also reve~led a significant main 
effect ofWM, with shorter RTs in the spatial WM task: F (1,39) = 8.01, p<.Ol. 
The RT ANOVA with highSTAI-trait and lowSTAI-trait as levels in factor GROUP 
also found a significant main effect of GROUP (F (1,54) = 5.24, p<.03), with faster 
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responses in the low-anxiety group. In addition, this ANOV A revealed a significant 
main effect ofWM, with shorter RTs in the spatial WM task: F (1,54) = 12.91, p<.005. 
-
WJ 
e 
-~ 
~ 
1200 
1100 
1000 
900 
800 
700 
600 
VerbalWM Spatial WM 
o Low Anxiety 
• High Anxiety 
Figure 20. Reaction time in high- vs. low-trait anxiety participants (BISIBAS 
selection). 
Correlations 
Two correlations were significant before the control for a.-inflation was applied: 
RT (verbal WM) X BIS scores: r (58) = .30, p<.025 
RT (spatial WM) X BIS scores: r (58) = .28, p<.04 
These correlations failed to reach significance when control for a.-inflation in multiple 
correlations was applied. 
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13.4. Discussion 
The results revealed important differences between the two groups of participants, in 
both test-anxiety and WM performance. As expected, the low-trait anxiety group 
reported significantly lower levels oftest-anxiety, as compared to the high trait-
anxiety group, both prior and following the experimental session (as shown by 
differences in state STAI scores, see also Table 14 and Fig. 18). 
Both measures of WM performance, accuracy and reaction time, revealed a better WM 
performance of the low trait-anxiety group, as compared to the high trait-anxiety 
group, as indicated by the main effect of GROUP in both analyses. The verbal and 
spatial n-back tasks were equally impaired, as revealed by the lack of interactions in 
the ANOVAs (see also Table 14 and Figures 19 and 20). 
Importantly, virtually the same results were obtained for the groups selected according 
to two measures of trait-anxiety (the BISIBAS scales and the STAI-trait scale), which 
emphasises the reliability ofthe outcomes. Some additional support for the 
relationship between anxiety and WM performance was provided by the pattern ofBIS 
X RT correlations, which were significant when not controlled for mUltiple tests. 
With regard to the two lines of predictions discussed in the introduction, the fmdings 
appear to suggest the following. An important result is that test-anxiety does not 
mimic threat-evoked anxiety in its effects on WM, in particular the selectivity of the 
latter. Unlike threat-ofshock anxiety, test-anxiety seems to be equally detrimental for 
verbal and spatial WM processing. This is inconsistent with previous reports of 
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predominant verbal WM deficits in conditions oftest-anxiety (Ikeda et aI., 1996; Lee; 
1999; Markham & Darke, 1991). However, as mentioned above, the verbal and spatial 
tasks used in these studies contained complex demands in addition to WM and it is not 
clear how well verbal and spatial tasks were matched for stimulus material and 
difficulty. The present study employed verbal and spatial task using identical stimuli 
and only differing in their instructions. They are well matched on difficulty, as 
indicated by equivalent levels of accuracy in Pilot 4 (Study 2), as well as Studies 3, 4 
and the current study. Therefore, with regard to the first line of predictions, the present 
results suggest that visuo-spatial attention affected by threat-of-shock and attention 
(most probably of an executive nature) depleted by test-anxiety are supported by 
largely distinct mechanisms. Although this may have important implications (e.g. that 
arousal and the orienting response are not characteristic for all anxiety states), further 
investigations would have to elucidate this matter. 
The difference between the effects of threat-evoked and test-anxiety also provides 
some support for the distinction made by Heller and colleagues (Heller & Nitschke, 
1998; Heller et aI., 1995) between anxious apprehension and anxious arousal. 
However, the distinction that the current data support is not that anxious apprehension, 
associated with worry, disrupts predominantly the phonological loop, while anxious 
arousal depletes executive/attentional resources. Rather, it appears that anxious 
apprehension and arousal both appear to affect attentional mechanisms, but that these 
attentional mechanisms are relatively distinct. This conclusion is relevant in the 
context of the second line of predictions (see Introduction). The finding of trait- and 
test-anxiety being associated with a generalised, unspecific WM disruption is 
consistent with one of the central claims ofEysenck and Calvo's (1992) processing 
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efficiency theory that trait- and test- anxiety affect primarily the Central Executive 
component ofWM (Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley and Hitch, 1974), and, to a lesser 
extent, the slave WM systems. Consequently, there is little support in the current data 
that anxiety acts as a "secondary" WM task (Markham & Darke, 1991) and has a 
prominent effect on the phonological loop. 
Nevertheless, one must also consider an alternative interpretation of the present 
results. If, as discussed ealier, visuo-spatial attention and executive attention are 
equivalent, then one would have predicted selective disruption of spatial n-back 
performance (as with threat-induced anxiety). Although this was not observed in the 
current study, there is a possibility that there was such an effect, but that it was masked 
by the effect ofa worry-component of trait anxiety, which had a selective effect on 
verbal n-back performance. In other words, it is conceivable that what appears as a 
non-specific effect of trait anxiety on n-back performance could be a sum of two 
specific effects, triggered by distincy elements of trait anxiety. 
The problem with this account is that it lacks a basis for predicting a selective effect of 
trait-anxiety on visuo-spatial attention. The current paradigm did not contain any 
suggestions to any threatening stimuli or events. One could further assume that highly 
anxious participants operate in a high-vigilance mode that would be demanding on 
visual attention. However, this would predict faster reaction times in high-anxiety 
participants, quite the opposite of what was found. 
In conclusion, the present results, considered together with the outcomes from Studies 
4 and 5, suggest that different types of anxiety all influence WM processing at the 
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level of attentional resources. However, it also appears that attentional mechanisms are 
fractionated. Furthermore, specific anxiety states appear to be associated with specific 
attentional mechanisms. 
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Chapter 14. Study 7: Neuroanatomical correlates of verbal and spatial3-back 
WMtasks 
14.1. Introduction 
Models of prefrontal asymmetry in emotion 
There have been attempts to explain the differential effects of mood on verbal and 
spatial WM perfonnance in terms of neuroanatomical overlap between brain regions 
involved in WM and affective processing (Gray, 2001). The particular 
neuroanatomical model of emotion that appealed to Gray was the most influential 
model of inter-hemispheric asymmetry in emotion by Davidson and colleagues 
(Davidson, 1995, 1998; Sobotka et aI, 1992). The model is based on the dichotomy 
between emotions that trigger approach behaviours and emotions that cause 
withdrawal behaviours (Davidson, 1992). With respect to the emotions involved, this 
dichotomy does not completely overlap with the conceptualisation of emotions as 
positive vs. negative. For example, while fear, a negative emotion, would be seen as a 
withdrawal emotion, anger, also a negative emotion, has both approach and 
withdrawal aspects. Similarly, positive emotions are not necessarily approach 
emotions. For instance, states of satiation, which can be qualified as positive, do not 
necessarily stimulate approach behaviours. In addition to the distinction between 
approach and withdrawal emotions (or affective states), the model by Davidson and 
colleagues was also largely inspired by a substantial corpus of psychophysiological 
(EEG) studies which found asymmetric frontal activity associated with affective 
states, traits and disorders (Davidson, 1995; Davidson et aI., 1990; Henriques & 
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Davidson, 1997; Sobotka et aI., 1992). These studies consistently showed that 
approach states are associated with less left frontal than right frontal power in the EEG 
alpha band (8-13 Hz), with the withdrawal states showing the opposite pattern. Since 
power in the EEG alpha band is inversely related to neuronal activity, these EEG 
results suggest that approach affect is associated with more left frontal than right 
frontal neuronal activity, whereas withdrawal affect, conversely, is associated with 
more right frontal than left frontal activity (Davidson, 1995). Importantly, frontal 
inter-hemispheric activity associated with the two types of affect, is conceptualised in 
relative terms. The model does not predict, for instance, that approach emotion is 
associated with left frontal activation exclusively, or that left frontal region is the 
principal brain region involved in the generation and maintenance of approach-related 
emotion. 
The EEG studies above did not employ source-localisation procedures. Furthermore, 
unlike ERPs, EEG does not contain information about specific waveform deflections, 
whose anatomical origins are sometimes known (Le. ERP waveform components). 
Hence, EEG studies could only provide very coarse approximations of the anatomical 
coordinates of the recorded neuronal activity, recorded from the scalp. However, 
further neuropsychological evidence and especially neuroimaging studies have 
provided more precise indications on the anatomy of the observed EEG asymmetries. 
Data from patients with damage of the dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC) showed that 
individuals with left PFC damage were more likely to subsequently develop 
depression, compared to individuals with damage to the right dlPFC (Morris et al., 
1996). 
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There were also neuroimaging studies which revealed patterns of dIPFC activation 
consistent with the predictions of the model by Davidson and colleagues. For instance, 
an fMRI study by Sutton et al. (1997) found asymmetric PFC activation in response to 
affectively-laden pictures, in the direction predicted by the model. Another 
neuroimaging study which pooled data from several types of anxiety disorders (Rauch 
et aI., 1997) also revealed asymmetric, right-lateralised, dIPFC activity associated with 
anxiety (phobia). However, many neuroimaging studies failed to discover asymmetric 
PFC activation associated with emotional states that can be qualified as approach or 
withdrawal-related. A meta-analysis of neuroimaging data from a large number of 
studies, performed in relation to inter-hemispheric frontal asymmetries in emotion 
(Lawrence & Murphy et aI., 2001) found only limited support for Davidson and co-
workers' model: positive, but not negative, emotional states were associated with 
asymmetric frontal activity in this meta-analysis. Furthermore, a neuroimaging study 
of threat -of-shock anxiety (the procedure we used in Studies 4 and 5) found lateralised 
activity in one PFC region, but in the opposite direction to the one predicted by 
Davidson and co-workers (Chua et aI., 1999). Chua et aI. found left-lateralised, and 
not right-lateralised PFC activation predicted by the model, though it has to be noted 
that the PFC region from this study is not part of the dIPFC. In a review of the 
neuroimaging literature of emotion, Davidson and Irwin (1999) provided a 
methodological reason for the failure of neuroimaging studies to discover dIPFC 
asymmetries. The authors argued that direct statistical comparisons between 
hemispheres are needed and few if any studies have performed them. Furthermore, it 
Was also proposed that reliable asymmetries can be present even in the absence of the 
main effect in a particular brain region (in this case, dIPFC). Consequently, statistical 
tests of Emotion by Hemisphere, or Emotion by Brain Region by Hemisphere need to 
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be run even in the absence of the main effect of Emotion. The latter is very rarely 
done. Furthermore, Davidson and Irwin argued that neuroimaging studies that fulfil 
these requirements (e.g. Sutton et aI., 1997) do fmd dlPFC asymmetry associated with 
approach vs. withdrawal emotion. 
Gray (2001) employed 2-back verbal and spatial WM tasks, observed to reliably 
activate the PFC (as mentioned earlier, Gray's tasks served as a basis for our 3-back 
WM tasks). The investigator induced positive and negative mood by means offilm 
clips and found that spatial WM was more disrupted by positive mood than by 
negative mood, whereas verbal WM performance was more disrupted by negative 
mood than by positive mood. Gray explained the results in terms of the dlPFC 
asymmetry model by Davidson and colleagues, taken in conjunction with the evidence 
of asymmetric activation of the PFC in WM tasks. Evidence of some PFC 
asymmetries associated with verbal vs. spatial WM processing indeed exists, as 
discussed in Chapter 1. However, reliable lateralisation has only been found in areas 
situated outside dlPFC (e.g. Broca's area, BA 44, in verbal WM, Cabeza & Nyberg, 
2000; Smith et aI., 1998). Furthermore, as it will be shown below, imaging studies 
employing n-back tasks tend to fmd bilateral activation in verbal and spatial versions 
of the task (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; Smith & Jonides, 1999). 
The present study applies fMRI to investigate dlPFC activation in the verbal and 
spatial3-back tasks from Studies 4,5 and 6. The study uses the region of interest 
(ROI) methodology, i.e. it limits the scope of the investigation to one ROI, the dlPFC 
(BA 9 and 46), bilaterally. More specifically, the aim of the current study is to 
determine whether the 3-back verbal and spatial WM tasks used in our studies activate 
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dlPFC asymmetrically, i.e. more left than right dlPFC activation in the verbal 3-back 
task and/or more right than left activation in the spatial 3-back task. The clarification 
of this issue will provide some factual ground for determining whether asymmetric 
dlPFC activation can explain the differential effect of threat-of-shock anxiety (fear) on 
verbal vs. spatial3-back tasks. 
N-back tasks in other neuroimaging studies 
Early neuroimaging studies that employed n-back verbal and spatial tasks (Awh et aI., 
1996) reported left-Iateralised activity in the PFC in response to a 2-back letter task (in 
Broca's area, BA 44, as well as the premotor and suplimentary motor areas, BA 6, see 
Fig. 1, Chapter 1), but the comparison with an equivalent (i.e. 2-back spatial task) was 
not made in the same subjects. Instead, the conclusions about lateralisation in verbal 
and spatial WM were based on comparisons of item-recognition tasks (e.g. Smith et 
aI., 1996). In order to address this limitatio~ two subsequent neuroimaging (tMRI) 
studies directly compared verbal and spatial n-back tasks. D'Esposito et aI. (1998) used 
2-back verbal and spatial tasks, very similar to the ones employed by Awh et al. 
(1996). The regions where activation was found were almost the same as in Awh et aI. 
(1996), but no reliable laterality was found either in the verbal, or i9. the spatial task. 
. . 
Similarly, other neuroimaging studies using verbal or spatial n-back tasks separately 
and employing either PET or tMRI as imaging technologies, also did not fmd reliable 
lateralisation in verbal and spatial n-back tasks (e.g. Nystrom et aI., 2000, see Cabeza 
& Nyberg, 2000, for a review). Moreover, some studies even found lateralisation in 
the opposite direction from the one initially found by Smith and colleagues (Cohen et 
aI., 1997). This led Smith and Jonides to conclude in a recent review that n-back tasks 
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do not show reliable asymmetry, presumably because they involve extensive 
manipulation of information, in addition to storage (Smith & Jonides, 1999). . 
However, although D'Esposito et ai. (1998) performed direct statistical comparisons 
between the tasks, by means of subtraction (see Chapter 1), homologous regions in the 
two hemispheres were not compared directly. A recent study by Nystrom et at. (2000) 
addressed this issue, by administering n-back verbal and spatial tasks to the same 
group of participants and directly testing for the main effect as well as the interactions 
involving the hemisphere factor. The study failed to revealleft-more-than-right 
activation in any PFC region (including dlPFC) associated with the verbal n-back task 
or right-more-than-Ieft PFC activation in response to the spatial n-back task. However, 
the study has been justifiably criticised (Goldman-Rakic, 2000) for failing to match 
the n-back tasks on difficulty (the verbal task was considerably easier, as indicated by 
significant verbal vs. spatial WM accuracy differences, Nystrom et aI., 2000). 
Furthermore, the argument first raised by Davidson and Irwin (1999) in relation to 
neuroimaging studies of emotion, is applicable to Nystrom et aI.'s (2000) study, as 
well as to other neuroirnaging studies of WM: these studies only tested laterality in the 
regions that showed the main effect ofWM tasks, and not in other regions as well. 
In the present study I chose to directly compare 3-back verbal and spatial WM tasks, 
which were matched for difficulty. Furthermore, the study proposes to test for effects 
or interactions involving the hemisphere factor in the a-priori selected ROI (dlPFC), 
irrespective of the main effect of task. 
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Methodological considerations 
General jMRI methodology 
fMRI exposes the brain to a high-strength variable magnetic field and records the 
electromagnetic response of hydrogen ions to the field variations (Ogawa et aI., 1992). 
The response of hydrogen ions is dependent on their concentration. Therefore, 
different types of tissue will respond differently structural MRI (anatomical images, 
insensitive to neural activity) is sensitive to such differences. Furthermore, differential 
responses would be expected from the same type of tissue, depending on its 
oxygenation level. Hence, the signal to which functional MRI (fMRI) is sensitive is 
referred to as Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent (BOLD) signal (Ogawa et al., 
1992, 1998). In other words, ftv1RI reveals the parts of the brain where metabolism is 
more intense by detecting BOLD changes, because it is well-established that metabolic 
changes are directly related to the level of oxygen in blood. The further assumption 
that fMRI also makes is that neurons that are more engaged in a particular 
psychological process are also more metabolically active. There seems to be a relative 
consensus with regard to the latter assumption. 
The combination offield strength of the magnets used in scanners and the sensitivity 
of the employed detectors result in the formidable spatial resolution offtv1RI, with 
some of the recent studies claiming to have imaged ocular dominance columns in the 
visual cortex (Duong et al., 2001). However, the temporal resolution of the technique 
is rather coarse (of the order of seconds at best) and seems to be mainly constrained by 
the nature of the recorded process: changes in the BOLD signal follow electrochemical 
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activity in neurons, but they are very slow compared to the latter (electrical responses 
can last milliseconds, while the BOLD response starts with a delay of several seconds 
and lasts approximately 16 seconds). Although progress in both understanding the 
BOLD signal and analytical techniques substantially improved the temporal resolution 
of fMR!, it is still not better than a second (for a comparison, the resolution of 
electrophysiological techniques, such as EEG, is thousands of times higher). However, 
as already mentioned, the spatial resolution offMRI is superior to that of any other 
brain-mapping technology. Therefore, in the present study it was decided to employ 
fMRI in order to probe an anatomical hypothesis: the asymmetry of dlPFC activation 
in verbal and spatial WM tasks. The current study utilised well-understood and 
frequently used methods, such as the Echo-Planar Imaging (EPI), the block-design and 
the method of cognitive subtraction. 
Block-designs and event-related designs injMRJ 
There are two main types of paradigms employed in cognitive fMR!. Block-designs 
denote paradigms in which the events (stimuli) are blocked by condition. In contrast, 
in event-related designs events (stimuli) from different conditions can be intermixed, 
because the change in the BOLD signal associated with each event is recorded. For 
example, in an experiment that records the brain activity associated with nouns vs. 
verbs, the block design would present all the nouns followed by all the verbs (or vice-
versa). The same experiment could present the items in a random order, if it chose to 
employ an event-related design. The latter seems to be more advantageous than the 
block-design. Blocking of items can lead to strong priming effects (see the well-
known example of English past-tense, Seidenberg & Hoeffuer, 1998) and habituation. 
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It would also limit the analysis to only comparisons between the existing groups of 
items. Event-related designs naturally avoid all these problems items can be 
intermixed, randomised; items can also be grouped in different ways after the 
recording is made (since the response to individual items is preserved). However, 
because of the slowness of the BOLD response, block designs are considerably more 
reliable in detecting BOLD signal changes and, hence, have considerably more 
statistical power. Therefore, not surprisingly, whenever priming and habituation are 
not a concern, the block design is preferred for its simplicity and power. It is still the 
most widely-used fMRI design. The nature ofn-back tasks does not demand event-
related designs. Since these tasks require participants to make comparisons across 
trials, the sequence of trials cannot be interrupted frequently. Hence, there is no need 
to scan each n-back trial separately. Evidently, it would be interesting to be able to 
have several scans during the same WM trial (start, middle, end) in order to 
distinguish between different processes. However, with the current level offMRI 
technology a 3-sec trial would be difficult to scan in this way. Moreover, this goes 
beyond the theoretical question asked in the current study. Consequently, the present 
study employed a block-design with separate blocks for the verbal and the spatial WM 
conditions. 
N-back baseline 
An important issue in neuroimaging paradigms is the isolation ofthe process of 
interest. Using the earlier example of the study comparing nouns and verbs, one would 
not need additional conditions to reveal the difference between nouns and verbs: brain 
scans associated with nouns would be directly compared to those associated with 
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verbs. However, that would only permit conclusions with regard to the difference in 
brain activation, it will reveal little about brain activity in response to the processing of 
nouns or verbs separately. The individual scans in response to nouns and verbs would 
contain activity attributable to perception and covert/overt motor responses, and it 
would be very difficult to isolate the activity associated with the process of interest 
(e.g. semantic processing). 
There are two methods used in neuroimaging to circumvent this problem. The simplest 
method is the cognitive subtraction method (Posner et aI., 1988) based on the concept 
of pure insertion (Sternberg, 1969, see Chapter 1 for a discussion). Cognitive 
subtraction paradigms have one or more baseline tasks (conditions), supposed to be 
similar to the main task (condition) in all respects but one: the process of interest. 
Therefore, the subtraction of baseline tasks from the main task should remove all 
activity but the one associated with the process of interest. However, as discussed 
earlier, the pure insertion assumption has been justifiably criticised and neuroimaging 
data were provided that questioned cognitive subtraction. The alternative to cognitive 
subtraction is parametric variation: varying the parameter of interest in a task at 
several levels, with no distinction between task and baseline. There have been 
parametric fMRI designs of the n-back task, which used I-,back, 2-~~ck and 3-back 
, . 
tasks (Cohen et aI., 1997). Though methodologically sound~ such designs can also be 
associated with problems. For example, in parametric n-back studies a potential 
problem is the switching between multiple conditions (I-back verbal, I-back spatial, 
2-back verbal, 2-back spatial, etc). Furthermore, the results from parametric and 
cognitive subtraction paradigms ofn-back tasks were very similar. Therefore, it was 
decided to employ a cognitive subtraction paradigm in the present study. 
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A further issue is the choice of the n-back baseline. Many neuroimaging studies ofn-
back tasks employed the O-back baseline (comparing the item on each trial to a single 
item presented before the run). While the use of such baseline significantly increases 
the chance of finding difference in activation, it is conceivable that the item presented 
before the run is stored in long-term memory. Consequently, the difference between a 
O-back and a 3-back may be a qualitative, rather than a quantitative one. Hence, the 
current study employed I-back verbal and spatial tasks as baseline tasks for the 3-back 
tasks. In the I-back task the item on each trial is compared to the item on the previous 
trial. The I-back is closer in its processing demands to the 3-back than the O-back is. 
However, the 3-back requires keeping track of more trials at any particular time (at 
least 3 trials), as compared to the I-back (at least 1 trial), which can be seen as a 
difference in the WM load. 
14.2. Method 
Participants 
Ten right-handed (Chapman & Chapman, 1987) individuals (5 females, 5 males, mean 
age 23.3, sd 1.67, range 22-28), free from psychological or neurological histories, 
were recruited, in accord with guidelines established by the Institutional Review Board 
at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Medical School (Madison, USA), and paid 
$70 for their participation. 
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Apparatus 
A Pentium 100 MHz PC was used for task presentation and collection of behavioural 
data (accuracy and RT). Stimuli were presented through fiber optic goggles (Avotec, 
Jensen Beach, FL) suspended from the head-coil. MRI data were acquired on a 
General Electric (Waukesha, WI) EchoSpeed 1.5 Tesla scanner equipped with high-
speed, whole-body gradients and a standard clinical whole-head transmit-receive 
quadrature birdcage headcoil. 
WMtasks 
The 3-back tasks developed in Study 3 and employed in Studies 4,5 and 6 (see Fig. 8, 
Chapter 10), were also used in the present study. The task was performed in blocks of 
34 trials. As in the previous studies, responses were made with the dominant hand. 
The only difference, compared to the previous studies was the use of control n-back 
(I-back) tasks, verbal and spatial. 
Design 
The study involved two sessions. During the first session, participants underwent a 
simulated experiment using a mock MRI scanner in order to adapt to the MR 
environment and practice the tasks. Additionally, a dental impression was acquired for 
the motion-attenuating bite-bar used in the second session. During the second session, 
participants performed the same tasks in the actual MRI scanner whilst fMRI data 
were acquired. Data were acquired in two scans, corresponding to the two WM tasks. 
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Order of presentation was counterbalanced across participants. Both scans were 
preceded by 4-minute practice blocks during which no functional data were acquired. 
The functional scans consisted of seven blocks: four I-back blocks, which served as 
the control task, interleaved with three 3-back blocks. The beginning of blocks was 
signaled by a brief cue (4.5 s). Each functional scan was 843 s in duration. 
Imaging Parameters 
A T2* weighted gradient-echo echo-planar (EPI) pulse sequence (TEffR = 50/3000 
ms, FOV = 24 x 24 cm, a = 90°, matrix = 64 x 64,23 slices, slice thickness = 7 mm, 
inters lice gap = 1 mm, 276 images per slice, scan time = 14 min 03 sec), customized to 
employ a Shinnar-LeRoux slice-selective pulse to yield sharper slice-select 
boundaries, minimizing slice cross-talk, was used to acquire functional data. 
Data Processing 
Functional image data were reconstructed off-line. Except where otherwise noted, all 
subsequent processing was performed using the MCW AFNI software suite (Cox, 
1996). To minimize the effects of motion, time-series data were realigned to the flrst 
image of each scan using an iterative weighted least squares algorithm (Cox & 
Jesmanowicz, 1999). The resulting volume-registered time series were visually 
inspected in cine loops for signs of gross head movement using STIMULATE (Cox & 
Jesmanowicz, 1999). Analyzed functional image data were also examined for signs of 
the so-called ''rim'' artifact (Strupp, 1996). A three-parameter (mean, line~ trend, and 
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amplitude; 273 degrees of freedom) linear least-squares fit between the MR signal 
time-series and a hemodynamically-delayed box-car reference function was then 
computed for each voxel to identify paradigm-correlated MR signal changes 
(Bandettini et al., 1993), yielding two statistical parametric maps (SPMs), 
corresponding to the Verbal and Spatial WM tasks, per participant. An isotropic 
spatial Gaussian filter of7-mm FWHM (- 2x the in-plane resolution) was applied 
prior to statistical analyses (Friston et aI., 1997). 
Based upon Monte Carlo simulations performed in the same laboratory on ''null'' 
datasets (i.e., data with no structured signal changes and noise characteristics similar 
to those observed in "real" scans), acquired using the same scanner and identical 
acquisition parameters, a conservative nominal a threshold of p ::;; 10-6 (t (266) ~ 3.95) 
was adopted for thresholding single-participant SPMs. SPMs were placed into 
normalized stereotactic space (Cox & Hyde, 1997) through a combination of manual 
land-marking and piecewise linear transformation. Prior to normalization, SPMs were 
nearest-neighbor interpolated to I-mm isotropic voxels. Groupwise SPMs were 
created by squaring and summing the SPMs across participants to create Verbal and 
SpatiaL WM X2 SPMs (Hotteling, 1931). The X2 maps were thresholded by requiring 
individual voxels to exceed X2 = 35.5, p = .0001, and show significant activation (t ~ 
3.95) at the single-participant level in five or more participants. This is an inferentially 
transparent and efficient means of reducing unreliable noise sources without 
specifying a cluster threshold or setting the a threshold to some very high level, two 
alternative methods that inflate the likelihood of Type II errors. The voxel-wise 
threshold was thus formally set atp::;; 1 x 10-15 (X2 (10) ~ 93.6). 
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Figure 21. The segmented Regions of Interest (ROIs), circumscribed to two areas of dIPFC: BA 46 and 
BA 9. Free-hand drawn ROIs are shown here superimposed on coronal (right on the left) slices of a 
structural MRI scan. 
Figure 22. The segmented BA 46 (green) and BA 9 (red) ROls in 3-dimensional 
reconstruction. 
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ROI Analyses 
Separate ROIs were constructed for two cytoarchitectonic areas in the dorsal PFC, 
Brodmann's areas (BAs) 46 and 9, using the probabilistic map ofRajkowska & 
Goldman-Rakic (1995) digitized to the nearest 1 mm (see Fig. 21). In order to avoid 
including neighboring regions, we excluded the region 15 mm to either side of the 
midline for BA 46 and 10 mm to either side of the midline in the posterior (Y axis ~ 
38) portion ofBA 9. ROIs were always drawn displayed on the right side of the 
monitor. Once drawn freehand, the ROIs were segmented using SP AM 
(http://psyphz.psych.wisc.edul-oakes/spam/spam_frames.htm) and a T2* histogram-
based approach that excluded non-gray matter tissue (see Fig. 22). Data were extracted 
separately from the single-participant Verbal and Spatial WM SPMs for each ROI in 
each hemisphere from thresholded (I ~ 3.95) and unthresholded (I> 0) activation 
SPMs to permit independent inferences to be drawn about inter-hemispheric 
asymmetries, if any, characterizing voxels reliably associated with WM performance 
and voxels that do nol exhibit a reliable main effect of the WM versus control contrast 
but do exhibit a reliable Task X Hemisphere effect in association with task 
performance. That is, some voxels may show a significant effect of Hemisphere or 
Hemisphere X Task in the absence of a reliable main effect (~avids~n & Irwin, 1999). 
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Figure 23. Coronal slices (front to back starting on the top left slice, right 
displayed on the left) showing the difference between the 3-back and I-back tasks. 
Only voxels that showed differences in five or more subjects were included. 
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14.3. Results 
Behavioural data 
Regular electronic equipment (e.g. computers) cannot function in the scanner 
environment, because of the very high magnetic field. Therefore, in order to collect 
response data (e.g. buttonpresses) in the scanner, specialised equipment is needed. In 
the present study a new fibre-optic device was used to collect responses. Due to 
improper prior testing, the device did not have sufficient protection from the scanner 
field and the behavioural data were corrupted 
Groupwise SPMs 
The activation associated with the Verbal and Spatial WM tasks is typical of this sort 
of experiment (see Fig. 23). Moreover, the pattern of activation is roughly similar 
. across tasks: the superior and middle frontal gyr~ intraparietal sulcus, and the 
cerebellum. Generally, the Verbal WM homologues of Spatial WM-related clusters of 
activation are more extensive and higher in magnitude. 
ROJ Analyses 
Analyses were conducted as Hemisphere (Left, Right) X Region (BA 46, BA 9) x 2 
(Verbal WM, Spatial WM) ANOV As for repeated measures using the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction for violation of sphericity when necessary. Hence, all tests were 
conducted on 1 and 9 degrees of freedom. 
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Figure 24. The main effects in the unthresholded (top) and thresholded (bottom) analyses of 
fMRI data. No interactions approached significance. 
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Thresholded SPMs 
As displayed in Figure 24, significant effects of Region (F = 20.6, p =.001) and Task 
(F = 5.9, p = .038) were found. No other main effects or interactions were revealed. 
Unthresholded SP Ms 
In addition to the effects of Region (F = 57.5, p < .001) and Task (F = 6.713, p = .029), 
a reliable effect of Hemisphere (F = 5.6, p = .043) was found (see Fig. 24). No other 
main effects or interactions were revealed. 
14.4. Discussion 
The present study aimed to test the hypothesis (Gray, 2001) that asymmetric inter-
hemispheric activation of dorso-Iateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) in 3-back verbal and 
spatial WM tasks, in conjunction with prefrontal asymmetries in emotion, can account 
for the differential effect of threat-anxiety (fear), observed in Studies 4 and 5. More 
precisely, if it is true that: 
A) spatial 3-back performance relies predominantly on right dlPFC activation, while 
verbal n-back performance relies primarily on left dlPFC activation 
and that 
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(B) threat-anxiety activates the right dlPFC more than the left dlPFC, 
one could predict a selective spatial n-back by threat-anxiety interaction (as observed 
behaviourally in Studies 4 and 5). The objective of the present study was to test one of 
the two constituents of this hypothesis (i.e. A). For A to be true, a significant Task 
(spatial vs verbal) X Hemisphere, or Task X Hemisphere X Region needs to be 
revealed. No such effects were observed. Although the present outcomes do not rule 
out potential WM asymmetries in PFC areas outside the dorso-Iateral region (e.g. 
Broca's area), the model of prefrontal inter-hemispheric asymmetry in approach vs. 
withdrawal emotions was specifically formulated with regard to the dlPFC (Davidson, 
1998). Therefore, the results do not corroborate the neuroanatomical explanation of 
selective disruptive effects of threat-anxiety on spatial3-back performance in terms of 
prefrontal asymmetry in emotion (Davidson, 1992, 1995, 1998). Importantly, the study 
performed statistical tests of interhemispheric differences irrespectively of the 
presence of main effects, as required by Davidson and Irwin (1999). 
One limitation of the present study is inherent to fMRI technology. The activation data 
from verbal and spatial WM tasks represents an average of the neural events during 
WM trials. It is conceivable that neural events of short duration (e.g. 10-50 ms) can be 
asymmetric, but that such asymmetries would remain undetected due to low temporal 
resolution offMRI. To address this concern, modem multichannel,EEG or MEG 
recordings combined with source-localisation algorithms, are needed. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Summary of individual studies 
The general theme of the investigations presented here is the influence of emotion on 
Working Memory. The effects of positive mood on the Central executive component 
of WM served as context for the studies reported in Part II. The impact of negative 
affect (anxiety/fear) on the verbal and spatial WM mechanisms were investigated in 
Parts III and IV. Affect was directly· manipulated in Part III via affect evocation 
procedures and indirectly manipulated in Part IV through pre-selection of participants 
with specific emotional profiles. The seven studies described in the thesis employed 
three types of cognitive tasks, thought to have differential WM demands, namely 
analytical (reasoning) tasks (Studies 1 and 2), creative (insight) problems (Studies 1 
and 2) and continuous performance (n-back) WM tasks (Studies 3-7). All three types 
of tasks were piloted (in Studies 1 and 3) in order to ensure adequate levels of 
performance prior to testing experimental hypotheses. A number of experimental 
paradigms were utilised, most notably concurrent task methodology (Study 2) and 
experimental affect evocation (Studies 4 and 5). Several types of data were collected: 
behavioural (Studies 1-6), physiological (ERPs- Study 2, EMG- Study 4, heart-rate-
Study 5), clinical (anxiety questionnaires, Study 6) and neuroimaging (fMRI, Study 7). 
Part II (Studies 1 and 2) directly tested one of the key assumptions in the explanation 
of differential effects of positive mood on analytical (reasoning) vs. creative (insight) 
performance (lsen et aI., 1987, Oaksford et aI., 1996), namely that the two types of 
tasks make differential demands on the Central Executive component of WM 
222 
Part IV. Threat and spatial WM: the generality of the effect 
and its neuroanatomical correlates 
(Oaksford et al., 1996). Study 2 employed a concurrent task paradigm, previously used 
with reasoning tasks (Gilhooly et al., 1993; Oaksford et al., 1996). The concurrent 
WM task was temporally superimposed not only upon reasoning, but also upon insight 
processing, and the degree of interference with the two types of tasks compared. The 
presence of the concurrent WM task had a significant negative impact on reasoning 
performance, consistent with previous research (Oaksford et al., 1996), but did not 
seem to affect insight performance. Electrophysiological (ERP) recordings, taken in 
response to the concurrent task, showed an increase in the amplitude ofan ERP 
waveform component closely associated with WM processing, P300. The increase was 
only observed when the concurrent task was temporally superimposed upon reasoning. 
The superimposition of the concurrent task upon an insight problem resulted in the 
same P300 amplitude as in response to the concurrent task administered alone. 
Furthermore, the ERP results do not rely solely on the ERP waveform analysis. A 
more objective and sensitive analytical too~ Principal Component Analysis, confirmed 
and further extended the conclusions regarding P300. 
To conclude, there is good agreement between behavioural and ERP data, both 
suggesting differential Central Executive/WM involvement in reasoning and insight 
processes. This finding strengthens the interpretation of prelliously observed 
" .. 
differential effects of positive mood on creative and analytical performance in terms of 
WM processing. Biologically plausible computational models ofWM (O'Reilly et al., 
1999) suggest that updating is critical for normal WM functioning. Such updating is 
thOUght to be controlled via dopamine projections from the basal ganglia into the 
prefrontal cortex. The same projections were propos~d to mediate the beneficial effect 
of positive mood on tasks requiring creativity and flexibility (Ashby et al., 1999). It 
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seems likely that the rapid and relatively unselective updating induced in conditions of 
positive mood can indeed be facilitatory for creative tasks. However, such updating 
may be detrimental for tasks requiring careful analysis and maintenance of 
intermediary information (e.g. reasoning tasks). It also appears likely that the larger 
amplitude of the P300 ERP waveform component in the analytical condition reflects 
the trade-off between re-organisation ofWM in response to the concurrent task and the 
need to maintain detailed intermediary representations in the reasoning task. Since 
such a trade-off would be less costly in the insight task, the P300 amplitude in 
response to the concurrent task during insight problem-solving was the same as during 
the concurrent task performed alone. 
In Part II it was difficult to control for the possible confound of differential 
involvement ofWM slave-systems (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974), i.e. the phonological 
loop and the phonological sketchpad, in the reasoning and the insight tasks. Part III 
(Studies 3, 4 and 5) was specifically dedicated to testing potential differences between 
. these two WM components in their sensitivity to affect. Verbal and spatial n-back 
tasks were developed and rigorously piloted in order to obtain tasks that would only 
differ in the type of information to be held in WM. Furthermore, unlike Part II which 
only provided indirect evidence with regard to the effects of mood on WM, Part III 
employed experimental mood induction. Based on the well-documented phenomenon 
of attention to threat in anxiety (Mathews et al., 1997), as well as the role of vi suo-
spatial attention in spatial WM, it was hypothesised that spatial WM would be 
selectively disrupted by anxiety (fear) induced by threat-of shock, whereas verbal WM 
would be less affected in conditions of threat-evoked anxiety. Two experiments 
conf1llIled this prediction, both with and without delivery of electric shocks. Three 
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physiological techniques (startle eye-blink, corrugator and heart-rate recordings), 
validated the presence of self-reported anxiety (fear) under conditions of threat-of-
shock. The analyses also showed a direct relationship between the physiological and 
self-report measures of anxiety (fear) and the decrement in spatial, not verba~ WM 
performance. These data provide support for the proposal that threat-induced anxiety 
and spatial WM, when concomitant, compete for visual attention resources. Though 
indirectly, it also corroborates the view that spatial WM, more precisely its rehearsal 
mechanism is based on attention and that verbal and spatial storage components of 
WM do not use identical pools of attentional resources. 
In Part IV (Studies 6 and 7) it was attempted to clarify two important issues regarding 
the effect observed in Part II. 
Firstly, it was interesting to see if the effect of anxiety elicited by threat-of-shock 
would generalize to forms of anxiety that are less stimulus (or event) bound, e.g. trait 
and test anxiety. Verbal and spatial n-back performance was compared across two 
groups of participants, selected on the basis of high vs. low trait anxiety scores in 
questionnaires. Participants were grouped (selected) twice, according to scores on two 
of the most well-known measures of trait-anxiety (the Behavioral Inhibition and 
Behavioral Activation Scales, Carver and White, 1994 and the Spielberger State-Trait-
Anxiety-Inventory, Spielberger, 1983). In both selections trait anxiety successfully 
predicted state-anxiety differences between groups measured before and after the 
experimental session. Furthermore, trait anxiety was associated with impairments in 
both verbal and spatial WM performance. Therefore, trait/test anxiety does not mirror 
in its effects on WM the selectivity of threat-of-shock anxiety (fear). These results 
contradict some suggestions in the literature that verbal WM performance may be 
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more impaired than spatial WM performance by trait and test anxiety. They also 
support one of the central claims ofEysenck and Calvo's (1992) processing efficiency 
theory, namely that trait and test anxiety affect the Central Executive component of 
WM more than the verbal and spatial storage components. 
The second question asked in Part IV, refers to the neuroanatomical correlates ofthe 
effect observed in Part II, selective spatial WM deficits in conditions of threat. One of 
the most influential models of functional neuroanatomy of emotion is the model of 
prefrontal asymmetry (Davidson, 1992, 1995, 1998). The model proposes that the 
dorso-Iateral division of the prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) shows left vs. right activation 
asymmetry corresponding to approach vs. withdrawal affective states, respectively. In 
conjunction with putative dlPFC asymmetries in WM tasks, Davidson's model was 
used to explain differential effects of positive and negative mood on verbal and spatial 
2-back WM tasks (Gray, 2001). However, although WM tasks indeed show 
asymmetric PFC activation, this has only been documented for PFC areas outside its 
dorso-Iateral (dlPFC) division, e.g. Broca's area, premotor and suplimentary motor 
areas. Therefore, Study 7 employed neuroimaging (fMRJ) in order to detennine 
whether the 3-back WM tasks used in Studies 3-6 are associated with asymmetric 
dlPFC activation. No evidence of reliable asymmetry in dlPFC activation in verbal and 
spatial3-back tasks was found. This result casts doubt on the potential interpretation 
of the anatomical correlates of the effect observed in Part II in terms of Davidson's 
prefrontal asymmetry model (e.g. Gray, 2001). It is concluded that alternative 
neuroanatomical models have to be developed in order to account for the observed 
behavioural effect. 
226 
Part IV. Threat and spatial WM: the generality of the effect 
and its neuroanatomical correlates 
General conclusions 
In addition to the interpretation of individual studies, the present investigations 
resulted in two conclusions of a more general nature. 
Firstly, an examination of the effects of positive affect on insight and reasoning tasks 
in conjunction with the effects of negative affect (fear and anxiety) on verbal and 
spatial Working Memory suggests that various forms of emotion influence cognitive 
processing at a motivational level. Emotion seems to prioritise among cognitive 
mechanisms and such priorities are most likely evolutionarily-driven. For example, 
positive mood of the sort elicited by several groups of researchers (Estrada et al., 
1997; Isen et al., 1987; Oaksford et aI., 1996) appears to both facilitate exploratory 
behaviour and relax attentional constraints, thus contributing to rapid and relatively 
unselective updating of WM contents. Therefore, the tasks that fit this strategic pattern 
(e.g. insight tasks) are facilitated and, conversely, tasks whose requirements conflict 
with this pattern (reasoning) are disrupted. Similarly, emotions elicited by the presence 
of an explicit threat, i.e. anxiety and fear, are likely to automatically trigger visuo-
spatial attentional mechanisms, in order to localise the threatening stimuli. It does not 
appear that all forms of anxiety lead to this activation of visual attention. For example, 
test anxiety did not seem to selectively interact with spatial WM. This suggests that 
the cognitive correlates of emotions broadly falling within the same category, e.g. fear 
and test-anxiety, may be rather different and that particular emotions may serve rather 
specific functions in the environment. These functions may determine the cognitive 
mechanisms with which individual emotions are associated, e.g. fear and visual 
attention. 
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The second conclusion is that the distinction between slave- or storage-systems and 
executive/attentional systems may not hold very well. In the classical multi-
component model ofWM (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), there is a clear distinction 
between the attentional component, the Central Executive, not "equipped" with 
storage capacity, and the "slave" systems that perform storage of verbal and visuo-
spatial information but have no role to play in selecting or prioritizing information (i.e. 
attentional capacity). If, as it appears, spatial WM (the visuo-spatial sketchpad) is 
intrinsically associated with shifts of attention, the above distinction seems to lose 
substance, because a fundamental process in one of the storage WM components, i.e. 
rehearsal in spatial WM, is based on a process that is intrinsically associated with the 
selection/prioritization of visual input: visual attention. Furthermore, there could be 
other implications of this. 
One possibility is that attentional resources are centralised, but that there is some 
asymmetry in the relation between the Central Executive and the "slave" systems. In 
other words, visual attention could be part of the Central Executive and verbal and 
spatial WM could have differential links to the Central Executive, with spatial WM 
being more closely associated with Central Executive processes. A more radical 
possibility proposed by some theorists (Shah & Miyake, 1996) is that in contrast to 
" .' 
classical theories of centralised attentionallexecutive functio,n (Central Executive, 
Baddeley, 1986, Supervisory Attentional System, Norman & ShalIice, 1986), the 
systems which perform the prioritisation of behaviours, appear to be fractionated. We 
favour a middle-perspective based on comparisons of the effects of different kinds of 
anxiety, i.e. fear vs. trait/test anxiety, on WM sub-systems. For instance, the similar 
effects of trait-anxiety on verbal and spatial WM support the presence ofa centralised 
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attentionaVexecutive mechanism. On the other hand, the selective effects of threat-
anxiety suggest the de-centralised character of some attentional systems. Visual 
attention seems to have critical importance for some WM components, but not for 
others. This idea has recently been proposed in the cognitive behavioural (Smyth, 
1996) and cognitive neuroimaging (Awh et aI., 1999) literatures and our results 
support it. 
The general conclusions are still somewhat speculative and more evidence is needed 
for choosing the viable accounts. It seems that experimentation involving 
manipulations of affect can be rather fruitful, due to the specificity of some of the 
emotion-cognition interactions. In contrast to traditional views on the effects of 
emotion on cognitive processing, e.g. the resource allocation mode~ it is increasingly 
clear that the modulation of cognitive processing by emotion can be selective. It is 
hoped that the present studies can serve as an indication of this. 
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